By Thomas B. Hunter

June 2000

In early 1984, U.S. Navy Cdr. Richard Marcinko, former commanding officer of the Navy's elite counterterrorist unit SEAL Team SIX, was summoned to the office of Vice Admiral James A. "Ace" Lyons, Jr., then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy (Op-06).  During the course of the meeting, Admiral Lyons conveyed to the commander his concerns over the vulnerability of U.S. military bases to terrorist attack.  Marcinko was then directed to draft a proposal for a new unit, specifically tasked with testing the security of U.S. Navy bases.  

This would not be the only mission of this new team.  In fact, testing of Naval security was primarily a cover for the unit's primary function - covert counterterrorist missions conducted around the world.  In this way, a portion of the unit would deploy overtly to a given Naval base to carry out its security mandate, while a small element would covertly infiltrate a foreign nation to carry out whatever counterterrorist activity was required.  This "activity" as to be very much in line with the practice of aggressive neutralization of known terrorists carried out on a regular basis by nations such as Israel and Great Britain.  

In a short time, Marcinko chose the name "Red Cell" for this new unit (formally designated OP-06D) and set about selecting personnel.  According to his non-fiction book Rogue Warrior: "There were fourteen plankowners in the unit, three officers and eleven enlisted men - one platoon, two boat crews, seven pairs of swim buddies. It was a classic SEAL design." Thirteen of the fourteen SEALs were from Marcinko's former command, SEAL Team SIX.  The only non-SEAL plankowner was Steve Hartman, a decorated former member of the USMC's elite Force Reconnaissance teams. The team was based at Dulles Airport in Washington, D.C.

The annual Red Cell budget was $4 million, funded by classified or ‘black’ money about half of which was for video support. Of the remainder, a portion was for analytic and documentary support. Probably half of all funds were spent for travel.

In order to provide the maximum educational benefit for both the installation commander (as well as to verify Red Cell's claims of penetration - which were sometimes disputed by base commanders), it was decided that a video crew using low-light equipment would have to be incorporated into the planning and execution of each mission.  This video documentation process, contracted to Essex Corporation, had two primary phases. The first was the installation of video equipment throughout the target base. Cameras were placed to monitor the facilities, such as the main gate, fences, guardhouses, and other obvious potential means of entry or places where Red Cell’s operators might strike. These cameras remained in plain sight for a few days so that the base personnel would become accustomed to their presence and returned to their normal routine. The second phase of video documentation presented a much different problem. While the stationary cameras might catch some of Red Cell’s activities once inside the base, the inherently clandestine tactics used would require a mobile video team capable of following the Red Cell team wherever the operators might choose to venture.

This was no easy feat, as the video crew itself would also have to be able to penetrate the base in order to remain close enough to Red Cell to video its actions.  To remedy this problem, three former SEAL Team SIX operators were hired to film every operation.  This had a dual benefit in that not only were these men able to secretly enter the installation without giving away the location of the team, but having been trained in exactly the same techniques as the Red Cell members (some of whom they had already worked with in SEAL Team SIX) they could anticipate the moves of the team, and thus be in a position to provide superior video surveillance of the events as they unfolded.

Video support included the following products:

• "Quick Look" — An ‘in the field’-edited video produced from the exercise tapes. Virtually every evolution was videotaped presenting each day’s evolutions in a narrative and chronological depiction of the key exercise events and shown during the exercise "hot wash up" critique approximately 24 hours after the exercise ended.
• VASEX (Vulnerability Assessment Exercise, the actual exercise using terrorists) a formal video report portraying vulnerabilities exposed during the exercise recommending corrective action. This was provided three to six months after the exercise. This was an important product in that it enabled the base commanders to take the video to Washington in an effort to gain additional monies in order to finance the suggested security remedies at their bases.
• Vulnerability Assessment Report — A formal video report depicting the vulnerabilities of an installation or specific facility. This was similar to the VASEX, except that no exercise determines these vulnerabilities. Instead, they were determined by Red Cell and contracted personnel in coordination with station personnel.
• Generic Reports - These 20-minute videos, provided a generic training objective, such as checking cars, gate security, enhancing pier and waterfront security, and countering terrorist swimmer attacks. These tapes would then be circulated to the Navy as training guides for that specific subject.

Virginia-based Kapos Associates, Inc. (KAI) was hired as a contractor to provide an independent report from each exercise. A retired Navy aviation commander took notes during the exercises and produced an analysis describing what occurred. This written documentation was then fed into a computer that provided statistics on which techniques that had proven successful and which had not. This provided a valuable unbiased (non-SEAL) insight, which helped to alleviate the reluctance of base commanders and Naval senior officers to accept suggestions for security improvements. The KAI contract was terminated with the shutdown of Red Cell in 1991, however they would go on to conduct Security Awareness Gaming Exercises (SAGE) at other major facilities, such as Seattle-Tacoma International Airport in 1993.

By Marcinko's own admission, he and his men spent a great deal of their non-training time drinking and brawling, a theme carried over from his days as CO of SIX.  This type of activity was certainly not unique to Red Cell, however the frequency of its occurrence and numerous mishaps that resulted directly from drinking have frequently been pointed out as a failure in discipline and leadership by Naval Special Warfare and conventional military officers of all branches.  To be sure, this would catch up to Red Cell several months later, and prove to further the already poor disciplinary reputation of the unit within the Navy.  

It may be said that this type of behavior was facilitated by the lack of oversight of Red Cell during its brief operational history, however this is only partly true.  Indeed, while great attention was given to monitoring the unit's actions during training exercises, there existed virtually no supervisory apparatus to which the team had to answer during its off-duty hours.  This lack of oversight can be said to have given carte blanche to Red Cell members to act not as disciplined members of a Navy unit, but rather more as a small fraternity that viewed themselves as beyond the standards of acceptable conduct, even for such a unique special operations/counterterrorist unit. 

This is not to say, however, that Red Cell operated completely autonomously and without any regulation.  In fact, Admiral Lyons drafted a formal set of guidelines under which Red Cell was expected to operate. Additionally, the team was assigned a Navy lawyer in an effort to ensure that they operated within the parameters of the law.  Finally, each scenario could not simply be selected by Red Cell and acted upon.  Instead, the team was required to present a scenario for a given installation to the small cadre of senior officers overseeing the program.  Therefore, each scenario (as designed by Red Cell) had to first be approved by Admiral Lyons, then by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and his staff, and finally by the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the theater in which the installation resided.  Finally, according to Marcinko's book Rogue Warrior, Lyons added his own personal warning: "Stray too far from what we've agreed on, and you and your boys are history." These words would prove to be prophetic ones, but not before Red Cell had its moment in the sun.

Red Cell team members were expected to maintain their SEAL qualifications in diving, parachuting, and demolition.  Beyond this, however, they were given great latitude in virtually all regards.  Marcinko's command style with regard to physical training conformed to that of numerous other elite special operations units around the world, such as the British SAS.  There was no required, formalized fitness program.  Instead, members were expected to train individually and expected to maintain a high level of physical fitness.

Advanced training for this unit was not as essential for this unit, due to the fact that its team members had already graduated from the most rigorous military schools offered by the Department of Defense as well as those hosted by other nations.  Moreover, all team members had active duty experience with Force Recon or the regular SEAL Teams and SEAL Team SIX, all of which offered continual training in advanced skills such as HALO and HAHO parachuting, advanced combat diving, close quarters battle (CQB), sniping, and scores of related techniques.  For this reason, it was most important for Red Cell to maintain its proficiency in shooting and to develop unique new techniques such as might be needed by a globally deployable counterterrorist unit.  For this reason, some members were sent to the CIA's facility at the Harvey Point Defense Testing Activity ("The Point") where advanced skills are taught to CIA and DOD personnel.

For aviation assets, Red Cell was frequently partnered with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment during training exercises (most commonly the MH-6 Little Bird, especially for shipboard assaults), though they were ferried oftentimes by Air Force cargo aircraft.  They used C-130's for both transport and for free fall parachute training, C-5's and C-141's for transportation of the team with its gear, as well as smaller aircraft as required.  

By the Spring of 1985, Red Cell was ready for its first field test.  The site selected for this was one familiar to the team members, the Norfolk Naval base facilities.  The location was familiar due to the fact that Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base (home to SEAL Teams Two, Fours and Eight as well as SEAL Team SIX [Dam Neck would become the home of SIX's successor, the Naval Special Warfare Development Group]) was just a short twenty-minute drive to the Norfolk base.

In practice, as set forth in the guidelines handed down by the Navy oversight body, the base commander was to be briefed not only on the fact that Red Cell would be conducting an active test of base security, but also which targets (facilities) were going to be 'attacked' and when the attack would take place. 

Umpires were also used as a neutral third party to determine the casualties and damage inflicted as a result of Red Cell's incursions. Umpires were usually base personnel, intimate with its workings and knowledgeable about the current activities there. They were vested with the authority to halt or divert an exercise at any time. Thus, if something operationally important was going on at Point B, and Red Cell planned to go through B to get from A to C, the umpire could say that they couldn’t go through B or even be in that area. The umpire could, however, suggest that the operators could get from A to C through point D. This operational knowledge of the facilities and their operations were valuable assets that enabled the exercises to run more smoothly and effectively.

This procedure was followed at the inaugural three-day event at Norfolk, which involved the use of smoke grenades, booby traps, and simulated explosives targeting the Navy's Second Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet Headquarters.  This exercise took place and was deemed a general success, though it was primarily a test for Red Cell itself on interacting with base personnel, commanding officers, videotaping procedures, infiltration parameters, and similar necessary baseline procedures.

The first true exercise took place in June 1985 at New London, Connecticut, home of the US Navy's Trident and Ohio-class submarines, a vital component of the US nuclear 'triad', essential to the security of the United States. 

The Naval Submarine Support Facility (NSSF) was one element of the Naval Submarine Base New London, and one of Red Cell's targets.  The base provided intermediate level maintenance, ordnance, and supply support to three submarine squadrons of 22 nuclear attack submarines, support vessels and service craft.  The upper portion of the base hosted the base facilities (BOQ, commissary, etc.), while the lower portion on the river held the submarine piers (areas in which the subs are kept for maintenance).

Red Cell’s pre-mission reconnaissance of the base found numerous lapses in security, including:

Other lapses were documented as well.  Several team members rented a light plane and were able to fly directly over the submarine pens, with no apparent reaction from base personnel.  In another instance, Red Cell rented a small boat and, flying a Soviet flag - in 1985, well prior to the fall of the Soviet Union - managed to drive the boat close enough to the dry docks and other facilities (seen in the above photo) to take video and still photographs of classified construction elements of the vessels.

Following three days of preparatory work, Red Cell initiated the exercise with a phoned warning to the base operator. With the required phone warning, the base went on full alert.  To Red Cell's delight, while base security was indeed heightened, it numerous other flaws were becoming apparent to the team.  For example, while Marine and Navy Security teams patrolled along the fence lines and hear the gates, other areas were left vulnerable.  Moreover, advanced motion detectors had been turned on to protect the ordnance facility, however these sensors covered only two sides of the building near the front, leaving the back door wide open. This latter deficiency was exploited by four Red Cell operators, who scaled down the cliff to the back of the building.  The video crew was then moved into position in a similar fashion.

Captured all the while on video, two operators burrowed under the fence and moved to one side of the facility while the others did the same.  A lone sentry was 'killed' with a shot from a silenced pistol (ruled 'dead' by a referee) and adjacent propane tanks were booby-trapped.  The team then picked the lock of the side door, entered unchallenged, and placed 'explosives' near the nuclear weapons preparation area as well as on stockpiled torpedoes.  The team then extracted and concluded the night's activity.

On Day Two, the team focused on both the upper and lower sections of the base.  One element struck at the hospital, communications center, and HQ buildings, with no resistance.  Another element made up of four operators changed into wet suits at a yacht basin approximately one-half mile upriver from the submarine pens.  With civilian work clothes packed into dry bags, they swam down the river to the piers, climbed the pilings, and changed back into their civvies.  From their they were not only able to neutralize the sentries (who were reportedly in a shack drinking coffee), but they were able to plant explosives on the diving planes of one submarine, and actually made entry into a nuclear sub tied up at the pier.  Once inside the submarine, the team was free to roam at will.  They planted demolition charges in the control room, nuclear-reactor compartment, and torpedo room.  Had these been actual explosive devices, of course, the submarine would have been a total loss (not to mention the potential for release of radioactive material).

The exercise proved without question that the installation was highly vulnerable to terrorist infiltration.  In the debriefing that followed, however, what might have proven a golden moment for Red Cell was tarnished when Marcinko chose to conduct his meeting with the senior base commanders in a manner that was needlessly abrasive and unprofessional.  Nonetheless, his team did carry out its mission with expertise and demonstrated an invaluable flair for the unconventional mindset - an invaluable trait for a unit with a mandate as unusual as that of Red Cell.

By Labor Day of 1985, Admiral Lyons, who had been a staunch proponent of Red Cell and Marcinko, was promoted out of his job in Washington to become Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).  While this was perceived as a step up the ladder for the Admiral, it also removed him from the position that enabled him to protect Marcinko on those increasingly numerous occasions when flag officers phoned to complain about Marcinko's actions and attitudes towards the Navy.  Thus, Red Cell lost its most valuable ally in the Pentagon.  It was at this point that the future of the unit began come into question.

On the Labor Day weekend, however, it was discovered that an opportunity existed to text the security of Air Force One while it was housed at Point Mugu, its home when President Reagan vacationed at the president's ranch some 125 miles to the north.  Thirteen of the team's members traveled to California through circuitous routes and varied times, practicing (to a degree) traveling covertly should the team be called on to perform its covert counterterrorist function in a foreign country.  The team's equipment and the video crew arrived via a Navy jet into Alameda Naval Air Station.

For this exercise, Marcinko gave his team great freedom in planning their own penetrations and actions at the objective.  Point Mugu was a bit different than most Naval bases in that it had a well-trained SWAT team (made up of males and females) that had been formed specifically to respond to unusual threats to the installation and its personnel.  Reconnaisance by car, bicycle and boat found the typical security shortcomings such as poorly secured rear gates and fences and scheduled Marine and Naval Security patrols.  Red Cell operators also visited local bars and establishments, peeling base decals off vehicle bumpers and windows for use on their own vehicles at the time of the actual exercise.

Perhaps symbolically, it was the failure of main gate guards to stop vehicles as they passed into the base (while Red Cell operators used the distraction to scale nearby fences) that marked the start of the operation.  Having gained access through this manner, the team infiltrated the base to find that the 'alert' base was anything but.  The multi-million dollar F/A-18 Hornets stood in a row, virtually unprotected on the flight line, sentries appeared nonchalant, and all seemed like business as usual.  Of course, these were the very flaws that Red Cell had been tasked to uncover.  With every movement videotaped, the team did just that — uncovered, exposed, and exploited scores of security shortcomings.

Of the more noteworthy actions taken by Red Cell:

However, while the 13-man team proved quite capable of causing massive disruption to base personnel, facilities, and services, the most notable event occurred when Red Cell operators stole a weapons carrier, loaded it with a pallet full of 500-pound dummy bombs (covered with a tarp), and drove it to the Bachelor Officer's Quarter's parking lot where it remained unchecked for the entire weekend.  On the third day, they drove the weapons carrier to the far section of the field near Air Force One.  They climbed out, activated the 'explosives' and walked away.  This action would have completely destroyed the Boeing 707 and killed or wounded anyone in the blast area had the explosives been authentic.

Naples, Italy is an area teeming with US military personnel and home to scores of high-ranking officers from all service branches. These personnel are attached to a wide variety of offices, including the headquarters of both NATO’s Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) and nearby home port of the Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, which is responsible for all US Navy activity in the Mediterranean Sea. Following the kidnapping of Brigadier General James Dozier in 1981 and the assassination of Leamon Hunt, US chief of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observer Group, in 1984, it was decided that a security check of Naples by Red Cell was imperative. Of particular concern were the personal security arrangements of a U.S. Navy three-star admiral who was deemed a viable target for terrorists.

Soon after their arrival in Naples, Marcinko and three Red Cell operators met with the admiral and his wife to discuss the five-day operation and to assess their existing security situation. Having previously been assured by the Naval Investigative Service (later renamed the Naval Criminal Investigative Service) that there were numerous factors contributing to the safety of the admiral and his wife. These included the physical location of their home on the top of a hill that not only offered a good view of the drive up to the house. The admiral’s home was also within a naval housing compound, which offered further peace of mind in knowing their neighborhood was made up of US military personnel. High walls had also been constructed around the home and topped with broken glass to deter intruders. Further precautions included two roving bullmastiff guard dogs and an armed personal driver. The admiral has been assured by NIS that this complementary set of security measures was sufficient to ensure his safety. Red Cell would quickly dispel this notion.

At the first meeting, Marcinko and his team demonstrated the ease with which a man could scale the walls and make entry to the admiral’s bedroom. They then proceeded to show the admiral how simply turning off the power (accessible from a gray box attached to the wall of his home) could make it impossible for he and his wife to phone out in case of an emergency. Red Cell also explained that a silenced 9mm pistol would eliminate the guard dogs and showed him how easily a terrorist could plant an explosive device under the manhole cover at the residence’s main gate. The admiral was convinced, and immediately ordered the base placed on full alert for the remainder of the exercise, during which Red Cell would attempt to abduct the admiral.

Despite the heightened state of security and the notification that he was the target of a pending kidnapping, Red Cell managed to abduct the admiral twice within a 12-hour period. In one instance, a lone Red Cell operator approached the admiral, put a gun in his side, and they both entered the admiral’s limousine for the morning drive to the base. This occurred despite the fact that not only was the armed driver present, but an additional Navy security guard was in the front passenger seat. After arriving at the base, the operator directed the admiral to his office and ordered him to open his safe and produce the day’s operational codebook.

Red Cell also used the opportunity to demonstrate the vulnerability of naval officers in the Naples area. After renting motor scooters, two of operators waited near the main gate of the Navy Base. Upon spotting a vehicle with NATO plates or a driver wearing his or her uniform (with insignia), they would follow the car to a stoplight. There they would pull up next to the vehicle and slap a sticker on the driver’s side window reading, "You are one dead Navy asshole, sir. Love and kisses, the Red Brigades." These messages, while pointing out genuine flaws in personal security, were again not well received by senior Navy officers, and complaints were filed with the new Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Op-06). Unlike the previously lenient Ace Lyons, CNO Donald Jones took the complaints seriously.

Red Cell’s clock was ticking.

End of Part One.