Special Operations.Com
Belgium
SIE ( Speciaal Interventie Eskadron
)
Special Intervention Squadron
Note: Previously on
this site it appeared that were two CT units in Belgium,
the SIE and the ESI.
The SIE and ESI are in fact one and the same group
and should be treated that way in all reports and
articles.
SIE is the Dutch acronym : Speciaal Interventie Eskadron
ESI is the French acronym : Esquadron d'Intervention
Special
As you may know Dutch and French ( along with German
) are official languages spoken here, Dutch in Flanders
( the north ), French in "La Wallonie" ( the south
).
The name "Diana" is actually "Diane", the Greek goddess
of hunting. The group was called that at its inception,
but quickly adapted the more neutral acronym(s), SIE/ESI.
The goddess is still featured on the unit's badge
however.
Almost all civilians in Belgium still refer to the
SIE/ESI as "groep Diane" ( Group Diane ), although
the name hasn't been officially used for over a decade
now.
The SIE ( Speciaal Interventie
Eskadron ) or Special Intervention Squadron, in English
( in French : SIE = Esquadron Speciale d'Intervention
) are Belgian's only specialized armed police unit.
As Belgium is a small country, they perform both SWAT
and CT duties. Their origin is military since they
were created as a unit within the 'Guard of the Empire'
( = literal translation, you can however compare this
'Guard' with the French Gendarmerie, they are exactly
alike in concept. A Belgian dialect word for them
is 'Gendarmen' which is plural for one member of the
corps ). This 'Guard' had a military organization
and ranking system, they also stood under the command
of the Supreme Military Command. They have however
always performed civil duties : traffic, crime investigation,
... You could view them as a union of State Troopers
and FBI. Due to reforms they are now to merge with
the police force.
The SIE consists of two basic units
: observation and armed support ( = the 'shooters'
= intervention unit ). The observation unit shares
its duties with the POSA ( platoons which perform
observations and high risk arrests ) teams. The POSA
are in fact a spin-off from the SIE, in that the SIE
operates from Brussels, while the POSA has teams in
several parts of the country and serves as 'back-up'
for certain tasks ( not CT however ).
SIE is the primary
group tasked with counterterrorism duties for the
Belgian government. SIE, like many European units,
was created in the aftermath of the 1972 Olympics..
When it was originally raised, it operated under the
code-name "Diane". In spite of the fact
that the name for officially changed to Escadron Special
d’Intervention (ESI) (or, SIE ( Speciaal Interventie
Eskadron ) in 1974, the moniker "Diane"
can still be found when mentioned in the Belgian press.
The unit is also known by the name Groupe Interforces
Antiterroriste. Outside of Belgium , however, the
unit is known by is newer and more formal SIE acronym.
Overall control of
SIE lies with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although
it is important to note that prior to 1994, SIE took
its orders from the Ministry of Defense. Depending
on circumstances, however, the unit can also be deployed
under operational control of the Ministry of Justice.
In those instances, SIE plays the role of a national
SWAT team which includes powers of arrest against
criminals (similar to Germany's GSG-9). When operating
in this environment, SIE may be backed up by the Grupe
de Repression du Terrorisme (GRT) of the Judiciary
Police. This unit has been compared to the United
States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in that
it is a plainclothes unit tasked, in part, with domestic
intelligence-gathering.
SIE
may also work in tandem with the Securite de L'etat
(State Security). This group is unique in that is
receives its tasking only from the office of the Prime
Minister. Securite de L'etat is responsible for infiltrating
domestic terrorist and insurgent groups such as the
Kurdish rSIEstance and Algerian terrorist movement
which has a significant presence in Belgium. SIE acts
as the assault force is situations in which any of
the above organizations are involved. In fact, the
only area in which SIE takes a back seat is in situations
where an explosive device is involved. Here, the unit
hands over duties to the Service d'Enlevement et de
Destruction des Engins Explosifs (SEDEE). In major
terrorist operations outside of Belgium, SIE would
be replaced by the Equippe Specialise de Reconnaisance
(ESR) section of the ParaCommandos.
The 200-man SIE is
broken down into three primary units. An assault/action
branch (SIE); an observation and arrest branch (POSA),
and a medium-sized logistical unit. Notable amongst
these is the observation branch, which is known to
be capable of performing small-scale infiltration
of terrorist groups, similar to the Securite de L'etat.
The unit is one of
a number of international CT units that draws its
membership directly from the national police, in this
case the Gendarmerie Royale. Those who volunteer face
a primary selection process which involves a rigorous
two week course. The attrition rate of this course
is typical, averaging approximately 50 percent. Those
who pass the selection phase face another three months
of training at the "Schoolcompagnie" before
they become fully qualified operators. SIE is different
from many of the western units in that females are
permitted to serve in the unit, although they serve
in observation and undercover roles only. SIE operators
receive training in the offensive and tactical use
of cars and motorcycles during high-speed chases and
hostage rescue. Their motor pool contains unmarked
vans and Mercedes sedans used in undercover work as
well as Range Rover 4x4s. Zodiac inflatable boats
are used for waterborne operations.
In 1993 SIE spent 1,000 man hours
in counterterrorist duties. In the same year they
spent 7,000 hours fighting narcotics trafficking and
nearly 20,000 man-hours combating organized crime.
SIE was deployed under the Department of Justice to
combat an unusual series of murders at supermarkets
in the 1980s. These instances have caused some concern
in Belgium due to accusations that they were the result
of an attempt by senior officers in the SIE to overthrow
the Belgian government. There has been no resolution
to this suspected activity and given the secretive
nature of the unit, speculation is that there most
likely will not be.
A profile of the unit
From an interview conducted with the commander of
the unit, Eric Liévin.
The unit commander, Eric Lievin, gives a synopsis
of the unit's philosophy :"A criminal dealing
with the SIE,
has a better chance of surviving than another. His
chance of escape however will be non-existant".
They try to use a minimal level of violence/force,
and yet try to attain a maximum level of efficiency.
Example of this : an armed and barricaded terrorist
was disarmed and taken away without any blood-shed
on either
side. ( date : March 5 1999 location : Elsene/Ixelles
near Brussels )
Can an armed man who has barricaded himself always
be apprehanded without a brutal intervention
Eric Liévin:
That is at least what is intended. In a crisis-situation
we always try to negociate first. Many hours if that's
what it takes. Some of our staff are trained for that,
and we can always rely on a psychologist of the general
command. Everybody knows that serious problems are
always resolved without violence. In the SIE the priority
is always to prevent harm to any hostages, free them
and catch the bad guys alive. That is our professional
honour and we are trained for these kinds of delicate
situations.
Yet, your men are sometimes obligated to open fire?
Eric Liévin:
Indeed; but only when all other possible means have
failed and when the lives of hostages or operators
is in danger. The variety of possible methods of intervention
is large. It ranges from negociations to shoot to
kill. All methods can all be combined to get the optimal
result : situation solved, nobody hurt. What methods
are there? Without giving away to much details, a
small summary : use of gas, attack dogs, unarmed apprehension,
... Alle methods are studied, analyzed and our operators
are intensively trained in them.
Just like society, we have gone through an evolution.
That society demands less violence and more efficiency.
Some methods which were previously called "efficient",
are now no longer socially acceptable. We work as
hard as we can to limit this violence to an absolute
minimum. This of course calls for technically perfected
means, a thorough training and may mean more risk
to the personnel.
To us, the end result is important, but also the
means by which it is accomplished.
To attain such a level of control, the technical
and physical standards of the SIE must be quite high?
Eric Liévin:
They are. In the intervention unit we have a personnel
shortage of 30%. Plenty of candidates, but we don't
want to change the selection criteria. The delicate
nature of our assignment does not allow such a thing.
BSIEdes the technical and physical aspects, we value
cold-bloodedness, character, stress rSIEstancy, ...
Maturity is primordial. Our men are no cowboys or
crude morons. They have to be able to size up a situation,
knowing that their decision can have catastrofic and
lehtal consequences.
What about selection of
candidates
Eric Liévin: Candidates undergo a
thourough medical examination. After that they take
tests for a week long to evaluate their physical,
psychological and intellectual capacity. He who passes
gets gets a 5 month training, SIE and POSA together.
For the POSA members a 2 month evaluation period withing
the unit is the end of the couse, the members of the
SIE receive an additional 2 month training course,
whether they will serve on the intervention unit or
observation unit.
Could you describe the profile of an operator?
Eric Liévin: Medium
age is 27-28. All of them are expert marksmen, but
some train further in long range sniping or shooting
under adverse conditions. There are also diving and
explosive experts on board. Women are also allowed,
only for the obersvation unit that is. If they would
pass the physical tests for the intervention unit
then they would be allowed to do the job, but up to
now none has passed.
What qualities must a good observer have?
Eric Liévin: A good observer has to
have a lot of patience, an eye for detail and and
a capacity to synthesise everything he sees through
his scope. It is very important that the observers
and the arrest unit function as a tightly knit team.
This goes for POSA as well as SIE. Of course, one
cannot forget the technical staff ( engineers, techinicians,
... ). Thanks to them and the new techniques they
introduce, operations previously thought impossible,
are now a reality.
What about training frenquency ?
Eric Liévin: They
train as much as possible, either in Belgium or abroad.
But there is a feeling that there is not enough time
for training, because of the amount of operations
performed. Training gives the squad the chance to
practice all different kinds of situations : barricadings,
kidnapping, airplane hijack, hostage taking, uprisings,
...
How do the men deal with the stress coming from operating
in extremely dangerous situations.
Eric Liévin: During an op there is
little time for stress, it's there of course, but
they are trained to keep it under control in the heat
of the battle. Afterwards stress feelings are dealt
with, everybody does it in their own way.
Have members already been killed on an op?
Eric Liévin: Not on an op, but in training
yes. In 1987 a member died during an exercise with
a helicopter, and in the beginning of the 90's another
member died during a live fire drill.
Does that mean that a drill is more dangerous than
an op?
Eric Liévin: No. But it is so that
a training exercise has to approach reality as close
as possible. And exercises are more frequent than
really dangerous ops. So it is normal that a team
is in more danger during exercises than during ops.
When somebody dies it is always an accident, and an
inquiry is always performed to see whether the squad
is not stretching the limits. In comparison with other
foreign units the death toll is small in the SIE,
although every death is one too many.
Is the combination of a family life and a job in
the SIE easy, since they have to be available 24 hours
a day?
Eric Liévin: It certainly is not !
One has to be available at any moment and family life
can suffer because of it. Our guys ( SIE and POSA
) carry a semaphone which can go off at any given
time. It does not matter where they are, they have
to drop everything and go straight to the unit. To
count on daddy to pick up the kids is a risky thing.
The wives also have to live with the anxiety of seeing
their husband leave for a maybe risky assignment.
Can one say that in every intervention, there is
a lesson to be learned?
Eric Liévin: Yes. We are so professional
that we do indeed look for a lesson in every intervention
we do. Debriefings are very important to us. Even
if we have had, up to today, quite a number of successful
missions - fortunately -, we do learn more from our
mistakes then from our successes. My definition of
the word "mistake"? What I can think of
is a gas propelling unit which malfunctions, due to
lack in maintenance... But we always try to not let
the mission success depend on one single means. Especially
when technical stuff is involved...we always have
a back-up plan.
We also have debriefings with foreign units. We have
had members of the GIGN come over here, to analyze
the way we handled a situation in Elsene. Three years
before that, we went to them to gain valuable lessons
from the storming of the hijacked aircraft in Marseille.
Is luck a factor in what you do?
Eric Liévin: That speaks for itself.
Without a wee bit of luck, any op, how well prepared
it may be, can end in the wrong way. However, we have
to 'help' luck in every possible way, try to eliminate
coincidence completely.
Are there at this time situations that can catch
your unit off guard?
Eric Liévin: In
all modesty, I do think I'd have to answer yes to
that question. We try to be prepared for kinds of
developments in a situation, but surprise always lurks
around the corner.
We always deploy our means as flexibly as possible,
to be able to control any given situation. We do keep
an open mind to all kinds of new technologies ( arms,
transmission, ... ) We Belgians have one great advantage.
Our land on the cross roads of the Anglo-Saxon, German
and Latin culture. We combine the Latin sense for
imagination, improvisation and flexibility with a
fiercefully strong will. That is our great strength.
---------------------------------------------------------------
"A merciless selection"
BRUSSELS. - In the session 1997-'98, 132 member of
the gendarmes, were candidate for a function within
a unit of the SIE, while there were only 51 available
positions : 23 for observation, 16 for intervention
and 12 for POSA ). In a first selection round 29 candidates
were waived ( for medical or administrative reasons,
or dropped on request )
Eventually 59 candidates took part in a week of tests
for the observation unit and 44 for the intervention
unit and the POSA. After that week, only 24 candidates
for observation remained, 6 for intervention and 8
for POSA.
During training 19 members, passed all tests and
they were assigned to the SIE : 12 for observation,
5 for POSA and 2 for intervention. That results in
a 15% drop out. A lieutenant of the training unit,
says the average percentage would be around 20 for
the last couple of years.
---------------------------------------------------------------
"Patience"
BRUSSELS. - José Masschelin, reporter
for a belgian newspaper.
"Because of my profession I have been able to
follow quite a number of SIE operations. What I remember
mostly about them, is the sheer professionalism with
which they resolve the situation, but also their tremendous
patience. They are capable of waiting for hours and
hours, before performing a direct action, which can
sometimes be violent. I also followed an op of the
RAID in Roubaix. Without questioning the skills of
these people, I thought they began shooting rather
fast, four people died there.
When an Islamic fundamentalist had barricaded himself
in Elsene, the SIE approached the situation very differently.
For hours and hours they talked, when that got no
results, the terrorist was apprehended without having
any injury."
--------------------------------------------------------------
"A Close Bond"
VERSAILLES. - The commander of the GIGN, commander
Eric Thomas (34).
"The SIE is a sister unit of the GIGN. We have
a very good relationship with our belgian colleagues,
which is more than a mere partnership. You could describe
the bond between our units, as one of great respect
and friendship. De members of the SIE are true pro's,
but nonetheless very modest. We have learned quite
a bit from them, concerning special techniques of
combatting certain forms of criminality and negociation
skills. We meet on a regular basis to exchange professional
experience. The bond between the SIE and the GIGN
is very close."
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