Operation Desert Storm
Scud Hunting on the
Ground
Directed onto targets by U.S.
and British special forces, the Maverick-equipped
A-10 Thunderbolt II made short work of suspected
Iraqi Scud mobile launchers.
Hot Link
Counterforce:
Scud Hunting
Excellent report from CDISS, the Centre
for Defence and International Security Studies based
in the Department of Politics and International Relations
at Lancaster University in the UK.
The Gulf War
To view a CNN video of Iraqi Scuds
(including mobile launchers), click here.
TARPS - Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance
Pod System - IMINT
photos of Scuds taken during the war.
For a great look at Iraq's ballistic
missiles check here.
Here's a good picture
of an Iraqi Scud brought back from the Gulf War.
April 1992: UNSCOM inspectors surveying
the remains
of ballistic missiles destroyed by Iraq.
Special
Forces Operations in Desert Storm
- Detail on the Delta / SAS Scud hunt
Case
Narrative - Al Jubayl,
Saudi Arabia
The 1998 threat
Israel
sets up Patriot missiles amid Iraq tensions
- February 2, 1998
Biological
and Chemical Weapons: What
they are and what they can do
How has Iraq gone about obtaining
a ballistic missile capability? Check here.
Here is a good overview of how
ballistic missiles are classified, along with
some info on missile ranges.
Scud Hunting with
Delta Force and the Special Air Service (SAS)
By Thomas B. Hunter
During
the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Saddam Hussein launched
approximately 350 ballistic missiles against Iran.
These attacks included a large number of R-17 single-stage
missiles from a stockpile of 650 purchased from
the Soviet Union. The R-17, as originally designed,
had a maximum range of 300 km and was capable of
carrying either a 2,000 lb. conventional or 100
kiloton nuclear warhead. In time, however, Iraqi
engineers were ordered to develop a weapon capable
of striking deeper into Iranian territory. To this
end, designers made use of cannibalized parts from
other R-17s to create three longer range hybrids
unique to the Iraqi military: a long-range Scud
(unnamed), the al-Hussein (600-650 km) and the al-Abbas
(750-900 km). Most alterations were made via a reduction
in warhead weight and a corresponding increase in
fuel load. Saddam also managed to acquire 36 mobile
launch vehicles based on the MAZ543 (8x8) wheeled
chassis, originally developed in 1965 for the Soviet
Army. The TELs as designed had a road range of 550
km, a top road speed of 70 km/hr, and vehicle cab
air filtration for use in an NBC environment. Of
these, only the Al-Abbas could not be fired from
a mobile launcher. However, these successive Iraqi
modifications, while providing greater range, dramatically
reduced both the structural integrity of the missile
and its notoriously poor accuracy (1 km CEP).
Despite
these major drawbacks, it did serve one purpose
particularly well: when fired in any number against
densely populated urban areas, the Scud was an effective
terror weapon. This secondary use was not lost on
Hussein. On 18 January, seven Scuds struck Haifa
and Tel Aviv, destroying 1,587 apartments and causing
nearly fifty civilian casualties. Similar attacks
followed in the next few days. These terror attacks
caused the desired response. Israel immediately
sortied aircraft ready to strike Iraqi targets.
Later, they launched a nuclear-capable missile into
the Mediterranean Sea to clearly demonstrate to
Iraq one of the possible responses to further Scud
attacks. Only quick intervention by senior U.S.
politicians and the immediate dispatch of Patriot
missile batteries to Tel Aviv averted a catastrophe.
Hussein's intent was clear: to divide the Coalition
by prompting Israel to attack and thus become an
active participant in the war. There seemed little
doubt that at the very least, this action would
cause Syria, Egypt and others to abandon the Coalition.
At worst, Arab nations might side with Iraq and
prompt an all-out Middle East war. For this reason,
destruction of Scuds became the overwhelming priority
for Allied war planners.
The
primary focus of counterforce planning at the hme
with regard to the Iraqi Scud threat revolved around
the location and destruction of fixed launch sites.
By August 1990, the Department of Defense had located
five such sites with 28 launchers. TR-1 / U-2R reconnaissance,
E-8 JSTARS radar ground surveillance aircraft, and
DSP early-warning satellite imagery quickly located
fixed sites, however these tools proved insufficient
in monitoring the transient mobile Scud launchers.
Thus, the decision was made to send special operations
forces to hunt the Scuds on the ground. The U.S.
Army's Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta
(SFOD-D), better known as Delta Force, and the British
Special Air Service (SAS) were selected to perform
what would become one of the largest counterterrorist
operations in history.
The
senior British officer in the Gulf, Lieutenant General
Sir Peter de la Billiere, was the first to convince
U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf, a skeptic of the
use of special operations forces, that SAS teams
could be inserted behind enemy lines to conduct
effective harassment and sabotage missions against
the enemy. To the surprise of some, this suggestion
was approved and two 'Sabre' squadrons (one half
of the Regiment's fighting manpower) were deployed
and began operations on 20 January 1991. On 24 January,
however, the mission was changed to focus on Scud-hunting
in western Iraq. The British teams were assigned
a vast expanse near the H-2 airfield, from south
of Highway 10 to the Saudi Arabian border. known
as "Scud Alley".
One
squadron from Delta arrived in Saudi Arabia by early
February 1991 as part of the Joint Special Operations
Task Force (JSOTF). Following a period of concentrated
planning, teams infiltrated western Iraq by a variety
of methods, often working with the pilots and crews
of MH-60 Black Hawks and MH-47E Chinooks from the
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR)
based in Ft. Campbell, Kentucky. (Heavily armed
aircraft from this unit also conducted independent
direct action missions against Iraqi radar sites,
convoys, and other targets.) The U.S. element was
assigned as its hunting ground the area northwest
of Highway 10 near Al Qaim, known as "Scud
Boulevard".
The
primary mission for both SAS and Delta was to locate
and designate targets for destruction by Coalition
warplanes. To this end, most teams traveled at night,
while hiding out during the day. In periods of darkness
or for targets obscured by camouflage, the roving
teams carried laser target designators (LTD). Using
these, an attacking aircraft could employ laser-guided
bombs or missiles riding the beam emitted by the
LTD. Those targets that were caught out in the open
during daylight hours were targeted visually by
the operators on the ground who then directed in
aircraft armed with unguided bombs and other munitions.
The hunters were able to provide information on
enemy vehicle movements, however by the time this
intelligence was incorporated into the target package
oftentimes the mobile launchers had left their hiding
place and moved to another location.
In
addition to their targeting duties, Delta undertook
other direct action missions against the Scuds.
These included using long-range, .50-caliber sniper
rifles to disable and destroy missiles both in rearming
farms and those mounted on their TELs. Other interdictions
reportedly involved eliminating Scud crews as well
as the use of AT4 anti-tank missiles on larger targets.
One of the more interesting elements of the operation
was the group based at the outpostof Al Jouf, approximately
150 miles south ofthe Iraqi border. This was a truly
'joint' team made up of SAS personnel, along with
USAF A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft and AFSOC MH-53J
Pave Lows. These British teams soon developed a
close relationship with the USAF crews as the Pave
Lows provided insertion and the 'Warthogs' were
often the first aircraft to respond to reports of
TEL sightings. It should be mentioned that other
SAS units were also transported in their own version
of the Chinook, flown by its own helicopter squadron
(based in Hereford) or Royal Air Force (RAF) crews.
One 30-man SAS team, reportedly deployed from Al
Jouf, successfully assaulted a Scud command-and-control
center, despite the presence of an estimated 300
Iraqi military personnel.
Delta
and SAS adapted to the harsh terrain by making effective
use of light vehicles during their operations instead
of patrolling on foot. Delta operated the Fast Attack
Vehicle (FAV) while the SAS drove two versions,
the Longline Light Strike Vehicle (LSV) and an updated
version of the long-lived "Pink Panther"
Land Rover. Both vehicles were designed to carry
heavy loads, including two or three fully-equipped
soldiers, food, water, ammunition, extra fuel and
a wide variety of weapons (up to six Milan or TOW
anti-tank missiles, and a mount for a 40mm grenade
launcher, 30mm cannon or .50 caliber heavy machine
gun). One persistent but unverified report from
the Gulf War recounted that a single LSV carried
12 SAS troopers and their gear during one such operation.
It
was not long, however, before a major shortcoming
in the Scud hunt operations became apparent. Upon
sighting a viable target, the troopers had to communicate
the intelligence over the emergency "guard"
frequency. Response times averaged an unacceptably
high sixty (60) minutes, during which some targets
were able to escape unharmed. The C3I system that
had proven so effective for the advance planning
of conventional airstrikes proved insufficient for
incorporating real-time intelligence being sent
back by the troopers. In order to facilitate communications
between the ground teams and Coalition air power,
the SAS requested and was approved the posting of
liaison officers to the Tactical Air Control Center
(TACC) in Riyadh. As a result, improvements were
made which permitted more direct communication.
This was further enhanced by the practice of keeping
ground attack aircraft constantly in the air, ready
to respond immediately when a suitable target was
located. Coalition aircraft were also warned of
the presence of special forces operating in western
Iraq, in an effort to prevent any "friendly
fire" casualties.
These
missions were not without loss to the hunters. At
approximately 0300 on 21 February, four pilots and
crew from the 160th SOAR and three Delta operators
were killed when an MH60 helicopter crashed into
a sand dune during zero-visibility weather conditions
near the Ar Ar airfield. The ground team was reportedly
conducting counterforce operations when one of the
team was injured in a fall from a cliff and required
medevac, to which the 160th responded. Similarly,
one eight-man SAS team was compromised while on
a reconnaissance mission. Four of these troopers
died during escape-and-evasion after they were engaged
by subsequent Iraqi patrols. Commandos from both
groups were injured in firefights with Iraqi forces
on a number of occasions in addition to casualties
from exposure to unexpectedly cold nighttime weather.
The
effect of the overall ground-based 'Scud Hunt' from
a military perspective is skill a matter of speculation.
There is no question that Coalition aircraft attacked
a number of decoys and other targets that only after-action
analysis revealed were not Scud-carrying TELs. One
graphic incident occurred at a press briefing during
the war in which General Schwarzkopf claimed video
footage being displayed showed Scud launchers being
destroyed when in fact later analysis indicates
it was instead a group of fuel tanker trucks. At
the end of the war UNSCOM found 62 complete al-Hussein
missiles, six MAZ-543 TELs and four other TELs,
along with parts of 88 other missiles and nine TELs.
The Iraqis were also suspected of hiding other missiles
from the UN inspection teams. 14 of 28 fixed sites
were also destroyed. From a political perspective,
however, the hunt was an unqualified success and
may have provided one of the single greatest, and
least known, contributions to the victory of Coalition
forces in the Gulf.
