The Hon Ian McLachlan AO MP

Minister for Defence

Ministerial Statement

Outcome of the Board of Inquiry into the Black Hawk Training Accident of 12 June 1996

Parliament House

Canberra

6 March 1997

Mr Speaker, I seek leave of the House to make a statement on the Report of the Board of Inquiry on a Training Accident at the High Range Training Area, Townsville, on 12 June 1996 and to table a Report by the Chief of Army on that accident.

Honourable Members will recall the sadness and dismay with which the nation heard the news of the accident at the High Range Training Area near Townsville shortly after dusk on 12 June 1996.

The accident occurred during an exercise to practise the recovery of Australian citizens held hostage by armed terrorists.

Six Black Hawk helicopters and 24 aircrew from the 5th Aviation Regiment and 43 soldiers of the Special Air Service were conducting a live-fire airmobile assault on a simulated terrorist position.

As the formation reached the target zone, two helicopters collided. The lead helicopter crashed to the ground upside down and was consumed by fire. The second helicopter entered a flat spin before crash landing in an upright position. It too was destroyed by fire.

Eighteen Australian servicemen perished and a further 12 were injured - some critically. Equipment worth $37 million was destroyed.

There were heroic acts in the face of this terrible accident. The reaction at the crash scene was cool headed, courageous and swift. Despite the confusion of the collision and the crash and the danger of flames and exploding ammunition, those at the scene acted quickly and decisively to evacuate the injured.

I am advised that the Army will be proposing a number of awards to recognise brave and conspicuous service in the immediate aftermath of the accident.

The professional response of local ADF units, the Queensland Emergency Service, the Queensland Police and staff at Townsville General Hospital undoubtedly saved further lives.

The Defence Department acted swiftly to ensure that the injured survivors and the families of those who lost their lives were paid such compensation and provided with as much ancillary support as existing legislation allowed. This was done as quickly as was possible.

I know from letters which have been sent to me that the sensitive assistance of family support bodies and the overwhelming support of the Australian community were of great comfort to the families of the victims, to their comrades and to those close to them.

This was the largest peacetime disaster to strike our armed forces since the Voyager collision of 1964.

Nevertheless, the training activities which so unfortunately culminated in this accident are essential to our national security. This is particularly true with just three years remaining before the Sydney Olympic Games.

Training for counter terrorism operations is inherently dangerous. It takes our forces to the cutting edge of capability. It demands degrees of speed, stealth, precision, accuracy and lethality beyond those required of any other element of the Army.

But such training also demands a careful balance between safety and realism. This can only be achieved through meticulous military preparation and planning and the execution of a staged progression of training which reflects the difficulty and danger of the task to be achieved.

This need to balance safety and realism is at the heart of the report which I will table today.

Following the accident, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General John Sanderson appointed a military Board of Inquiry. The Board was required to establish the primary and contributory causes of the accident and to make recommendations to prevent another tragedy.

While it was also to make recommendations in relation to possible disciplinary action, the Board was not constituted as a court and had no powers or authority to make findings in relation to offences under the Defence Force Discipline Act.

With the exception of matters concerning national security, the Inquiry was open to the public. The survivors and the next of kin and families of those who lost their lives were provided Commonwealth funding to attend the hearings and received legal representation as required.

The Board of Inquiry was extensive and thorough. It conducted hearings in Perth, Townsville and Sydney over a period of three months. It took evidence from 144 witnesses, accepted 215 written exhibits and considered numerous instructions, correspondence and statements.

The Board's Report, which was submitted to the Chief of Army on 20 December last year, reflects this thoroughness. It comprises more than seven thousand pages in seventeen volumes.

Since submission to the Chief of Army, the Board's finding and recommendations have been studied in detail by technical and legal experts within the Army and the Department of Defence.

These experts have confirmed the adequacy of the Board's Report and advised on corrective action to minimise the probability of further accidents.

These recommendations form the basis of the Chief of Army's Report which was submitted to me last week.

In his report, General Sanderson addresses the findings of the Board of Inquiry, the advice of the panel of experts and, most importantly, the steps to be taken to reduce the risk of further accidents.

The Board found that the immediate cause of the accident was that the lead helicopter, Black 1, turned right and converged on an adjacent helicopter, Black 2. As a result, Black 1 struck Black 2 with multiple rotor blade strikes causing both aircraft to crash and be destroyed by fire.But, as is almost always the case with accidents of this nature, the events immediately preceding the accident do not stand in isolation.

The Board found that while there was no single reason for the tragedy, there was a chain of events that successively and cumulatively led to a situation where the accident became what the Board describes as the inevitable outcome.

During the early stages of the Board's proceedings, there was a good deal of speculation about the causes of the crash. At that time and until today, the Government took the position that it would not comment on matters before the Board.

The findings of the Board clearly dismiss some of the more widely speculated causes. It found:

	There were no mechanical defects in the Black Hawk helicopters involved. In fact the aircraft's design unquestionably prevented a greater death toll;
	The accident was not caused by unserviceable night vision goggles; and
	No shots were fired in or at any aircraft which were causal to the accident, nor was there any ordnance explosion prior to the collision.

The Board identified 16 directly causative and a further 26 contributing factors. It found a linkage between these factors, although it did not place a separate weighting on each of them.

The Board found a number of long term systemic factors which contributed to the accident. Among them:

	The Black Hawk aircraft had a high rate of unserviceability in the two years leading up to the accident.
	High pilot separation rates over a similar period had further eroded the bank of experience at the 5th Aviation Regiment.

These factors clearly affected the experience levels among Black Hawk crews and prevented them from gaining sufficient flying experience for special counter terrorism operations.

More immediate factors arose from the planning, preparation, rehearsal and conduct of the exercise. Among these:

	The planning for the air mission on the night of the accident was found by the Board to be inadequate.
	There was inadequate information about the objective.
	There was a failure on the part of aircrew adequately to resolve conflicting understanding of the location of specific targets.
	The conduct of the night mission differed from that of the day mission and there was no rehearsal of those changes.
	The Flight Lead in Black 1 lacked experience in leading special recovery missions.

On their own, none of these factors directly caused the accident. But the Board found that as a train of events, they, in addition to other causes, cumulatively contributed to a situation where the accident became inevitable.

The function of the Board was not merely to determine the cause of the crash, but also to identify areas for remedial action to reduce the risk of further accidents. This aspect is of the greatest importance.

The Board made 79 recommendations, many of which require the Australian Defence Force to implement and adhere to best practice procedures. These recommendations will help ensure a safer environment and assist in preventing a recurrence of the circumstances which led to this accident.

At the time of the accident, I made clear our determination that all possible measures were to be taken to ameliorate risk without compromising capability. Accordingly, the Chief of Army has developed a plan to implement the Board's recommendations.

The plan addresses systemic and equipment issues, and proposes measures to improve command, control and exercise planning as well as changes to training.

To stem separation rates, the Army is reviewing the employment and conditions of service of its aircrew. Measures so far taken include the introduction of a Pilot Retention Bonus, increasing return of service obligations and increasing the numbers of trainee Army pilots.

In addition, the Army is ensuring that qualified flying instructors can be better employed in operational units by contracting out some of the less demanding pilot instruction.

Action has been taken to place all counter terrorism and special recovery elements within the same command structure, with all outcomes now being the responsibility of the Land Commander.

The Army is reviewing the training requirements for counter terrorism and special recovery operations. This will establish a training sequence to overcome the erosion of combined skills which had previously occurred between biennial special recovery exercises.

New directives will be issued to ensure that the command and control, planning, intelligence gathering, orders and briefings, conduct of missions and training requirements which were recommended by the Board are specified for future Special Forces operations.

The acquisition of proximity warning devices, improved night vision goggles and redesigned fast roping and rappelling devices is being evaluated.

Crash data recorders will be fitted to all Army aircraft as a matter of priority and to Black Hawk helicopters as a matter of urgency.

I have directed the Chief of Army, as the responsible commander, to provide me with monthly reports on the progress of the implementation plan and on the status and safety of counter terrorism training.

In addition, I have asked the Chief of the Defence Force, General John Baker, to establish an overarching Defence Force Flying Safety Authority, under the Chief of Air Force.

This authority will be responsible for the supervision of all flying safety issues for the Defence Force, regardless of the Service operating individual types of aircraft.

I turn now to the issue of whether disciplinary action is to be taken against any individual.

In accordance with its Terms of Reference, the Board recommended that disciplinary action be considered against five members in relation to negligence, deficiencies in the exercise of command and errors of judgement.

The Chief of Army has considered these recommendations and has taken advice from the Army's Legal Branch.

As a result of advice to him, the Chief of Army has referred the Board's Report and the legal advice to the Land Commander Australia, whom he has appointed as a Convening Authority, to consider whether or not to prefer charges under the Defence Force Discipline Act against three persons.

In addition, the Chief of Army has decided to take administrative action against two other personnel.

Until the matters of military discipline are properly determined by the Convening Authority, it would be quite inappropriate to disclose the names or appointments of any persons facing administrative action or referred to the Convening Authority, or to disclose details of offences which might be pursued against individuals.

For this reason, some of the findings and recommendations which could lead to possible disciplinary action have been expunged from the Report which I will table today.

It is the responsibility of the Convening Authority to decide whether military charges are to be laid. I expect the Chief of Army to announce the decision of the Convening Authority within a month.

I can inform the House, however, that as a result of requests for advice by the Department, separate advice has been received from the Queensland and Commonwealth Directors of Public Prosecutions that, based on the Board's Report, no criminal charges would arise from the accident.

Mr Speaker, for some time the Government has been considering the issue of the adequacy of the compensation and rehabilitation benefits available to members of the ADF.

Military service is distinctly different from civilian employment. It often involves considerably more dangerous activities which may result in severe injury or death. It therefore warrants distinct rehabilitation and compensation arrangements.

The need for a review of military compensation was brought into sharper focus by the Black Hawk accident. In particular, it has become quite clear that parts of the existing peacetime compensation and rehabilitation scheme for ADF personnel are inappropriate.

Consequently, the Minister for Defence Industry, Science and Personnel ordered a review of existing rehabilitation and compensation arrangements for military personnel.

The review was to investigate compensation arrangements for military personnel including the adequacy of the lump sum payments, ancillary benefits and supporting services for dependants of deceased personnel.

It was to also examine the different entitlements that accrue to members of the ADF for death or severe injury suffered during peacetime service under the Veterans' Entitlements Act or the Military Compensation Scheme as well as the administrative arrangements involved when members are covered by both schemes.

This review is to report to Mrs Bishop very shortly and will be subject to consideration by Cabinet.

Nothing we can do will fully compensate for the loss of those 18 Australian servicemen. All of us have been affected by this tragedy. But I hope some consolation can be found in the knowledge that those who perished did so in the service of their country.

The Australian Defence Force has set in train sound, logical and decisive steps to ensure that counter terrorism and special recovery operations can be conducted for the protection of all Australians.

The training and preparation of our counter terrorism forces will continue to be as demanding and realistic as is safely possible. We must maintain our cutting edge capability in counter terrorism operations.

Those lost in this terrible accident would have expected nothing less of us.

Mr Speaker, I present a copy of my Ministerial Statement and a copy of a Report by the Chief of Army on a Training Accident at High Range Training Area, Townsville on 12 June 1996.