China's Secret Weapon for Information Warfare

By Mr. John A. Thacker, Jr.

Introduction

Over the past 5 years numerous articles have appeared in Chinese military journals proclaiming the critical importance of winning electronic and information battles in "local war under high-tech conditions." In a handful of these articles, the authors consider using Special Operations forces (SOF) to attack command-and-control (C²) targets. Since at least 1997, SOF have carried out electronic warfare (EW) missions in a number of People's Liberation Army (PLA) large-scale exercises. During the same period, Chinese companies began to market man-portable EW systems, suitable for employment by SOF against C² facilities. This article examines the PLA's vision of EW and its development of tactics for SOF to conduct EW missions.

Doctrinal Development

The underlying principle in the PLA for EW doctrine is to seize the initiative by disrupting the enemy's ability to exercise effective C² while protecting one's own C² capacity. In a number of PLA articles, the authors expand the classic definition of EW to include physical attacks on the full range of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, sensors, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) systems and networks. In fact, the terms EW and information warfare (IW) seem to be used almost interchangeably by PLA authors. For example, during an October 1997 PLA exercise in Chengdu Military Region, the "electronic warfare scenario" included not only standard EW actions (jamming, intercept, and electronic protection measures), but also depicted "electronic combat with artillery attacks," camouflage and deception to counter reconnaissance, and the use of SOF personnel to destroy an enemy command post (see figure 1), thus integrating the basic components of IW.

Figure 1. SOF Personnel Rapidly Retreat After
They Destroy an Enemy Command Post During Chengdu Exercise

EW Missions for Special Forces

The employment of SOF teams for EW missions gives the PLA several important capabilities for conducting attacks on enemy C² systems. Of primary importance, SOF offer the PLA the ability to disrupt enemy C² in the rear area. Ground-based EW systems have a limited range due to propagation losses (a fixed amount of energy being spread over a broader area with increasing distance), terrain masking, and other obstacles. Realizing this, the adversary will often place key C² nodes in its rear area, out of range of ground-based EW systems and most indirect-fire weapons. As demonstrated in the Chengdu exercise, the PLA will employ SOF teams to degrade or destroy these C² centers.

In addition to direct action, PLA SOF units train for electronic countermeasure (ECM) operations where ground-based standoff EW equipment is out of range of the intended target. These teams carry lightweight intercept and jamming equipment (see figures 2 and 3) and are highly trained, specializing in enemy communications equipment and fundamental code-breaking skills. SOF teams will employ ground, air, or naval means to infiltrate the enemy's operational and strategic depth. Once near the target, the team will conduct intercept, jamming, and electronic deception missions against communications or radar systems. In addition to traditional EW actions, Chinese writers have begun to comment on the possibility of using special operations to attack automated command networks. One author points out that because computer viruses spread very rapidly through a network, access to even a remote, unprotected network node could result in widespread disruption.

Figure 2. Manpack Direction-FInding (DF)
System for the Very-High-Frequency (VHF) Band

Figure 3. Portable Signal Collection System
for Locating and "Fingerprinting" Radars

Advantages

The use of SOF teams for jamming and intercept provides a number of advantages over traditional standoff jamming methods. The close proximity of the team provides a significant range advantage over ground-based standoff EW platforms. The propagation loss from a jammer to the targeted receiver is much lower for the SOF man-portable system. For example, an SOF team that is 500 meters from the target will have a propagation loss at least 10,000 times lower than that of a ground-based system located 50 km from the target. This allows the SOF team to use much less power for effective jamming. The SOF would have the same advantage for intercepting signals, allowing collection of very weak signals that a standoff system would not detect. Because the SOF team uses relatively low jamming power and is operating in the enemy's depth, there is little chance that jamming will interfere with friendly communications. Unintentional interference can be a serious problem for standoff jamming systems.

Finally, SOF teams provide the PLA with an effective means of overcoming serious technical and financial resource constraints in their development of offensive EW and IW capabilities. Most EW missions performed by SOF teams have alternative high-tech solutions, such as precision strike weapons or unmanned aerial vehicles with advanced EW capabilities; however, these solutions can be very expensive and technologically challenging. The use of SOF provides the PLA with the option of investing in human resources rather than its limited technical and financial resources.

Conclusion

In the PLA, SOF teams are an essential component for disrupting enemy C² and seizing the initiative. The expansion of the battlefield and the dispersion of the C² system provide enhanced opportunities for SOF to take direct action against C⁴ISR nodes. As portrayed in PLA exercises, coordinated strikes by conventional weapons, SOF teams, and standoff EW assets throughout the enemy depth will make it possible to completely disrupt the enemy's C² capability.