The Role and Effect of Special Operations Forces in Theater Ballistic Missile Counterforce Operations during Operation Desert Storm

By Thomas B. Hunter

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The use of theater ballistic missiles (TBM) in warfare first surfaced during World War Two. Germany's use of the V-2 rockets, while of little military value, caused significant strategic concerns on the part of the Allies. This was primarily due to the fact that the use of such weapons directly against major population centers resulted in civilian casualties and a steady drain in morale. Due to a comparatively low level of technology, locating and destroying these missiles and their launchers proved to be largely unsuccessful. Only advances of coventional armed forces across enemy held territory, which precluded the use of viable launch sites, eventually brought a halt to the attacks.

Radical advances in technology since 1945 would lead an observer in 1999 to conclude that, if confronted with a similar threat, modern nations such as the United States should be well-equipped to deal with such a dated threat. Prominent civilian research institutes have concluded that counterforce operations against the mobile launchers themselves might significantly reduce the overall threat from theater ballistic missiles. This is true both of prelaunch and postlaunch attacks which have been deemed to be synergistic, enhancing the overall effectiveness of such tactics.

During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Saddam Hussein launched TBMs against a variety of targets. As in World War Two, TBMs rapidly became a strategic concern for military planners. As such, the Coalition launched a comprehensive and focused effort to locate and destroy the missiles and their launchers, known as counterforce operations. Initially considered to be a virtually insignificant element in the campaign, mobile Scud launchers soon proved to be more numerous than expected, and much more difficult to eliminate. A joint force of conventional military strike aircraft and Special Operations Forces (SOF) was quickly assembled and assigned this mission.

An examination of counterforce actions during Operation Desert Storm provides ample evidence that Special Operations Forces, working in conjunction with Special Operations Aviation and conventional airpower, may provide the most effective tool in combating this growing threat.

Iraq’s Scud Missile Program

A complete accounting of Iraq’s ballistic missile program has proven a difficult task for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, Iraq’s well-documented unwillingness to comply with United Nations monitors following Desert Storm revealed an aggressive, coordinated campaign by Baghdad to hide requested materials. Additionally, the initial batches of information provided by Iraq were described as "confusing, misleading or inaccurate."

Iraq’s theater ballistic missile program was initially centered on the Russian 8K14 missile, known in NATO parlance as the SS-1c Scud B. The Scud-series guided missiles are single stage, short-range ballistic missiles that use storable liquid propellants. The Soviets introduced the Scud B on the Joseph Stalin (JS-3) heavy tank chassis in 1961. Four years later, the JS-3 was replaced by the MAZ-543 (8 x 8) wheeled chassis. This transition gave the Scud missile system much greater mobility and also reduced the number of support vehicles required.

Iraq’s Saddam Hussein had long been a proponent of the use of theater ballistic missiles as a core element of his military strategy. Iraq began to receive its first shipments of the Scud-B in 1974. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980 -1988), Iraq fired an estimated 350 ballistic missiles against major population centers in Iran. This experience contributed greatly to the expertise of mobile launch teams. It was reported that

By 1982, the Iraqi armed forces had two divisions responsible for launching Soviet-designed Scud missiles. At that time, each division possessed 150 mobile Scud missile launchers, some purchased from the USSR and others manufactured in Iraq, for a total of 300 mobile Scud missile launchers. In addition to the soviet-designed Scud missiles, other parts of this division possessed a smaller soviet-designed missile resembling a Scud, but much more accurate. This missile, name unknown, had the same range and warhead as the Scud and it was also a mobile missile.

At that time, however, Iraq did not possess the ability to deliver chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons with their Scud missiles, however experimental work was ongoing on "non-conventional" warheads. The warheads under development included a so-called "small", "medium", and "large" warhead, so named because of the weight of the warhead.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, Iraqi scientists were directed to reverse-engineer the Russian missiles in a short-term effort to increase range and payload. The long-term goal was to develop an entirely indigenous missile system. And while this latter goal was ultimately unsuccessful, the expertise gained from the reverse-engineering process enabled the Iraqis to modify the Scud-B. These technical gains were enhanced though the acquisition of advanced production machinery as well as components from missile systems from overseas suppliers. Specifically, Iraq gained expertise in missile propulsion systems, propellants, guidance and control and airframe production technologies.

The results of this process manifested themselves in two new hybrid missiles, the Al Hussein and the Al Abbas. The Al Hussein, while basically the same dimensions as the Scud-B, had an extended range of 600-650km. The effect of this was to bring most of Israel and all of Syria into striking range.

The second Scud modification, designated the al-Abbas, was tested in April 1988. It had an enhanced range of 900 km, putting all of Iran, as well as the Strait of Hormuz, within reach. With a diameter of 0.88 meters the al-Abbas was some 14.50 meters in length -- some three meters longer than the Scud-B (length: 11.50 meters; diameter: 0.88 meters). However, it was not clear that the al-Abbas was stockpiled in any large numbers or even achieved operational status. Apparently, this missile had been test-fired only once. According to one a detailed report, these modifications were achieved by cannibalizing propellant and oxidizer tanks from other Scuds, lengthening the size of the tanks, and increasing the amount of fuel. Additionally, the Iraqis reduced the regular Scud payload from 1,000 kg to 140-180 kg.

In December 1990, Iraq test-fired a number of the newly modified missiles. Unbeknownst to Hussein, this test program gave the U.S. Space Command a unique and invaluable opportunity to verify the specific infrared signals emitted by the Scuds, as well as to test their early warning satellites and related communications links.

It should also be noted that beginning in 1985, Iraq embarked on a cooperative effort to produce a new missile system known as the BADR 2000. This two-stage missile was to have a range of 1,000km. To this end, Hussein ordered the construction of sophisticated production facilities and imported high- technology production equipment for the fabrication of the first solid-propellant stage of this system. Postwar inspections by United Nations inspectors indicated that no complete missiles were produced.

In late January 1991, an unidentified Iraqi officer reported that the first priority of the Iraqi government was to determine the distance at which the Scud missiles were in relation to their targets when they were destroyed by Patriot missiles. The purpose of gathering this information was, according to the officer, to facilitate the employment of chemical warheads on the missiles. Iraqi efforts to technologically master the fusing mechanisms that would enable the detonation of the warhead at altitude had apparently failed.

While an Iraqi engineer looks on, an UNSCOM team member from Germany inspects one of Iraq's mobile missile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), probably at Taji camp, just prior to destruction.  This Soviet-produced MAZ-543 TEL was modified in Iraq--by extending the length of the launch rail--to be able to fire Al-Husseins, which are longer than the standard Scud.  

Iraqi activities at Scud related sites were closely watched. From facilities such as the Taji Tactical SSM Storage site, regular shipments of Scud-related equipment were observed. Intelligence analysts were able to determine that a number of other facilites, previous thought to be serving simply as ammunition depots, were indeed integrated into the Iraqi Scud missile program.

U.S. intelligence reports indicated that Hussein had, at most, 50 TELs. This figure was revised down to eighteen just prior to the war. Israeli intelligence had previously reported to the U.S. that the number was much higher, possibly as high as 500. However, this information was not accepted and the lower American estimate of 18 was adopted as the official count for Coalition planners. Eventually, however, intelligence estimates would place the number at as many as 15 battalions with 15 launchers each, for a total of 225.

By August 1990, Hussein had finalized the construction of 5 fixed sites with at least 28 launchers in western Iraq. It was widely suspected that Iraq would attempt to strike Israel with theater ballistic missiles in an effort to draw that nation into the war. Such a reaction would likely ignite a war between Israel and Jordan, cause serious friction in the fragile multinational Coalition, and, at worst, possibly ignite another Arab-Israeli conflict.

In December 1990, an Iraqi Republican Guard soldier reported that 60 Scud missiles had been positioned along the Mutlaah Ridge northwest of Kuwait City. The missiles were reportedly well camouflaged and protected by Iraqi security forces, Republican Guard troops, anti-aircraft guns, and tanks.

In an effort to reduce the possibility of Israeli military action against Iraq in response to missile strikes, a secure telephone link between the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MoD) was installed and activated. This vital link not only enabled frequent and unfettered contact between the two nations, but also enhanced Scud early warning capabilities.

On 17 January, seven Scuds struck throughout Tel Aviv and Haifa. Over 1,500 structures were destroyed and 47 people were injured. Hours later, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir spoke to President Bush via telephone and expressed his concern over the attack. Furthermore, Shamir stated that Israel would not remain out of the war much longer. Bush ordered the immediate deployment of two advanced Patriot missile batteries and also promised to destroy all remaining Scud launchers.

Five days later, however, a Scud struck the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan. Ninety-six persons were injured, and three died of heart attacks. This attack spurred a call on the direct hotline from Amnon Shahak to the National Military Command Center. Shahak demanded immediate action to stop the Scuds and emphasized that Israel was prepared to act independently against Iraq. A larger response, in the form of an entire battalion of T'zanhanim brigade commandos along with a small special operations team were gathered at an Israeli air base for an attack on Iraqi targets. This airborne assault, escorted by F-15 fighters, was never authorized to depart the airport, however, and the mission was scrubbed.

Later that day, General Downing arrived at Ar Ar and met with an Israeli intelligence operative who had recently concluded a covert reconnaissance mission. During the meeting, the Israeli announced that he could provide the exact coordinates of four Scud launchers. The decision was made to immediately deploy a special operations team to locate the site.

Two MH-47E Chinook helicopters ferried the team, along with a modified Land Rover, into western Iraq. Within one hour of insertion, the team located and identified the launchers reported by the Israeli agent. An airstrike was called in, and all launchers were reportedly destroyed. A hovering Black Hawk helicopter videotaped the incident, and a copy of the tape was later viewed by Shamir. After viewing the strike, Shamir spoke to President Bush and conveyed his confidence in the actions being taken to eliminate the Scud threat.

The Mobile Launcher Problem

The locations of fixed launch sites were well known to Coalition planners. So, too, were such related facilities as missile fabrication and construction sites, fuel depots, and storage depots. It was against these sites that the Allies focused the lion’s share of their counter Scud efforts.

Strike planners, using the best available intelligence, believed that the special fuels used to power the Scud missiles were only able to be stored for approximately four to six weeks, after which time they became unusable. So, it was reasoned, if the fuel production facilities could eliminate from the outset, the missiles themselves would cease to be a viable weapon after that time.

Therefore, on the first day of offensive airstrikes, virtually all fixed Scud launch pads were attacked by Coalition warplanes. The following day, the Latifiyah rocket-fuel plants and rocket motor production facilities at Shahiyat were targeted with multiple strikes and heavily damaged.

It was soon discovered that Iraq was using civilian vehicle convoys to transport Scuds, and also to hide their TELs. Using this method, it was not only possible to conceal these weapons, but further hampered Coalition intelligence attempts to determine the number of launchers deployed as opposed to the number destroyed. This action prompted the U.S. State Department to designate all civilian convoys as legitimate military targets.

On the 18th, A-10s, F-15s, F-16s and an AC-130 gunship were assigned specifically to seek out and destroy all mobile Scud launchers. Almost immediately, pilots began to report back that they had identified and bombed Scud-bearing convoys. One report, carried by the Washington Post, claimed that U.S. warplanes attacked 11 previously undetected mobile missile launchers in Iraq, hitting at least six, including three loaded with missiles pointed toward Saudi Arabia. Bomb damage assessment videos could not, however, confirm that the trucks carried the elusive Scuds.

In Israel, pressure for the Israeli government to respond to the Scud attacks with force was growing at a rapidly increasing rate. It was apparent to the Israelis that the "needle in the haystack" approach being executed by the Coalition was not sufficient. Fear began to grow that not only might the Israelis attack Iraq, but that such an attack might well escalate the conflict into an Arab-Israeli war that could very well shatter the fragile Coalition. Gen. Horner summed up this estimation:

"Though Israeli pilots were along the best in the world, they were less well-equipped than we were to hunt mobile Scuds. Consequently, their only real contribution to the war would have been to boost the morals of their own people. Far more important, however, the Coalition was a very fragile thing. Any Israeli retaliation on an Arab state – especially nuclear retaliation – no matter how justified, would have at best weakened the Coalition. At worst, it would have destroyed it."

In an effort to pacify the Israelis, General Horner dispatched a high level delegation to Tel Aviv. It was resolved that the United States would immediately send several batteries of Patriot missiles to Israel. This action appears to have assuaged the Israeli public and lessened pressure on Tel Aviv to resort to military action.

Nonetheless, the Patriots were, at best, only a temporary patch to a larger problem. Reports released after the war by a wide variety of sources revealed that the U.S.-made interceptors were largely ineffective in their designed role. This was due, in part, to the inherently defective Scud missile. Upon reentry, the missiles were prone to structural failure. Thus, when the missile reached its target, it was sometimes arriving in several large pieces, rather than as a whole. These multiple targets appeared to have confused the Patriot radar, causing the intercepting missile to target the largest piece, rather than the warhead itself.

Pacific Wind

During the opening weeks of the Iraqi invasion, Hussein’s army rounded up hundreds of foreign nationals and herded them off to various locations in Iraq. Many were relocated to strategically important facilities to be used as "human shields" against Allied air attacks. Others were simply placed in detention facilities. At once, Downing and his JSOC planners went to work to further develop contingency plans that had begun virtually immediately after Iraqi armor crossed the Kuwaiti border. It was obvious that scores of Americans would quickly be held hostage, and might require rescue.

Unbeknownst to anyone, even at the highest levels of CENTCOM, a lone operative from the CIA’s elite covert Special Activities Staff made repeated visits into and out of the embassy, smuggling out top secret documents and gathering vital intelligence, despite the heavy Iraqi presence. Inside the embassy, Ambassador W. Nathaniel Howell and a small contingent of embassy staffers and CIA personnel remained behind. Yet, while they had cleverly stockpiled supplies to sustain them during their predicament, they could not hold out indefinitely.

Using existing blueprints and the latest intelligence from all available sources, a mockup of the embassy was constructed at a remote are of Eglin Air Force Base. Here Delta commandos practiced assaulting the facility and rescuing the hostages. The proximity of Kuwait City to the Persian Gulf enhanced the likelihood of success, due to the proximity of the American fleet. To this end, three Delta operators were selected to infiltrate Kuwait City and coordinate the rescue.

The details of the operation were based on the covert infiltration of the trio into the city. They were to be equipped with advanced electronic tracking devices so that their movements could be monitored. Dressed as American businessmen affiliated with an international oil company, it was hoped that they would be rounded up by Iraqi security patrols and taken to locations housing other hostages. From there, the concealed transponders would identify the location of the group to senior commanders, and a raid or similar rescue operation mounted.

Pacific Wind never progressed beyond the advanced planning stages however, as senior government and military officials canceled the operation in fear of a potential counterattack by Hussein should the mission erupt into a full-scale firefight. In any event, these hostages were released in December 1990, and no operation was necessary. Interestingly, a postwar analysis of the planned operation by Delta and 160^th SOAR personnel indicated that the operation most likely would have succeeded.

This operation, while not directly related to the Scud hunt that would follow, is included here to illustrate the early involvement of JSOC in military planning for operations in the gulf

The initial plan for a JSOC presence in the Gulf was envisioned by General Stiner as a three part package. All packages would be a blend of Delta Force and Dev Group operators, 160^th SOAR and AFSOC helicopters and Army Rangers. The first and largest, A Package, would be based in Saudi Arabia and serve as JSOC’s rapid reaction force to respond to any requested mission. B Package would be dispatched to Europe to respond immediately to any terrorist activities there. Finally, C Package would remain behind at Ft., Bragg, tasked with responding to any necessary developments in areas not covered by the first two, virtually all of Asia, Latin America and Africa.

This plan was not approved due a variety of reasons. First and foremost, the political friction caused by having Stiner and another four-star general in any theater of operations was considered an impossible arrangement. Second, it was opined that Delta was better off remaining at Ft. Bragg where they could continue to train at their advanced counterterrorist facilities, rather than simply being flown to a remote desert with no foreseeable mission on the horizon.

Rather than simply give up in the face of such strong arguments, however, Generals Stiner and Downing flew to CENTCOM headquarters to propose the arrangement to Schwartzkopf. At the meeting that ensued, Stiner proposed a variety of options, including the deployment of Army Special Forces A-Teams into Kuwait to organize an covert resistance movement. Downing also outlined a plan to rescue any hostages at the U.S. embassy in Kuwait City. Finally, the duo put forth the idea of deep penetration missions behind enemy lines to monitor Iraqi force movements in the remote deserts. All suggestions were rejected.

It became clear that Schwartzkopf did not view SOF as a viable tool in the wider scope of Coalition military operations against Iraq. Rather, he viewed them as support elements of his own conventional battle plan. Nonetheless, he did permit the use of U.S. Special Forces as liaison officers with several Arab nations. He also approved the use of Navy SEALs in mineclearing missions and Air Force Pave Lows in the Combat Search and Rescue role.

Schwartzkopf’s distrust of special operations forces in a combat environment was derived from a series of experiences. During his tours in Vietnam, Schwartzkopf noted numerous occasions on which U.S. Army Special Forces A-Team camps had required the assistance of conventional military forces to prevent their being overrun. In his memoirs, Schwartzkopf noted the failure of SEAL Team SIX operators to conduct a reconnaissance mission of Point Salinas airport prior to a U.S. Army Ranger assault. This operation, which resulted in the deaths of four SEALs following a hazardous nighttime helicopter insertion, forced the postponement of the invasion by two hours. Later in the battle, he noted a series of other hardships encountered by special operations forces.

In a somewhat ironic twist, Schwartzkopf would be working closely with Sir Peter de la Billiere, commander of Great Britain’s forces in the Gulf. The irony came in de la Billiere’s background. Along with being his country’s most highly decorated soldier, he was also a former member and commanding officer of 22 Special Air Service. That de la Billiere was a master of unconventional warfare did not seem to detract from this relationship. In Schwartzkopf’s autobiography, he described the British commander in glowing terms:

"Just after Thanksgiving, I approached the British, presenting our battle plan to Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billiere, their commander in the gulf. A legendary soldier and adventurer, Sir Peter was former chief of Special Air Service and the most decorated officer in the British armed services. It was no coincidence that I’d gone to him first: Great Britain had been our closest ally in the crisis¼ I trusted his brains and judgement so much that I asked his advice on even the most sensitive military issues."

It has been surmised that is it this relationship that opened the window of opportunity for SOF operations in the gulf.

Coalition aircraft in counter-Scud operations flew a total of 2,493 sorties. An overview of Coalition aerial efforts to destroy Iraq’s ballistic missile capability provides a vital background for the analysis of SOF activities on the ground and is provided here for that purpose.

By mid August 1990, CENTAF had established the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It was from this location that the staff would generate the Air Tasking Order (ATO) that determined such items as routes, targets, and weapons load configurations for all scheduled missions, both by CENTAF and the Royal Saudi Air Forces (RSAF).

While fixed missile sites were a primary focus of Coalition warplanning, mobile launchers garnered very little attention. Given their elusive nature and the resources that would be required to hunt them down, it was decided only the fixed sites would be targeted. The only concession to the elimination of mobile launchers was the retention of F-15E Strike Eagles on alert at their base. These aircraft would, in theory, be available to launch and attack any mobile launcher reported by air reconnaissance.

On the first day of the air campaign, 22 F-15E Strike Eagles attacked the fixed launch sites near Al Qaim while five other F-15E’s bombed fixed sites around the H-2 airfield near the Iraqi-Jordanian border. Post strike bomb damage assessment (BDA) was unavailable due to poor weather.

On 18 January, however, Iraq launched eight Scuds at Israel from mobile launchers in the western desert. Reaction from the Israeli government was, as previously mentioned, severe enough to warrant a rethinking of the use of Coalition airpower. The first action was to assign a squadron of USAF A-10A Thunderbolts to patrol the western area. The results appeared to be immediately successful, with A-10 pilots claiming to have destroyed two launchers and damaged three more within hours. On the evening of 18/19 January, the F-15E’s were also sent back to again attack the fixed sites around Al Qaim and the H-2 airfield.

The standard plan for hunting Scuds for Coalition aircraft was a complex patchwork of numerous assets. If a Scud was launched from its TEL, the missile would be detected by airborne assets, such as patrolling F-15E’s, E-8A JSTARS, or space-based assets. JSTARS and F-15E’s would then coordinate to hunt down the TEL before if could escape the launch area. Launch warnings were simultaneously sent to CENTCOM. If no strike aircraft were in the area, CENTCOM would then direct in the closest available assets via AWACS.

One F-15E pilot described the difficulty in responding to Scud launches:

"Then you see that it is going straight up. So AWACS is yelling and hollering for us to get on it and we’re heading for the coordinates as fast as we could go. It was about twenty-five miles away from us but when we got there, we went up and down the road and all I could find in the targeting pod was a hot spot on the ground. It was no longer than five minutes after the launch when we found the hot spot. Those guys were fast. They were just like cockroaches that disappear when the kitchen light goes on."

Other factors highlighted the ineffectiveness of airpower alone against the mobile Scuds. Poor weather often precluded any ability for aircraft to view anything on the ground. Furthermore, the Iraqis had learned to park the launcher in locations to make them invisible to Coalition aerial reconnaissance.

Sir Peter de Billiere illustrated the problem:

"We had quickly found out that the Coalition air forces could not deal with the mobile Scuds as easily as they had supposed: bad weather was one factor in the enemy’s favour, but it also became apparent that the Iraqis were most skillful at concealing launchers. To a pilot flying at ten thousand feet, a missile in its horizontal, travelling attitude looked just like an oil tanker and, if it was parked under a motorway bridge, a favourite hiding place, it could not be seen at all by satellites or surveillance aircraft, yet it could be run out, set up and launched in only twenty minutes. Then, even if surveillance satellites pin-pointed its position from the heat of a launch, its erector-trailer would have disappeared again by the time an aircraft could be directed to the spot."

The SAS was the first special operations element to operate directly against the mobile Scud threat. In time, Schwartzkopf relented, and the SAS was permitted to cross the border to hunt for the elusive Scuds. Interestingly, and an indication of the high level of secrecy involved, not even Gen. Horner was briefed of their pending operations. His first notification of the active involvement of the SAS came when an officer from the Regiment appeared unannounced at Tactical Air Control Command (TACC) and began to coordinate plans for subsequent Scud hunting missions.

In an effort to focus Coalition efforts to find and destroy the mobile launchers, two distinct areas of operation had been devised. The first of these, known as "Scud Alley", was located south of the main highway connecting Baghdad with Amman, Jordan. The second, known as "Scud Boulevard" was located north of the highway. It was decided that the SAS would patrol Scud Alley, while American JSOTF teams would operate in the north.

The British 22 Special Air Service (SAS) is perhaps the best known special operations group in existence today. SAS proficiency in firearms, already very high, is refined for close quarters battle in the "Killing House." The basic CQB course is six weeks, during which troopers may fire in excess of 2,000 rounds. This skill is further enhanced during a squadron's SP duty. Adding an element of realism to the training is the use of live personnel as hostages during room clearing operations.. SAS counterterrorist and hostage rescue training is further facilitated by the inclusion of high-ranking members of the UK government, many of who (including the Prime Minister) take part in actual training exercises.

There are a number of organizations worldwide who also use the SAS name, such as the New Zealand SAS and the Australian SAS. There is some debate as to when Britain’s other legendary special operations group, the Special Boat Service (SBS) would be used in the counterterrorist role. This issue is still a matter of speculation, however some experts speculate that the SBS would not be deployed unless a large-scale terrorist incident occurred which tapped the SAS beyond their personnel levels. SAS and SBS are known to have deployed together on a bomb scare involving the ocean liner Queen Elizabeth II. In any case, maritime operations are not a skill that the SAS has forgone. Each squadron maintains its own Boat Troop, which devotes its time specifically to maritime operations.

The SAS cross-trains with the United States’ Delta Force, the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), France’s GIGN, Germany’s GSG-9, Spain’s GEO, the Royal Dutch Marines, and the SAS groups from Australia and New Zealand, to name a few. In return, these organizations have allowed British SAS members to train along side their own units in a reciprocal swap of information. These exchange programs have had the effect of raising counterterrorist skills worldwide to higher and higher levels. For as good as the SAS is, they have always been the first to state that they still have skills they can improve on and as a result are always on the lookout for a better way to do things. It has also been documented that at least one or two SAS personnel have been present at every major counterterrorist operation involving a friendly country since the unit’s establishment of the CRW. Their presence has oftentimes been in an official advisory role, but ex-SAS members have revealed that the group has often sent men to the scene of an incident, just to learn as much as they can about the success or failure of an operation.

There are four squadrons in the SAS, known as Sabre Squadrons. These are designated by letters as follows: A, B, D and G. Each squadron, in turn, is made up of Troops, which are each specialized in one method of insertion. The four Troops are Boat, Mobility, Air (Freefall), and Mountain. All soldiers are rotated through different troops during their (minimum) three-year service with the Regiment. This ensures that each man has at least two troop skills in addition to his standard patrol skills. This process ensures that each four-man patrol contains a diverse but comprehensive cross-section of necessary experience.

On 10 January 1991, one half of B Squadron was formally notified that they would be departing for Saudi Arabia no later than 13 January. On that day 30 men were then transported to Brize Norton airfield for the seven-hour flight to Saudi via a Royal Air Force VC10. After landing in Riyadh, teams were ushered quickly off their aircraft into covered transport vehicles. Form here, they were driven to a remote section of the base, far from the prying eyes of conventional military units on the base. This process, known as "isolation", is a common practice for SOF teams preparing to participate in any real world mission. Isolation periods can last anywhere from a few hours to a few weeks, depending on the type and urgency of the team’s upcoming operation.

Home for the approximately forty SAS troopers was a disused hangar, approximately 300 feet long and 150 feet wide. The hangar served not only as housing for the soldiers, but also as a warehouse for virtually all their equipment, including Land Rovers, outboard engines, laser target designators, food, ammunition, and explosives. By the height of hostilities, over half of the entire Regiment deployed to the Gulf. This included not only 22 SAS, but selected personnel from 21 and 23 SAS, the Territorial Army units – the largest Regimental deployment since World War Two. All SAS teams were equipped with handheld laser target designators, for use in the illumination of select Iraqi ground targets for attack by Coalition warplanes. It should be noted that SAS personnel were required to take anti-nerve agent pills, however in some cases it appears that this procedure was not strictly adhered to.

From the outset, SAS teams were ordered not to simply attack all targets of opportunity. Given the fragility of the Coalition, political factors were emphasized. One SAS trooper described the problem this way:

"We guessed the parameters of out operations would be loose, but that wouldn’t mean we could just go around blowing up power lines or whatever else we saw. We’re strategic troops, so what we do behind enemy lines can have serious implications. If we saw a petroleum line, for example, and blew it up¼ we might just be bringing Jordan into the war: it could be a pipeline from Baghdad to Jordan which the allies had agreed not to destroy so that Jordan still got its oil. So if we saw an opportunity target like that we’d have to get permission to deal with it. That way we could cause the maximum amount of damage to the Iraqi war machine, but not damage any political or strategic considerations."

By the end of the war, non-Scud related operations would include "snatching" Iraqi officers for interrogation, contaminating enemy fuel supplies, and destroying bridges.

On 20 January, SAS troopers crossed the Iraqi border for the first time. Operational details, such as transportation, were largely at the discretion of the team leader. Methods of insertion available revolved around three primary means: crossing the border on foot, by vehicle, or by helicopter. It appears that HALO insertion was a consideration, but its actual employment has not been confirmed. This is most likely due to the relative easy by which a large transport aircraft such as a C-130 Hercules could be spotted by Iraqi radar, however degraded the systems. Such detection would not only identify the aircraft for antiaircraft missiles and guns, but could also give away the general location of any team attempting to insert.

Bravo One Zero, a 30-man contingent from "A" Squadron was typical of SAS patrol activities against the mobile launchers and is one of two such patrols described here in detail for this reason.

This patrol was made up of six 110 Land Rovers, one UniMog support vehicle, and two motorcycles. Order of the patrol was three 110s, the UniMog, then three more 100s along with the two motorcycles. Whenever possible, the vehicles followed in the tracks of the one before it, to confuse the enemy as to actual number of vehicles involved.

The type of weaponry carried by the SAS team varied widely. Personal weapons included M-16 rifles with M-203 grenade launchers, sniper rifles, grenades, and an assortment of high explosives. Mounted weapons included Milan and TOW anti-tank missiles, Mk 19 grenade launchers, 7.62mm general purpose machine guns, and .50 caliber heavy machine guns.

To minimize the possibility of contact with the Iraqis, the convoy traveled primarily at night. During the day (predawn to post-sunset), the vehicles were gathered and hidden beneath camouflage netting. All time during which the team was not traveling was used for rest, maintenance, and planning.

A series of unexpected problems confronted the team immediately following their departure. The first of these was extreme cold temperatures after dark. Expecting cool, but not frigid, temperatures, the convoy did not carry with it cold-weather gear. This caused severe fatigue to all members due to the fact that none of the vehicles were covered, and therefore could not benefit from cab heaters.

The second problem was temporary, but delayed the entry of the convoy into Iraqi territory. Iraqi engineers had erected a large berm along the border, which was large enough to prevent any vehicle from crossing it. "A" Squadron reconnaissance teams were sent to examine a 50km stretch of the berm to find a suitable crossing point, however none was found. This forced the relocation of Bravo One Zero to another entry point much farther to the northeast.

The problems did not end with the crossing of the border, however. On the second night of the patrol, one Land Rover was lost following a collision with the UniMog and had to be buried before the convoy could proceed. The four SAS troopers in the disabled Land Rover were transferred to the UniMog, and the patrol was able to continue.

In one instance, three personnel approached the teams hide. As one lifted up the netting over one of the team’s Land Rovers, he was shot and killed at close range, followed almost immediately by a second. The third of the men was taken prisoner. Following the extraction of the prisoner by helicopter, the Iraqi vehicle was destroyed with explosives.

Code-named "Victor Two" this facility was suspected of directing a substantial portion of Scud missile attacks from the Western region. A 30-man SAS patrol in the area began to receive detailed information on the location, design, and manpower of the site from encrypted radio transmissions sent by commanders. So detailed was the information, that it accurately described not only the above-ground structure, but also the structural specifications on the underground architecture. Two SAS personnel decrypted this information, in standard SAS practice.

These reports also estimated that the enemy garrison numbered approximately 30 Iraqis, in fact the number was nearly ten times that. For some reason, the fact that Coalition aircraft had bombed the site was not conveyed to the team. Teams of Iraqi repair personnel had been deployed in response, thus accounting for the unexpectedly high numbers of enemy present.

It is perhaps most important to note that the bombing, however, did not cause sufficient or specific enough damage to render the site inoperable. This determination was made only through the closer inspection by the reconnaissance elements of the team immediately prior to the assault. It is likely, however speculative, to propose that aerial reconnaissance platforms then in place may have led Coalition planners to assume the site was heavily damaged and therefore inoperable. In fact, the primary transmission mast at the facility was still standing at the time the SAS team arrived and thus the facility was still capable of continued operations.

In the assault that followed, which included hand to hand combat, the site was functionally destroyed and the team was able to withdraw under fire. Surprisingly, no SAS troopers were killed or injured in the attack. Bravo One Zero returned to base six weeks after their departure as scheduled.

Bravo Two Zero

In 1993, a former SAS trooper released a best-selling non-fiction book detailing the experiences of his eight-man patrol during Operation Desert Storm. The book, which went on to become an international best seller, provided previously unrevealed details of special operations missions against the Scuds. An analysis of the actions of this patrol is summarized, as they, too, were typical of the circumstances and factors faced by both SAS and Delta teams operating against the Scuds.

British military intelligence personnel briefed the SAS team on the specifics of identifying an Iraqi Scud Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) convoy:

"You can expect the TEL to be accompanied by a command vehicle, like a Land Cruiser, with the company commander and/or the surveyor aboard. In the TEL itself will be the crew, two in the front, and the other operators in the back. The command post within the TEL is in the center of the vehicle, entry being via a door on the left-hand side. There may be infantry in support, but we don’t know how many – nor whether there might be several TELs operating together or in a convoy."

It became clear in meeting such as these that intelligence on Hussein’s Scuds was poor, and that the teams arrayed against them would be very much learning as they went. Further complicating the scenario of eliminating the missiles and their launchers was the question of how best to destroy them.

Allied intelligence agencies were aware that the missile warheads could contain chemical or biological agents. Thus, to directly attack the missiles on the ground could prove lethal for the special forces team.

The Coalition was aware that Iraq maintained a significant Direction Finding capability. A system of listening posts scattered throughout Iraq. This fact precluded the use of standard radio frequencies, lest the team give away its position and found itself the focus of alerted enemy patrols in the area. In the case of Bravo Two Zero, the decision was made not to use radios to call in airstrikes, unless a target of great significance presented itself.

Bravo Two Zero’s primary mission was the elimination of a vital landline. The bombing campaign had destroyed much of Iraq’s aboveground communications capability. It was assumed that the majority of Hussein’s message traffic was being carried through fiber-optic cables that crisscrossed the country. Most importantly, it was calculated that mobile Scud launchers were being directed through these very lines. It was estimated that due to a lack of secondary communications capabilities, and an increasing deprivation of skilled technicians to repair them, that the physical disablement of the lines would critically hamper Hussein’s ability to employ the TELs.

The initial airstrikes had dropped six primary bridges crossing the Tigris River in central Baghdad. While these attacks obviously hampered land crossings into the capital, they also severed the communications cables strung along the undersides of the structures themselves. This meant that Hussein and his senior leadership could not only no longer easily communicate with his army in Kuwait, but also could not reach the officers commanding the TELs in the field.

The area of operations assigned to Two Zero was a 150-mile stretch along a main supply route in northern Iraq. The team was notified that resupply would be delivered by helicopter in fourteen days.

Unlike Bravo One Zero, the method of transportation for the patrol selected was on foot, rather than by vehicle. This decision was made primarily due to concerns over the ability of the team to conceal the vehicles on the flat, featureless terrain. The eight men would be flown in by a single RAF Chinook, which would also provide resupply as requested by the team during its patrol.

The initial site selected by the team appeared secure in the darkness of the evening, however a brief reconnaissance in the early discovered that they were perilously close to several Iraqi S60 (57mm) mobile anti-aircraft gun emplacements. The decision was then made to contact headquarters and request and exfiltration and relocation. These efforts failed, however, and the patrol was unable to notify headquarters of their situation.

The patrol encountered a civilian child, who, in turn, ran away screaming in the direction of the S60 sites. Assuming it had been compromised, the team departed their position and attempted to maneuver away to an alternate location. During this action, Iraqi elements closed on and engaged the patrol. A series of running firefights ensued, during which the team was separated.

Several search and rescue attempts were made, based on weak transmissions made by the patrol as it attempted to evade the Iraqis, however none were successful. One member managed to travel on foot to Syria, where he was eventually returned safely to Coalition officials. Three of the patrol died (one from hypothermia, two from injuries sustained by enemy fire) while four were taken prisoner and interred for the remainder of the war.

Officially designated 1^st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1^st SFOD-Delta), the U.S. Army’s Delta Force is one of two dedicated counterterrorist units in the American military, and one of four fielded by the United States. Delta is organized into four squadrons; "A", "B", "C" and "D". The first three are operational/assault groups, while the latter serves as Delta’s training cadre. Each squadron is made up of approximately 75 operators and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The squadron, in turn, is made up of troops of fifteen to twenty men each, which can be subdivided into four to six man teams. These teams are organized along varied lines, but are most commonly associated with a specific specialty, such as SCUBA, HALO, or mountain climbing.

Delta also maintains support units that handle selection and training, logistics, finance, and the unit’s medical requirements. Within this grouping is a little known, but vital technical unit which is responsible for covert eavesdropping equipment for use in hostage rescues and similar situations.

These skills are enhanced by the unit's participation in an ongoing exchange and training programs with foreign counterterrorist units, such as (as might be expected) Britain's 22 SAS, France's GIGN, Germany's GSG-9, and Australia's own Special Air Service Regiment. Such close cooperation with other groups provides innumerable benefits, including exchanges of new tactics and equipment as well as enhancing relations that might prove useful in later real-world operations.

There have been persistent rumors of an additional squadron dedicated to aviation, made up of MH-6 and AH-6 "Little Bird" helicopters. Regardless of the validity of such claims, the vast majority of helicopter based assets are provided by the 160^th SOAR. Other assets, such as the larger U.S. Air Force MC-130 and C-141 Starlifters (for airborne operations as well as transportation) are also available at nearby Pope Air Force Base.

Delta is under the operational command of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The Command is responsible for studying joint special operations, requirements and techniques, training and exercises, and tactics. The Command also includes the Joint Special Operations Task Forces, which are responsible for direct action, strategic reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. The National Command Authorities (NCA) usually direct tasking for operations.

The National Command Authority (NCA) consisted of two key figures: President George Bush and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. Through communications with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Gen. Colin L. Powell, the unified command responsible for Southwest Asia under Secretary Cheney was Central Command (CENTCOM) commanded by Gen. H. Norman Schwartzkopf, United States Commander in Chief Central (USCINCCENT).

Under General Schwartzkopf were four service components: Army Central (ARCENT), Navy Central (NAVCENT), Central Air Forces (CENTAF), and Marines Central (MARCENT), and one sub-unified command - Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) - commanded by Colonel Jesse L. Johnson. Reporting directly to Colonel Johnson were the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF), the Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG), the 3^rd Special Forces Group (SFG) separate from ARSOTF, the Kuwaiti Navy, a Kuwaiti Special Forces Battalion, and AFSOCCENT commanded by Col. George A. Gray III, commander of the 1^st Special Operations Wing.

Delta operators carry out the majority of their training at what was once known as the "Security Operations Training Facility". The unit’s facility was operational in 1987 and built an estimated cost of $75 million. Since that time scores of improvements and additional structures have been constructed. Among the features of the new facility are numerous Ranges, which are include but are not limited to pistol, shotgun, sniping, and explosives. Other areas include a three-story hostage rescue facility, Olympic-sized swimming pool, gymnasium, tall swimming tank, mountain climbing wall, and even a basketball court. All these combine to provide the operators with what has been described as "the ultimate counterterrorism training center".

Delta’s presence in Iraq occurred virtually from the outset of hostilities. A small contingent of operators was deployed from Ft. Bragg to supplement General Norman Schwartzkopf’s close protection detail. These bodyguards, wearing uniforms bereft of identifying insignia, would never leave the general’s side, even as he went to work inside CENTCOM’s secure headquarters building.

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) provides aviation support to Army special operations forces. The Regiment consists of modified OH-6 light observation helicopters, MH-60 utility helicopters and MH-47 medium-lift helicopters. The capabilities of the 160th SOAR have been evolving since the early 1980s.

Shortly after the failed hostage rescue mission, Desert One, in Iran, the Army formed a special aviation unit. The unit drew on some of the best aviators in the Army and immediately began an intensive training program in low-level, night operations. The unit became a battalion of its own on October 16, 1981. Designated the 160th Aviation Battalion, the unit was popularly known as Task Force 160 because of the constant attachment and detachment of units to prepare for a wide variety of missions. Its focus on night operations resulted in the nickname, "The Night Stalkers."

On May 16, 1990 the unit was reorganized, designated the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), and assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The Regiment currently consists of three battalions. The 1st and 2nd Battalions are located at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, while the 3rd Battalion is located at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia. The organizational structure of the 160th SOAR allows the Regiment to quickly tailor its unique assets to meet mission requirements of special operations forces.

The 160th SOAR actively seeks and assigns the best-qualified aviators and support soldiers available in the Army. The unique mission of the unit requires that it work closely with the Army Personnel Command in the recruitment process. Once assigned, incoming officers and enlisted soldiers go through Basic Mission Qualification. The Officer Qualification Course lasts 14 weeks while the Enlisted Qualification Course is three weeks in duration. Two other qualification levels exist, Fully Mission Qualified and Flight Lead. Associated progression times are 12-18 months and 36-48 months respectively.

Following the invasion of Kuwait, initial plans called for the deployment of sixteen MH-47s from the 2nd Battalion. 2nd Battalion was only able to provide twelve and this prevented them from providing any aircraft in CONUS for other missions. Therefore, their commitment was reduced to eight. 3rd Battalion was tasked to provide four MH-47s and eight MH-60s, which brought the total to sixteen MH-47 equivalents. After finding out they were going to get MH-60s, SOCCENT modified the requirement to four MH-47s and eight MH-60s. TF 3/160 was comprised of Headquarters, two MH-47s, and eight MH-60s from 3rd Battalion and two MH-47s from 2nd Battalion. Deployment began on 3 September 1990 and the unit was based at King Khalid International Airport.

For the start of the air war, TF 3/160 had two missions. First, they had to provide MH-47s to support the pre-H hour attack of Iraqi air defense ground control intercept sites. They provided fuel bladder aircraft to refuel AH-64 attack helicopters from the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT). The operation was successful. The second mission was to forward deploy to Rafha and conduct Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions into Iraq to pick up downed allied pilots. TF 3/160 retained the CSAR mission throughout the war, but moved from Rafha back to KKMC when it was realized that the potential for allied shootdowns was slight.

Highlights of TF 3/160's combat experiences included the successful pick up of a downed F-16 pilot forty miles inside Iraq. Two MH-60s along with a security team from the 2^nd Battalion, 5^th Special Forces Group located and picked up the pilot. Both aircraft returned safely to base, despite significant enemy fire, including surface to air missiles. It was the only successful night vision goggle rescue. TF 3/160 conducted an emergency extraction of Special Forces "A" Team that had been compromised. The mission was conducted by a single aircraft, in daylight, and in the middle of a firefight.

The 160^th also participated directly in the Scud hunt. The Regiment’s role in the aspect of operations was primarily the infiltration and exfiltration of Delta and SAS teams throughout the western desert. Heavily armed MH-60 Black Hawks were capable of delivering small teams along with a desert patrol vehicle deep into Iraqi territory. The 160th also undertook what would informally become known as "Thunder Runs". These flights, involving MH-60 Black Hawks configured for the Defensive Armed Penetrator (DAP) role, were used in direct action missions against the Scud launchers, command and control sites, and lines of communication.

On 26 February, AH-6 helicopters attacked a radio relay compound with minigun and rocket fire. A Ranger element was then inserted and quickly secured the site. The 100-meter tower was then destroyed with explosive charges.

These operations were not without loss, however. At approximately 0300 on 21 February, four pilots and crew from the 160th SOAR and three Delta operators were killed when an MH-60 Black Hawk helicopter crashed into a sand dune during zero-visibility weather conditions near the Ar Ar airfield. The ground team was reportedly conducting counterforce operations when one of the team was injured in a fall from a cliff and required medevac, to which the 160th responded.

Air Force Special Operations Command also played a significant role in the Great Scud Hunt. Units assigned to AFSOCCENT included the 1^st Special Operations Wing from Hurlburt Field, Florida; the 71^st Special Operations Squadron of the 919^th Special Operations Group (SOG), Air Force Reserve, from Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; the 1720^th Special Tactics Group (STGP) also from Hurlburt Field, Florida; the 3^rd Battalion of the 160^th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) from Hunter Army Airfield near Savannah, Georgia; and the U.S. Navy’s Helicopter Combat Squadron (HCS) 4/5 from the USS Saratoga.

Combat Controllers, some of whom were assigned to JSOTF patrols, are trained to establish communications, command and control locations for both ground and aircraft commanders. They are experts in establishing navigation aids and in demolition work when obstacles and unexploded ordnance in the landing zone need to be neutralized. In the counter-Scud role played out in Desert Storm, however, their skills in directing Coalition aircraft onto suspected TELs and related targets proved a valuable asset.

Elements of all Air Force Special Operations Command units deployed to Desert Storm and performed a variety of crucial missions, including infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of Special Operations Forces teams on direct action missions. Missions also included rescue of downed crew members, psychological operations broadcasts, dropping 15,000-pound bombs and supporting counter-terrorist missions.

More than 50 Air Force Special Operations Forces aircraft were deployed, including helicopters and AC/EC/MC/HC-130s. These assets flew more than 830 missions to support CENTCOM. Crews recovered downed crew members and provided valuable target identification and human intelligence work. MH-53J Pave Low helicopters also acted as pathfinders during the first hours of the war. One AC-130 was lost during the war.

AC-130 gunships were also used in the Scud Hunt. One AC-130H was engaged by Iraqi surface-to-air missiles while on a Scud hunting mission. This incident resulted in the assignment of AFSOC asset mission oversight to the AFSOCCENT commander, rather than CENTAF.

On 28 January, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, personally ordered Schwartzkopf to accept the application of a covert special operations element to act directly against the growing Scud threat. This package, formally known as the Joint Special Operations Task Force, was initially comprised of one squadron from Delta Force plus a small element from the 1^st Battalion, 160^th SOAR. One week later, a larger force of an additional Delta squadron, a small Dev Group contingent, and a reinforced Ranger company were deployed as well.

Led by Gen. Downing, JSOTF arrived at King Fahd International Airport on 1 February. From here, the Delta commandos flew on to Ar Ar, a small border town near the northern border with Iraq. With the two Delta squadrons, Rangers, and additional personnel, the JSOTF contingent at Ar’Ar totaled nearly 800 personnel.

Ar’Ar also served as a significant forward base for Coalition forces. The Arab task forces reported to Prince Khalid through a Joint Forces Command in the Saudi Ministry of Defense, and were divided into a Joint Forces Command (North), a Joint Forces Command (East), and a Joint Forward Forces Command Ar'Ar (the command of the Arab defensive forces screening the border area). The Ar'Ar command was subordinated to the Joint Forces Command (North). It included two Saudi National Guard battalions, a Saudi Army airborne battalion, and a Pakistani armored brigade with about 5,500 men, over 100 tanks, and about 90 other additional armored vehicles and artillery weapons.

Ar'Ar airfield was initially a civilian, not military, airport. The facility was comprised of two terminals, one for standard civilian traffic, and another for the exclusive use of the local royal Saudi Prince. The main JOC was first established in the lobby area of the Prince's terminal.

However, after MG Downing directed all JSOC staff to establish a forward presence at Ar'Ar, the force expanded into the entire Princes terminal. Equipped with modern facilities (such as Western-style toilets, carpet, etc.), this area was soon filled with scores of cubicles to house all necessary assets, including J1, J2 intelligence (SCIF), J3, J6/JCU comms, the Command SGM, and the main JOC area. Communications were able to monitor all nets, including those used for infiltration and exfiltration teams in the field, etc. Elements from the reinforced Ranger company provided airfield security, which was supplemented by fortified fighting emplacements constructed in solid rock. A civilian crane was required for this and the process reportedly required two weeks of around-the-clock work.

Due to its close proximity to the border and the secret nature of operations at Ar'Ar, conventional Coalition forces were not widely aware of its new purpose, nor of the assets that occupied it. On one night, the NBD alert siren sounded, sending all personnel to scramble for their gas masks and protective gear. When a massive explosion rocked the base, it was thought that a Scud might have impacted. In fact, a flight of F-4 Phantoms in the "Wild Weasel" (anti-radar) role had detected transmissions from one of the Ar'Ar base radar. Believing the radar to have been activated by the Iraqis, the planes fired on the radar, destroying it.

Gen. Downing met with Gen. Schwartzkopf to brief him on his special operations team and their pending deployment. Following this, Downing met with SAS Colonel Andy Massey. During this meeting, Col. Massey informed Downing of the lessons learned to date by his SAS patrols operating in Iraq. Downing learned that the SAS teams, based out of Al Jouf, had encountered unexpected difficulties in their operations, primarily related to weather conditions. Two of his men had frozen to death, one after swimming across an icy river, the other while hiding from an Iraqi patrol. Also, Bravo Two Zero - an eight man patrol - was reported missing. Freezing temperatures at night had also frozen fuel lines in several of the Land Rovers, forcing SAS troopers to light small fires beneath their vehicles to thaw them out. While impossible to calculate, this sharing of operational experience likely reduced the risks to future JSOTF operations and possibly saved the lives of at least some operators.

JSOTF teams were primarily comprised of between 20 and 40 Delta operators along with a single Combat Controller from USAF Special Operations Command. The inclusion of the Combat Controller was made specifically to facilitate the communications between the team and any strike aircraft that might be requested. It was not long before the newly deployed JSOTF teams would find themselves benefiting from the lesson learned by the SAS just weeks earlier. The first JSOTF mission against the Scuds took place on 7 February and involved sixteen Delta commandos in two vehicles. The results of this patrol have not been made public and remain classified. Some idea of their actions, however, can be gleaned from several reports.

In one instance, two F-15E’s, just beginning a Scud patrol, were diverted to assist a special operations patrol, call sign Papa One-One. After being given the patrol’s radio frequency and authenticating, the pilots were notified that the patrol had been compromised and was being pursued by enemy vehicles. Traveling in a Pinzgauer, the JSOTF team was engaged in a running gun battle with at least seven Iraqi vehicles. Coordinating with the Combat Controller, the F-15E’s dropped a single bomb, destroying one enemy truck. Following this initial attack, the entire convoy was wiped out in seven strikes. Papa One-One reported one of the destroyed vehicles to be a mobile Scud launcher.

Yet another encounter between JSOTF elements and F-15E’s took place in the early morning hours of 13 February. While preparing to bomb a SA-3 site near Al Qaim, AWACS diverted a flight of two Strike Eagles to respond to a ‘troops in contact’ request for air support. Three Iraqi helicopters had been observed landing near an unspecified special forces element in a ‘no drop’ zone. The helicopters were subsequently engaged and two of three destroyed. In fact, the pilot of a 160th SOAR helicopter that had been operating in support of a JSOTF team had placed the radio request.

More often than not, however, it was the ability of SOF teams to locate and identify suspected mobile launchers and missiles for airstrikes that proved the most value to the Coalition effort to end the Scud threat.

The types of aircraft available to Coalition SOF for use in air strikes against suspected SCUD launchers were widely varied. The primary U.S. airframes included the F-16 Fighting Falcon, A-10 Thunderbolt, F-15E Strike Eagle, and AC-130 Spectre gunship.

One vital component of the air campaign was the new Joint STARS (USAF-Grumman Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System). Although still in development, two Joint-STARS' test aircraft flew 54 combat sorties and supported all mission taskings with a system availability rate of more than 80 percent. One of the two aircraft was in the air every day, tracking every vehicle that moved on the ground. Joint-STARS identified and targeted Scud missiles and launchers, convoys, trucks, tanks, surface-to-air missile sites and artillery pieces for coalition aircraft.

It is not clear to what extent the AC-130 was used, however its specific tasking in the counter-SCUD role has been documented. Historically, however, the Spectre has proven itself an extremely effective platform for destroying trucks, artillery, and lightly armored personnel carriers. However, as the AC-130 is a large propeller-driven aircraft with an inherently low airspeed when compared to jet aircraft, the gunship was not an ideal platform for TEL counterforce operations.

Initial coordination and communication between Coalition aircraft and teams on the ground was notoriously poor. The secret nature of the deployment of the SAS and JSOTF meant that, in the early stages of the Scud hunt, that the first notification to patrolling strike aircraft of the presence of SOF teams operating beneath them was the crackling message on the Guard frequency.

Initial communications problems for SAS teams were caused primarily by a technological flaw. The British teams were initially issued only high-frequency (HF) radios rather than the more advanced SATCOM systems. Following numerous complaints, personnel from JSOC met with the SAS liaison element it was determined that environmental conditions were causing unexpectedly significant difficulty. Factors such as temperature variations and flat terrain were adversely impacting the travel of HF radio waves and how they skipped to the ionosphere (or along the ground in ground wave mode). These made even scheduled, routine reporting difficult. Other inherent operational factors such as complicated antenna configurations, added weight and lack of a voice recognition capability also made the HF system unfavorable.

These conditions, however, did not effect satellite communications (SATCOM) equipment. Benefits of SATCOM to deployed teams included light weight, excellent reliability, data burst capability and much easier secure communications. One drawback to SATCOM, however, was that it could not be used while the patrol was traveling. In order to transmit or receive, the team had to remain in a stationary location, deploy the antenna and align it with the satellite.

This obstacle was overcome by loaning SATCOM equipment to the British forces at Al Jouf. Eventually, all elements (special operations helicopters, JSTOF/SAS teams, etc.) were using SATCOM equipment and were given high priority channel access. Nonetheless, teams equipped with SATCOM using KL-43's (data burst/field sized) on narrowband channels reportedly experienced difficulty both in transmission and reception.

Following one mission in which an F-15E pilot expressed his concerns over potential "friendly fire" casualties, the SAS dispatched two officers to Al Kharj to discuss what improvements might be made. SAS liaison officers were assigned to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) in Riyadh. The benefits of this relationship were immediate. Radio procedures were established to better facilitate communications between the SOF teams on the ground and strike aircraft. SAS teams were also directed to radio their requests directly to TACC so that airborne assets might be better coordinated. The decision was also made to inform Coalition pilots of SAS patrol areas.

These improvements not only enhanced Coalition reaction time to suspected Scud launchers, but also increased the survivability of SOF elements operating in the desert. In one instance, an SAS team patrolling in the area between H-2 and Al Muhammadi airfield believed itself to have been compromised. They immediately radioed back to TACC their request for extraction and air support. Two 160^th SOAR MH-60’s were scrambled to retrieve the team and an AWACS controller vectored in a two-ship flight of F-15E’s.

Scud patrols involving the F-15E Strike Eagle were based on a singular methodology. In this, two F-15Es, one equipped with a laser-targeting pod, the other with twelve 500-pound bombs, would depart their airfield just before dark. From here, they would transit to a tanker flying over western Saudi Arabia, then fly north to an area between H-2 airfield and Al Qaim. Once there, the two fighter-bombers would fly a racetrack pattern at medium altitude. Over the duration of the flight, the second aircraft would drop one 500 pound bomb at predetermined intervals varying between five and thirty minutes.

The intent of this seemingly haphazard approach was to deter any potential mobile Scud crew on the ground from setting up and launching their missile. Of course, an ancillary benefit was that any F-15 team, if they spotted a TEL on the ground, could attack the vehicle before it could launch its missile.

Upon arrival, radio contact between the Strike Eagles and the SOF team was established and the pilot was requested to investigate a suspicious vehicle. This vehicle did not present a threat and passed the team without incident. Fifteen minutes later, however,