Special Operations.Com
Germany
Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9)
Note: GSG-9 no longer handles terrorist
situations outside of Germany. They are now
more akin to the U.S. FBI's Hostage Rescue Team (HRT)
in that they respond only to terrorist situations
with Germany's borders.
Hot Link
Operation
Magic Fire
Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9)
Formed: 1973
Headquarters: Hangelar, Germany
GSG-9 was formed as a direct result of the inept response
of German police to actions of Black September terrorists
at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Following the end of
World War Two, German authorities had been apprehensive
about creating an elite military unit for any purpose.
This, in addition to the desire to demonstrate to
the world that Germany was no longer the fearsome
entity it once was, caused planners to establish security
that was as low-profile as possible. As a result,
the terrorists were able to penetrate the Olympic
compound, murder two athletes and take nine others
hostage. The incident took an even worse turn when
the on scene commander ordered his men to fire on
the terrorists who were preparing to board two helicopters
to effect their escape. Poor marksmanship, coupled
with a number of snipers who refused to fire, led
to the least desirable outcome - an open gun battle.
When the smoke cleared on the Furstenfeldbruck military
airfield, the nine remaining hostages and terrorists
were dead. After this, the Germans vowed they would
not be taken by surprise again and authorized the
creation of a counterterrorist unit which was deemed
operational in April 1973 - only six months after
the incident at Munich. The only stipulation was that
GSG-9 would be manned and controlled not by the military,
but by the Federal Border Police Force (Bundesgrenzschutz)
instead. One benefit that membership in the Federal
Border Police provides to German government CT efforts
is that these highly skilled operators can also conduct
long-term infiltration of terrorist groups, which
increases the potential for foiling any illegal act
before it happens, rather than simply reacting after
the fact.
Selection for those interested in becoming GSG-9
members has always been demanding. In keeping with
their strict charter, all recruits must be volunteers
and all must come from the Bundesgrenzschutz. For
those who are already members of the German Army (Bundeswehr),
they must leave, then join the Border Police to become
eligible. The initial training course is 22 weeks
long. The first 13 weeks is spent learning the fundamentals
of counterterrorism and police operations, including
a ratio of academic work much higher than that found
in most other CT units. This uniqueness is attributable
to the additional responsibilities the GSG-9 trooper
has as a member of the police, rather than the military.
The last half is devoted to specialization of operator
skills and advanced antiterrorist studies. An attrition
rate of 80 percent is not uncommon. Some graduates
are later sent to attend NATO's International Long
Range Reconnaisance Patrol (LRRP) School located in
Weingarten, Germany.
GSG-9 is currently broken down into three primary
groups; GSG-9/1, GSG-9/2 and GSG-9/3. These units
a specialized according to these respective taskings;
counterterrorism, maritime CT, and airborne. The first
two have approximately 100 operators each, with GSG-9/3
manning only 50. The unit is currently based at Saint
Augustin, near Bonn, where they share a medium-sized
compound with the regular Federal Border Guard. Those
who have visited the facility have returned with reports
that would seem odd to the uninitiated. According
to the unit's charter, money is no object when it
comes to equipping the team with the latest weapons
and equipment. This benefit does not apply to the
room and board of the team members. For example, the
food has been described as being poor at best and
their quarters bordering on Spartan. This may seem
unusual on the surface, however German soldiers have
long prided themselves on exactly this situation.
Operationally, GSG-9 has chosen the five man patrol
as its principle combat unit. As previously mentioned,
the troopers enjoy the full support of the government
when it comes to their equipment. As such, they are
issued not one, but two complete sets of combat gear.
One of these sets is tailored to daytime operations,
while the other is built around use at night. GSG-9,
like many of the larger CT groups, also has it's own
aviation unit, known as Bundesgrenzschutz Grenzschutz-Fliegergruppe.
Unlike numerous other CT and SO units, GSG-9 members
are not compelled to leave the unit after a set period
of time. Rather, operators are permitted to stay for
as long as they are able to maintain the group's high
and inflexible standards. This policy is a logical
one and has the added benefit of allowing the lessons
learned by senior operators to be handed down to the
newer members. As these 250 or so troopers fire over
1,000,000 rounds a year in training, it becomes obvious
that the German government takes its investment in
these soldiers quite seriously.
June 1994 - German counterterrorist police attempted
to effect the apprehension of Red Army Faction leader
Wolfgang Grams. A shoot-out erupted and Grams was
killed. Later reports indicated that his death may
have not occurred during the gun battle, but rather
later when, it is alleged, GSG-9 troopers executed
him shortly after subduing him. Retaliation followed
when members of the offshoot group AIZ firebombed
the home of a member of GSG-9. This action was remarkable
due to the fact that any and all personal information
regarding the identities of GSG-9 members is classified
top-secret. The fact that AIZ members located such
a target which suggests RAF/AIZ may have had assistance
from an "inside" source.
July 1994 - Called upon to effect the release of
a warden who had been taken hostage at the prison
at which he worked. The raid that ensued ended a 22-hour
riot and resulted in the rescue of the warden without
injury. KLM flight from Tunis to Amsterdam was hijacked
by a single terrorist who demanded the release of
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who was being held in New
York in connection with the World Trade Center bombing.
GSG-9 operators were dispatched to the scene and managed
to subdue the lone hijacker without firing a shot.
An editorial in the normally critical Aachener Volkseitung
praised the units restraint and called for their continued
existence. Mention should also be made of a significant
operation in which GSG-9 took part.
September/October 1977 - The benefits of the newly-created
unit came to fruition in 1977 when terrorists of the
Red Army Faction took hostage German businessman Hans-Martin
Schleyer. At the time, GSG-9 was a smaller unit, numbering
about 180 total personnel. Nonetheless, they had undergone
years of CT-specific training and had evolved into,
at least in training, one of the best organizations
of its kind in the world.
RAF immediately demanded the release of 11 of their
comrades-in-arms who were then being held in prison
in West Germany. Despite attempts by the West German
government to find a nation willing to take the terrorists,
one month passed with no resolution. Finally, on October
13, French authorities reported that Lufthansa Flight
LH 181 has been hijacked while en route from the Balearic
Islands to Germany. The Boeing 737, with five crew
and 86 passengers had changed course on the orders
of an individual identifying himself as "Captain
Mahmoud" - who would be later identified as known
terrorist Zohair Youssef Akache - and was heading
to Rome. The plane later landed in Rome, refueled,
and flew on to Cyprus where Mahmoud demanded the plane
be refueled again. Authorities in Rome permitted the
refueling after threats from the terrorists that the
aircraft would be blown up. By this time, word had
spread about the hijacking and many governments had
resolved not allow Flight LH 181 to land on their
soil. Such was the case in Beirut and Bahrain where,
in the case of Beirut, the runways were physically
blocked with equipment to prevent an unauthorized
landing. The pilot finally put down in Dubai despite
government landing denials. It was here that a significant
event transpired. The crew was able to communicate
to ground officials that there were four terrorists
on board. The strain on passengers and terrorists
alike began to take its toll, and later that day,
Mahmoud killed the pilot. Additionally, he postponed
his original 4:00PM deadline to 2:45AM the next day
after accepting a promise from the West German Minister
of State, who has been playing the role of chief negotiator.
After making this announcement, he ordered the plane
flown to Mogadishu, Somalia where it arrived on October
17.
Unbeknownst to the terrorists, GSG-9 had been following
the aircraft, on board a modified Lufthansa 707, since
it had landed in Cyprus . The "alert" 30-man
group had been airborne soon after the German government
learned of the airliner's destination. This group
flew from Bonn to Cyprus then on to Ankara and back
home after learning. A second 30-man unit, which included
commander Ulrich Wegener, had meanwhile flown from
Germany to Dubai. The cooperative Somali government
permitted Wegener's GSG-9 flight to land. Upon arrival,
the troopers were surprised to find that the Somali
commandos had set up a security perimeter around the
airport and were able to provide much-needed intelligence.
Following procedure, GSG-9 deployed sniper and reconnaissance
teams, and prepared to assault the plane immediately,
in case such event dictated that such an emergency
response was required. It was not, and along with
the the recently arrived second element of GSG-9,
planning began in earnest.
As the night wore on, officials came to the conclusion
that, given Mahmoud's growing instability and having
already proven his willingness to execute hostages,
a rescue operation would be authorized. At 2315, sections
of the assault element began their covert approach
to the aircraft. Two SAS men, who had accompanied
GSG-9 and were skilled in the use of "flash-bang"
grenades, accompanied the assault
teams. At 205, In an attempt to cause at least some
of the terrorists to come to the cockpit (thereby
establishing their whereabouts), the Somali commandos
lit a bright signal fire a few hundred feet from the
front of the plane. The reconnaissance team assigned
to that section of the aircraft reported that in fact
two of the terrorists, including "Captain Mahmoud",
had gone to the cockpit and were confusedly observing
the fire.
At the same time, GSG-9 commandos,
using specially designed, rubber coated ladders, made
entry through the aircraft doors. At 2:07, the emergency
doors were blown open with explosive charges and the
SAS operatives, who had managed to sneak undetected
onto the wings, tossed their grenades inside. With
this, GSG-9 entered the plane, ordering the hostages
to the ground. Within seconds, three of the terrorists
were killed, and the fourth severely wounded. The
operation was officially over by 212, when all the
hostages were retrieved unharmed, with one GSG-9 operative
slightly injured by gunfire. The same could not be
said for Schleyer, the German businessman abducted
a month earlier whose body was recovered three days
later.
Here is a second unit profile,
courtesy of Rexer.
Born
out of history and tragedy, GSG-9 was created right
after the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, to combat the
ever growing terrorism. Created within the Federal Border
Police (Bundesgrenzshutz), and not the military, to
avoid the impression of a new SS, the creation of the
unit was give the go-ahead on September 8, 1972. Placed
in command was Ulrich Wegener. An expert on counter
terrorism, he modeled the GSG-9 after the Israeli Sayeret
Mat'kal. It was even rumored that Wegener took part
in the Israeli rescue in Entebbe.
GSG-9 (Border Marksman Group
9, or Border Protection Group 9), became operational
on April 17, 1973. Two units were ready for deployment.
Given powers of arrest and national authority, GSG-9
operators are skilled marksmen as well as highly educated
police officers.
To become members of GSG9,
volunteers must have served with the Border Police
for over two years. If their application is accepted,
they must pass a series of 3-day physical and psychological
tests, and also endurance, shooting skills, fitness
and intelligence, finishing with a medical examination.
About 66 percent of the applicants are rejected. If
accepted, the trainee is sent to an intensive 22-week
training program. The program concentrates on teamwork,
marksmanship and physical and mental fitness. The
operators study the tactics and weapons of their unit,
as well as major terrorist groups. Operators train
in VIP security, driving, airborne insertions, aircraft
and train takedowns, skiing, first aid, and other
skills. At their base at St. Augustin, the GSG-9 has
a $9 million underground facility, presumably housing
many forms of terrorist hardware, and other related
items. Operators are taught how to use favorite terrorist
weapons, the M61 Skorpion and the AK-47.
GSG-9's strength is about 200
operators, which are divided into a headquarters unit,
five 30-man strike teams, a communications unit, an
engineer unit, a training unit and a flight of helicopter
and logistic backup. Each strike team is divided into
a command element and five combat teams, called specialein-satztrupp.
Each combat team consists of a commander, grenadier,
cover man, point man and sniper (marksman). GSG-9's
strike units are specialized in many different 'methods
of operation.' For example, Strike Team One (GSG-9/1)
is the 'standard' counter terrorist unit on the ground.
GSG-9/2 is specialized in maritime counter terrorism
and is trained by German Navy's Kampfschwimmers. GSG-9/3
is an airborne unit, specializing in HALO and other
forms of parachute drops.
Weapons are generally the same
as many of the world's counter terrorist units. The
favorite weapon is the MP5, and its many variants,
MP5 SD3 (silenced), MP5K (shortened version), MP5A2
and many others. Sniper rifles include Steyr rifles,
PSG-1 sniper rifle and the H&K G3. Pistols range
from the indigenous P7 and P9, to Glocks and .357
magnums.
GSG-9's
first deployment was at the 1974 World Cup games in
Germany. Intelligence reported that the Baader-Meinhof
terrorist group was planning an attack, but the sight
of G3-toting GSG-9 members deterred them. Over the next
few years, GSG-9 deployed to Austria in 1976, to assist
the Austrians in securing their Olympic Games, and to
Canada to assist the RCMP in securing the 1976 Summer
Olympic Games. They also continued to forge ties with
other counter-terrorist groups.
The unit's largest, and most
publicized, deployment was in Mogadishu, Somalia in
1977, where they stormed a hijacked Lufthansa airliner
and rescued all hostages. More details about this
mission can be found in the Foreign Special Operations
section under 'Operation
Magic Fire.'
During the Iraninan hostage
crisis, when Delta Force was getting ready to mount
their rescue, Wegener offered to inflitrate a team
of GSG-9 operators to provide much needed intelligence.
For reasons never explained, the offer was turned
down.
In 1982, receiving reports
from Frankfurt police of unusual activity in the outskirts
of the city, Colonel Uwe Dee, who took control over
GSG-9 after Wegener was promoted, inserted a 5-man
surveillance team near the target. Waiting for six
days, the operators finally spotted two people approaching
the woods. They turned out to be the top two female
terrorists. GSG-9 arrested them, and captured their
arms cache. The cache included weapons, explosives,
forged documents, maps and information about US military
bases, and maps showing 14 other supply caches. All
were placed under surveillance, and five days later,
Christian Klahr, one of the most important Red Army
Faction (RAF) figures was arrested at one of the supply
stations.
GSG-9 was highly regarded,
until June 27, 1993, in a small, rural town of Bad
Kleinen. That night, some thirty GSG-9 operators were
on a stakeout, with a mission to apprehend Birgit
Hogefeld and Wolfgang Grams, the two most-wanted members
of the Red Army Faction terrorist group. In an attempt
to arrest them, Grams managed to shoot and kill one
GSG-9 operator, and wound another, before being gunned
down himself. Everything might have ended quietly,
had it not been for a tabloid-hungry German press,
and an eyewitness who swore that a GSG-9 operator
had killed Grams in cold blood as he lay on the tracks.
The very fate of GSG-9 hung on the edge, as officers
resigned, and a cover-up descended over the incident.
Returning to the scene soon
after the Bad Kleinen controversy, GSG-9 successfully
apprehended a terrorist that had hijacked a KLM flight
to Dusseldorf. A GSG-9 squad managed to get into the
airplane, and to subdue the lone hijacker without
a shot being fired. After this operation, the GSG-9's
image was restored, and they weren't seen as a bunch
of trigger-happy, Rambo-types an
