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Ex New Horizons · 1997-98

Serveur de Guerre, paix et sécurité
Ex New Horizons · 1997-98

A Commitment to Canadians Abroad: a NEO Capability for the Canadian Forces
by/par LCdr Richard H. Jean

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfillment of one of the communication skills requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ

Since the evacuation of more than 50 Canadians from the violence of Albania by British and Italian Armed Forces, Canada’s ability to serve and protect her citizens abroad has never been more questionable. With the ongoing competition for dwindling natural resources, ethnic wars and general chaotic unrest, global instability will continue to mark a large number of countries where Canada has representatives.
Numerous budget cuts, re-engineering and governmental agendas have stripped the Canadian Forces (CF) of its potential capacity to efficiently rescue Canadian citizens from hostile territory. This paper explores what is required in the execution of Non Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and argues why Canada must have this capability borne within her Armed Forces. By reviewing events that have affected Canadians and other allied countries, the paper highlights why this important feature of Canadian sovereignty cannot be left into the hands of our allies.
The paper also examines current CF capabilities including compatibility with others as well as current training levels. The paper concludes with recommendations on how we can affordably give the CF the core capacity to conduct NEO.

PART 1 - INTRODUCTIONd

Canada sympathizes with the people of Albania, who have endured financial and economic hardship. However, restraints must be shown by avoiding the use of force and by laying down arms immediately.

Rt. Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, March 1997

As witnessed over the course of the last decade, the potential for small-scale regional conflicts throughout the world is not only very high but also increasing. With the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the need for worldwide security has grown rather than receded. Another factor which will de-stabilize global security is the expected population growth and the ever diminishing food, water and energy supplies required to sustain this expansion. Indeed, the United Nations estimates indicate that by the year 2050, the world population will reach over 10 billion people. Compounding these issues is the exponential growth in the world wide number of refugees, the breakdown of authority in many states and the resurgence of old hatreds. These challenges provide for difficult and immediate threats to international security.

These threats are not confined to any particular region of the world and are always very difficult to predict. Be it the ethnic, religious or political extremism as witnessed in the Balkan civil wars or the rise of fundamentalism in most parts of Africa and Asia, ethnic cleansing and other violent demonstrations continue to attract world-wide attention.[1]

The sum total of these trends do not indicate a fundamental breakdown of order in the international system, but neither do they indicate that the hopeful predictions of a stable and peaceful "New World Order" made in 1989 are likely to occur any time soon.... Global Stability will be the exception rather than the rule.[2]

A too often indirect casualty of these conflicts are the Canadian citizens trapped within those countries. As part of her foreign policy, Canada is committed to project her values and influence abroad. As such, she continues to maintain diplomats throughout the world in the hope of encouraging democracy and the rule of law. Unfortunately, those appointments can often be in dangerous regions plagued with deteriorating democratic environments. Whether those citizens are serving as ambassadors or within the private industry or even vacationing, Canada must be able to ensure the protection and, if required, the safe evacuation of those citizens.

This paper will argue why there is a critical requirement for the Canadian Forces (CF) to commit to the rescue and evacuation of her citizens trapped in desperate situations abroad. The thesis will explore the definitions and requirement of Non Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and propose how this expertise could be applied and developed. Drawing upon recent events where Canada had to call upon her allies to permit the rescue of her citizens, the paper will make a case as to why this capability must be present within the lifelines of the CF. The paper will also briefly describe what needs to be done in order for the CF to achieve this essential capability.

PART 2 - DISCUSSION

...the first concern of defence policy is the national aim of ensuring that Canada should continue secure as an independent political entity.

1971 Defence White Paper

Non Combatant Evacuation

NEO are conducted to evacuate civilian non-combatants and non-essential military personnel from locations in a foreign nation during time of endangerment to a designated safe area. NEO are normally conducted to evacuate citizens whose lives are in danger from a hostile environment but can also be required in the event of a natural disaster. NEO may also include the evacuation of military personnel and their families, selected citizens of the host nation or citizens of a third nation. The operation consists of a swift and temporary occupancy of an objective and is completed with a planned withdrawal of all personnel.[3]

There are two distinct environments in which NEO are conducted: permissive and non- permissive. Permissive operations are characterised by relatively benign environments such as disaster relief or evacuations when local transportation facilities are simply not available or when the local government agrees to the evacuation. Non-permissive operations are at the other end of the spectrum and can be distinguished from permissive operation by their hostile environment where use of lethal force may be required. These operations are often referred to as Hostile or Opposed NEO. Examples of these are where a host government or other forces are expected to oppose evacuation and military assistance.

Canadian doctrine describes non permissive NEO as a case where the host country is unable to provide or guarantee the security of the evacuation. In fact Canadian doctrine presumes that all Canadian evacuation operations will be conducted in a permissive environment for example "...where the host government agrees to the evacuation and to the provision of logistics and security support."[4]

NEO operations differ from other military operations in that the overall direction of the operation will remain with the Ambassador or the civilian authority that has requested the evacuation. The military commander is a supporting commander and is responsible for the military planning and execution of the whole operation. Another particularity of all NEO operations is that they usually involve units from more than one service. Evacuation may be conducted via air, land or sea using rail, rotary or fixed-wing aircraft, ferryboats, or ships.

Embassies are required to keep up-to-date evacuation Contingency Plans (CONPLANS) that include procedures for locating, notifying and assembling evacuees. Those plans will normally provide detailed information on the Command and Control arrangement for the region, a list of all diplomats and staff directly employed at the embassy, as well as a list of all Canadian nationals in the host country.

Once the Ambassador has requested evacuation, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) will designate an evacuation force charged with the responsibility of conducting the NEO. The unit responsible for the operation then deploys to the area of interest and commences the operation. During the execution phase, the unit secures assembly areas and an evacuation site, establishes defensive perimeters, and locates and escorts evacuees. Paramount in the execution of NEO is the requirement for force protection as well as that of their charge. This action may include establishing physical barriers to protect assembly areas and evacuation sites.[5] Under benign environments, the local populace will be informed of the intention to evacuate and may also be made aware of the Rules of Engagement used by the evacuation force.

The in-country ambassador is also responsible for providing local intelligence, local government liaison, and assistance to the NEO commander. The ambassador is the only person authorised to request, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), CF assistance or protection. Finally, the task of identifying whom is to be allowed to evacuate rest solely on the ambassador or his/her duly appointed representative.[6]

Another trait of NEO is that they often involve the removal, transport and temporary lodgement of a large number of personnel that are living under various degrees of personal discomfort and stress.[7]

As with most military operations, a critical aspect for NEO is the requirement for robust command and control arrangements. As the evacuation is often hectic, confusing and swift, communications between the evacuation force and the embassy staff is extremely important to the success of the operation. Secure communications are always preferred as they help maintain the element of security and surprise. "Early political decisions and speedy deployment of the evacuation force are [also] fundamental to the success of an evacuation force."[8]

Current Commitment to Canadians Abroad

Canadians serving abroad or visiting foreign lands have every right to expect that their government will continue to serve and protect them as required by current Canadian law. The law goes as far as considering embassies as sovereign territory. Although Foreign Service members accept that there may be risks associated to their appointment, they too are expecting to be protected in the event of hostilities in their host country. Ambassadors and their staff enjoy diplomatic privileges, which in fact gives them the same protection, as they would normally find in their country of origin.

Although not shielded to the extent of diplomats, ordinary Canadian citizens vacationing abroad also enjoy some degree of protection. Indeed, citizens who find themselves in difficulty can get help through a world-wide network of 250 offices, primarily found in Canadian Embassies and Consulates. This network is co-ordinated from the Ottawa headquarters of DFAIT through a sophisticated communications system that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Any Canadian can call one of these overseas offices and get the assistance they require.[9] The Consular Client Services Division of DFAIT is responsible for this service which extends to the provision of their evacuation should it become necessary.[10] All Canadian citizens can therefore count on getting rescued if they find themselves in need of evacuation.

Another department of the Canadian government responsible for the security of Canadian citizens is the CF. Their role in this mission, as described in the 1994 Defence White Paper, is to "maintain the capability to assist DFAIT in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas threatened by imminent conflict."[11] Their part in this assignment is also detailed in the 1998 Defence Planning Guide (DPG 98). DPG 98 explains that the CF are responsible for the "...evacuation of Canadians from a foreign nation where the government is facing an insurrection".[12] This task is limited to the effect that the only scenario that is to be contemplated is a permissive evacuation of Canadians and other nationals by a combined force. It does not allow the execution of NEO in a non-permissive or hostile environment.[13]

Therefore, the only time the CF can intervene on its own is when the host nation permits the evacuation. The only security that can be provided will be through the local constabulary or, in the case of a large consulate or embassy, the local RCMP detachment consisting of half a dozen police officers. Should the evacuation be non-permissive, very little help or protection can be offered as the CF are not expected or even mandated to conduct evacuation operations in a hostile environment. There are multiple examples where the local security forces soon found themselves to be inadequate for the task.

Real World Examples

Unfortunately, all evacuations are not created equal and the permissive type operations are the exception rather than the rule. The most recent example of a non-permissive Canadian evacuation occurred in the Albanian capital of Tirana. Following weeks of violence and a deteriorating domestic situation caused by the collapse of high-risk investment schemes in which nearly every Albanian family lost all their money, the British, American, Canadian and several other embassies ordered the evacuation of their citizens. President Clinton said that while there was no evidence that Americans were being directly targeted, "the disorder and violence... subjected American citizens and property to risks ranging from criminal acts to random violence."[14]

On March 13, 1997, DFAIT issued an advisory urging all Canadians to leave Albania. Those citizens had to be evacuated with the assistance of the British and American Embassies where they boarded Italian, British and American naval vessels. This operation was executed in what can clearly be described as a hostile environment as Albanian gunman fired on Italian and U.S. military helicopters evacuating the foreigners. In all, approximately 60 Canadians had to be evacuated from Tirana to various safe havens.

In the winter of 1987/88, trouble erupted once again in the small Caribbean island of Haiti. Canadian interest and citizens were being put at risk due to growing civil disobedience and random acts of violence. As a precautionary measure, the CDS ordered the Navy, Army and Air Force to plan and prepare for the evacuation of all Canadian citizens from three key points- of-entries in Haiti. As the naval task group took station off the coast of Haiti, the Army and Air Force made preparation for an airborne assault and deployment of tactical air transport to the island. The plan, training and military capability proved so inadequate that the operation was about to be cancelled when thankfully, the situation stabilised and tension eased enough to allow the citizens to evacuate via commercial airlift.

There are numerous other examples where countries, similar to Canada, exercised their sovereignty through the protection and evacuation of their citizens trapped abroad. Let’s examine the most recent example of a NEO conducted by another medium power. On the 17th of October 1997, the French Armed Forces effected the evacuation of more than 50 French civilians, civil servants and foreign nationals from the regions of Dolisie and Kayes in the Congo. The operation, nicknamed "Operation Antilope", took place amidst the Congo civil war where civil disorder, general hostilities and random acts of violence against French citizens were becoming increasingly alarmed. On October 14, the French authorities put together a joint task force responsible for the swift, stealthy and efficient evacuation of their compatriots. Elements of two companies of French Commandos, five fighter aircraft, five Tactical Transports and 1 Command and Control aircraft as well as one warship were tasked with the evacuation of 59 French citizens.[15]

Current CF Capabilities

As witnessed during the ice storm of 1998 or the Red River floods of 1997, the CF are well suited to carry out benign, permissive type evacuations. However, the capacity to obtain the same kind of success in hostile circumstances is extremely limited at best. We have had to either rely on the good will of other nations to help rescue stranded Canadians or we have had the good fortune of events diffusing themselves thus avoiding probable disasters.

As required by law, the CF must be able to answer the call from our distressed citizens no matter where they are located and no matter how dire their situation. The 1987 White Paper highlighted some of the capabilities that should become requirements and made tentative provisions for an increase and a consolidation of our commitment to sovereignty and collective security. The paper called for a number of "quick reaction battalion capable of rapid deployment to any area of the country and smaller SAS-type units for the rescue of terrorist hostages’ abroad and at home."[16]

Since the disbandment of the Airborne Regiment, however, this capability has virtually disappeared. Today, there is only one unit capable of participating in the rescue of Canadians caught in austere situations. That Unit is the CF Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2) located near Ottawa, Canada. This small elite team is mandated to provide a capability to "assist in mounting, at all times, an immediate and effective response to terrorist incidents."[17] Since most of the information available on this task force is classified, I will limit my comment to what is available in open sources.

JTF 2 is capable of rendering rapid, decisive help to small-scale rescue situations.[18] The unit is deployable anywhere in the world and is trained in hostage rescue, evacuation operation and terrorist takedown. Because of their size, most operations have to be executed with the assistance of a third party capable of providing perimeter defence, transportation and control assets. As such, should JTF 2 have been tasked with the Albanian evacuation, they would have required the assistance of a Rapid Reaction company as well as Tactical Transport assets in order to secure the points of entry, outer perimeter and evacuation lift. Since there is no force in Canada capable of quickly deploying as a Rapid Reaction company, JTF 2 would have had to rely on the assistance of an Allied unit such as the United States Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) or MEU (SOC). The MEU (SOC) is a ship borne, elite team capable of Special Operations which receives extensive training on NEO.

A typical NEO involving the MEU will normally comprise of approximately 4-5 assault helicopters, 6-8 fighter aircraft in close air support and numerous small to medium size landing craft. Total manpower for NEO is anywhere between one hundred to five hundred Marines normally borne on one of America’s Amphibious Units.[19] The biggest advantage of the MEU (SOC) capability is its self-sustainability and the fact that they do not depend on the other services when conducting NEO.

How well then, can we expect our units to operate with our allies? Doctrinally, the CF are compatible with her NATO partners and other allies. Indeed, Canadian doctrine is inspired from the Unites States Navy’s own Tactical Procedure Publications and covers permissive and hostile environment with and without allied assistance.[20]

To date, the capacity to carry out these types of operations has been rarely practised and has always been limited to permissive type of operations involving naval, air and land forces tasked with the rescue of a limited number of evacuees.

MARCOT 96, a navy led, joint and combined exercise conducted off the coast of Nova Scotia marked the first event where the CF applied some of the principles related to NEO. The NEO portion of the exercise was relatively small in scope and did not involve a key component namely DFAIT. Instead, civilian staff from the Leaster B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Centre acted as the embassy representative. Although the exercise proved very beneficial in learning the intricacies of NEO, MARCOT 97 did not provide a true test of what a full-scale evacuation entails.[21] Lift capability from shore to sea consisted of approximately 4 to 6 medium size Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) capable of transporting 8-10 persons each.

The biggest shortcoming in the current training curriculum is that there has been no co- ordinated joint exercise between DFAIT and DND to date. Another deficiency is that, because of our lack of capability, these exercises must be conducted in a completely benign environment where the scenario calls for no opposition from the host nation.

Notwithstanding our compatibility with other nations and our efforts to exercise NEO, our ability to exercise with our allies is often limited. The simple fact that we do not have the capability to engage in a more robust environment seriously put into question our effectiveness in supporting Allied efforts. During exercise JTFEX 97-3, the Canadian Task Group (CATG) had originally been tasked to support the Amphibious Task Group (ATG) in their execution of a non-combatant extraction. After multiple co-ordination meetings, the Commander of the ATG and the Commanding Officer of the Marine Expeditionary Unit requested that the Canadians be re-tasked for another role as it was felt that the CATG lacked the experience and know-how to even support the NEO.

Realistically speaking then, the CF can only be attributed with a limited capacity for evacuation from foreign shores and then only in a strictly permissive or benign environment. In fact, because of this capability gap, Canada, as a sovereign nation, has had to rely entirely on the capacity of our allies. Although this may seem acceptable and can sometimes even be the preferred option such as when our forces are committed elsewhere, to rely solely on other armed forces seriously compromises our ability to act as a sovereign state.

Based on current capabilities and training levels, all we can hope therefore is that either the rescue will be permissive or that our allies will come to our rescue. To rely on allies for the protection of our citizens is neither desirable nor feasible. To wit, the Unites States government guidance on the rescuing of foreigners clearly states that they are not a priority and nor should we expect them to be. In fact pursuant to Executive Order 12565, the U.S. Department of States’ priority for the evacuation of foreign nationals is third behind American citizens and their alien immediate families.

Another important factor in this issue is one of reciprocity. Is it realistic to expect our allies to commit their forces to evacuate Canadians? Arguably, if the Canadians are leaving, chances are that nationals from our allied partners are also on the move. But this is not a guarantee. Even if that were the case, how long will those same allies, who constantly state that we are not fulfilling our defence commitment on the world scene, continue to support our needs when we cannot reciprocate? The solution could be then to combine our efforts by offering air and sea support and even perhaps the services of Canada's own JTF 2. But even so, the issue of reciprocity would still not be completely satisfied. Our allies’ first priority will always be to their own countrymen.

As it stands therefore, we are virtually at the complete mercy of allied help and are unable to fully exercise our sovereignty. This situation is clearly unacceptable and is in fact contrary to the premise of the 1994 Defence White Paper which clearly states "...that Canada should never find itself in a position where, as a consequence of past decisions, the defence of our national territory has become the responsibility of others."[22]

Bridging the Gap

How can we realistically ensure that the safety of Canadians rest primarily in the hands of its own countrymen?

Brutal defence budget cuts, ostensibly to balance the budget, have squandered the combat power of the Canadian Forces. Without fanfare or public debate, Prime Minister Jean Chretien has quietly succeeded in disarming Canada. All that is left is a $9 billion border patrol.[23]

This comment by a reader of Maclean’s, although overstated, does reflect the ever- growing capability gap that the CF faces today. Multi-purpose combat capable force sounds good, but as described above, this capability falls short of meeting some of our the basic commitments to Canada and Canadians.

To recap, there are three key components in a NEO: First, an immediate reaction force capable of seizing the objective and establishing immediate contact with the evacuees. Second, a rapid reaction force large enough to secure a point of entry such as a harbour or airfield. The rapid reaction force must also be large enough to provide outer perimeter security at the assembly point. And lastly, a lift capability - air or sea - capable of both delivering the NEO force and transporting the evacuees to a safe haven.

The immediate reaction force requirement was satisfied by the creation in 1991 of Joint Task force 2 and does not need further examination. A rapid reaction capability was present within the lifelines of the CF until 1994 when, amidst criticism over the Somalia affair, the Liberal government ordered the disbandment the airborne regiment. This regiment was the only unit capable of quickly deploying, in force, anywhere in the world. Their combat power made them the only unit capable of fulfilling the security and escort requirements of a NEO.[24]

While our capacity to transport personnel via air is fair, our capability to conduct anything but small-scale evacuation by sea is marginal. With the forecasted payoff of the AOR by 2005, the Canadian Navy will loose its only lift capability. What is required is a vessel capable of not only transporting the evacuees, but also providing joint command and control facility from where NEO could be planned and executed. The Multi-Role Supply Vessel could provide the CF with a superb capability as "the primary role of these warships [is] to support naval operations and provide the CF with a sealift capability of overseas contingency and peacekeeping operations."[25] Their design will also allow them to effect Command and Control as well as embark a large number of passengers making it the perfect vessel for operations in the littoral in support of evacuation operation.

Another possibility would be the acquisition of a small carrier as a replacement to the IROQUOIS class destroyers scheduled to be paid off by 2010. "A carrier capability would offer greater potential to engage in unilateral Canadian Operations. NEO ... would be more viable, allowing a wider range of possible responses to be available to our political leaders for a given situation."[26]

How much of this can we realistically afford? While the cost of a carrier as a replacement to the ageing DDH 280 requires further study than is allowed by the scope of this paper, the MRSV has already been deemed to be affordable to the CF and Canada. As for the Airborne Regiment, since it was not disbanded as a cost saving measure, its reinstatement would only come at a certain political price, much of which is impossible to determine. In all, bridging the gap is a measure that is practicable, affordable and necessary.

PART 3 - CONCLUSION

The protection of Canadian sovereignty is a national task and Canada can neither expect the active assistance of our allies in the face of most contingencies, nor should it rely on them to protect our responsibilities.[27]

Canada, as a sovereign nation, holds basic duties and requirements that extend beyond the 12 nautical mile territorial sea. A basic premise of this claim is the ability to defend our land, possessions and our people. The primary arm of defence is Canada’s own combat capable multi- purpose Armed Forces. As described in the 1983-84 Statement of Defence Estimate, the Government called for such an armed force capable of protecting Canada and canadian national interest at home and abroad.[28] Never should we have to rely on a third party to execute the functions of defending the state. As it stands today however, the ability to exercise such principle is compromised by our inability to come to the rescue of our citizens held against their will in a country where law and order has collapsed. At present, we must count on our allies to do the job.

For Canada, the ability to conduct NEO on her own in a hostile environment is not only desirable; it is essential if we want to continue operating as a sovereign power. It would permit a degree of autonomy not currently present and enable participation in combined operations thus creating reciprocity when our assets cannot make it in time. Will innocent Canadians have to pay the price with their lives before the Government commits to this flexible and affordable capability? By giving us the means, the CF can fulfil a basic requirement in the defence of Canada sovereignty.

A NEO capability for the CF is not only affordable it is long overdue

Notes

¹Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper. (Ottawa: NDHQ Canada, 1994), P 5.

²Maritime Command, Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada, (Halifax: MARCOMHQ Canada), p11.

³United States Army, Army Field Manual (FM)-90-29101, Non Combatant Evacuation Operations, (Washington DC, USA, 1994), p 1-1.

⁴Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, Canadian Forces Operations, (Ottawa: NDHQ, Canada, 1997), Chap 11.

⁵Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-00, Canadian Forces Operations.... Chap 11, p 24.

⁶Ibid, p 18.

⁷United States Army, Army Field Manual (FM)-90-29101, Non Combatant Evacuation Operations... p 1-3.

⁸Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, Canadian Forces Operations ... Chap 11, p 12.

⁹DFAIT, Communiqué no 72, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca, (April 18 1996).

¹⁰Consular services and issues are currently under review by DFAIT.

¹¹Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper.... P 39.

¹²DPG 98, Defence Planning Guide, (Ottawa: NDHQ, Canada, 1998), Chap 3 p 23.

¹³Ibid p 27.

¹⁴AP news release, U.S. Rescue Operation Evacuates 400 Americans from Albania, http://www.lubbockonline.com, (15 Mar 97).

¹⁵Malo Durand, "Opération Antilope," Armées d’aujourd’hui, No 226, p 23.

¹⁶John Hasek, The Disarming of Canada, (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1987) p 229.

¹⁷Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper ... p 19.

¹⁸Commanding Officer, JTF2 Briefing, Mirabel Airport, 20 Apr 98.

¹⁹Naval War College, Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) - At the Operational Level in Military Operations Other than War, (Newport RI, USA, 16 May 95), p 3

²⁰Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, Canadian Forces Operations, ...p 31.

²¹LCDR D. Steele, MARLANTHQ, personal interview, May 97.

²²Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper... p 19.

²³J. Cecil Berezowski, Letter to the Editor, Maclean’s, (May 4, 1998).

²⁴MAJ Denis Thomson, CFCSC Toronto On, personal interview, 12 Apr 98.

²⁵Maritime Command, The Naval Vision, (Halifax: MARCOMHQ Canada 1994), p 23.

²⁶Tom Tulloch, An Aircraft Carrier for the Canadian Forces, Exercise New Horizons, 4 May 98.

²⁷Maritime Command, Adjusting Course... p 28.

²⁸John Hasek, The Disarming of Canada. ... p 226.

Bibliography

Books

Hasek, John. The Disarming of Canada. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1987.

Journals and Magazines

Berezowski, Cecil J. "Letter to the editor." Maclean’s (12 April 1998), p 4.

Durand, Malo. "Opération Antilope." Armées d’aujoud’hui. No 226 (Janvier 1998), p23.

Government Publications

Canada, Department of National Defence. 1994 Defence White Paper. Ottawa: NDHQ Canada, 1994.

Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Canadian Forces Operations. Ottawa: NDHQ Canada, 1997.

Canada, Department of National Defence, DPG 98 Defence Planning Guide 1988. Ottawa: NDHQ Canada, 1998.

Canada, Maritime Command, Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada. Halifax: MARCOMHQ Canada, 1997.

Canada, Maritime Command, The Naval Vision. Halifax: MARCOMHQ Canada, 1994.

Canada, Canadian Forces College. A Carrier for the Canadian Forces. Toronto: CSC 24, 1998

United States, Department of the Army. Army Field Manual (FM)-90-29101, Non Combatant Evacuation Operations. Washington D.C., 1994.

United States, Naval War College. Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) - At the Operational Level in Military Operations Other than War. Newport R.I. 1995.

Electronic Resources

"AP News Release, U.S. Rescue Operation Evacuates 400 Americans from Albania." [http://www.lubbockonline.com], Mar 97.

"DFAIT Communiqué no 72" [http://www.dfait-maegi.gc.ca], Apr 96.

Interviews and Briefings

Commanding Officer Joint Task Force 2, JTF 2. Briefing held at Mirabel Airport PM 20 Apr 98.

Steele, Lieutenant Commander David, MARLANTHQ Halifax. Personal Interview. May 97.

Thomson, Major Denis, CFCSC Toronto, Personal Interview. Apr 98.