Australian special forces and navy divers were
scouting the terrain of East Timor and Indonesian
forces deployments inside the territory months before
the actual landing of United Nations-approved peacemakers
last month, a senior Australian defence source has
revealed. Members of the elite Perth-based Special
Air Services Regiment and the Royal Australian Navy's
Clearance Diving Team (CDT) have been operating clandestinely
on the island since early this year.
The sole task of the two elite units was reconnaissance
in preparation for a large Australian Defence Force
(ADF) deployment.
The SAS's principal subjects have been infrastructure
in and around Dili, Indonesian ground force operations
in the hinterland and movements of military traffic
across the West Timor frontier. CDT divers scoured
Dili harbour and nearby anchorages for anti-shipping
mines, explosives and traps. They also surveyed nearby
sites in case an amphibious landing became necessary.
From the shore they scouted for Indonesian military
(TNI) and militia obstacles and deployments.
The two units train together off the coast near Perth.
While the SAS, whose strength is put at "over
500" by the Defence Department, stayed at Swanbourne
for the Gulf War, the CDT performed Timor-style work
in Kuwait during that conflict. Their orders did not
authorise offensive strikes, interdiction or sabotage.
Deployed by submarine and extracted by helicopter,
they were inserted when the Prime Minister put the
Darwin-based 1 Brigade on 28-day standby in April.
Although the helicopter flights were made at extremely
low level to avoid detection by radar, the TNI did
make it known in June that it was aware of unauthorised
intrusions, though it suspected the flights involved
covert weapons shipments to independence fighters.
On June 9, the Indonesian armed forces commander,
General Wiranto, ordered increased naval and air surveillance
off the East Timor coast after five helicopter flights
were reported in May and June.
The then East Timor military commander, Colonel Tono
Suratman, said there had been two helicopter landings
in the area of Larinkuten, near Viqueque, of a large
helicopter similar to the French-designed Puma. At
the same time as the helicopter landings were reported,
a vessel with a helicopter landing pad had also been
sighted off East Timor's coast, he said.
The description fits with the Seahawk helicopters
operated from RAN frigates.
The covert operations before the creation of the
Interfet force are classified secret and will remain
so under the Federal Cabinet's 30-year rule.
A senior ADF special forces and intelligence officer
recently said the small force was observing Indonesian
military activity as a necessary precursor to full-scale
deployment. The same tactics were used by the British
SAS during the 1982 Falklands and 1990-91 Gulf wars.
In July the same officer was saying that the official
outlook was that the ADF would deploy shortly and
that ensuing peacekeeping and United Nations stabilisation
plans would be similar to those effected in Cambodia
in 1991.
At that time, he said that ADF headquarters in Canberra
expected the eventual UN-sponsored intervention force
to be small and include only a minimal armed security
force. ADF planning did not anticipate an Australian
component as large as 4,500 personnel.
The SAS and CDT cells transmitted constant reports
on TNI and militia activities to ADF headquarters
and the ultra-secret Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
also in Canberra. Only 20 or so people, including
the Prime Minister, were allowed access to these reports
and attached assessments. Most members of Cabinet
have not seen them. The job of the DSD has been to
analyse the reports and conclude whether the recent
atrocities were a sustained policy of terror or a
violent reaction to impending independence.
The SAS cells, comprising no more than five troopers,
would never have been in a position to intervene.
Such operations would have required the support of
the SAS's Sabre Squadron, which has not seen action
since the Vietnam War.
In armed contact with the TNI and militia, the general
observations, technical descriptions and assessments
of TNI capabilities in Timor have been invaluable.
Major-General Peter Cosgrove, the Interfet leader,
inadvertently referred to the ongoing reconnaissance
recently when he said he was interested to read reports
of what the TNI and militia groups were doing in remote
and border areas. The covert surveillance gave the
ADF the most comprehensive intelligence survey of
the Indonesian military and paramilitary activity
as the East Timor situation deteriorated mid-year.
This has been uncomfortable knowledge in one respect.
United States agencies have complained to the Australian
Ambassador, Mr Andrew Peacock, about being denied
access to Australian reports because they were known
to be much more detailed than anything Washington
had.
Mr Peacock declined to forward the reports because
the names and operational deployment details would
be compromised.
The US has its navy and the CIA watching the zone.
Los Angeles class submarines are capable of positioning
pods called Ivy Bells on underwater communication
links. After a month or two they are retrieved and
then decoded.
They are believed to have been listening to TNI traffic
for as long as the SAS has been on the island.
