Special Operations.Com
Iraqi Special Forces
Focus Feature:
Iraqi
Mountain Warfare Tactics
Introduction
Iraqi special operations forces (SOF)
, after an early and uneven beginning during World
War II and its immediate aftermath, seemingly had
found a permanent place within the Iraqi military
prior to the 1990-91 Gulf War. However, due to poor
performance by the special operations forces during
that war, these units have probably undergone a major
reorganization. At this time it is unclear as to the
priority and support that the regime will give to
the special operations organization. This article
discusses the history and organization of Iraq's Special
Forces. A future article will describe in more detail
the tactics, weapons, and special equipment of these
forces.
Background
During World War II, Iraqi officers
suggested the possibility of establishing special-purpose
forces within the Iraqi armed forces, then serving
under British authority. The Iraqi officers, many
whom had served in the mountains of northern India,
suggested a Special Forces organization called light
mountain forces, which would complement Regular Army
formations. However, the idea did not meet with any
encouragement from the British Military Mission in
Iraq.
In 1951, many officers and men were
sent outside of Iraq to receive specialized strike/commando
training. In December 1954, a select group from Army
units was sent to Great Britain for commando training.
Upon their return, a commando brigade and the first
independent parachute company were formed. They were
maintained until 1959, when the brigade was disbanded
and the first parachute company was converted to a
parachute battalion. In 1964 the idea of forming strike
units in the Army was considered. Due to increased
interest in these operations, commando experts were
brought in from Egypt to assist in developing a training
course. Training began in 1965, with the British Military
Mission in Iraq administering the first training course
in conjunction with Egyptian advisors. However, as
time determined, training in strike and commando operations
seemed to be at cross purposes. Since the tactics
were essentially similar, it was decided to merge
the two types of training and formations under the
title of Special Forces or Special Forces Command.
The term "strike force" continues to be
used to designate a special mission. The Special Forces
Command was converted in the late 1960s to brigade-size
groups, and the Special Forces Administration was
formed.
Definition of Special Forces
In the Iraqi Army, "special forces"
has a different meaning from the term as used in Western
armies. Western Special Operations Forces (British
Commandos, Special Air Service, American Special Forces,
and Rangers) perform hazardous missions normally limited
to specific strategic targets. Iraqi Special Forces
are highly trained light infantry, schooled in airborne,
unconventional warfare and mobile tactics; they probably
have a definite tactical objective in support of division
or corps mission requirements. If tasked, the Iraqi
SOF could accomplish a limited regional strategic
requirement.
SOF Missions, Doctrine and Tactics
Over the years, Iraqi Special Forces
have maintained four basic missions: the conduct of
airborne and air assault operations, counterinsurgency
and population control, unconventional warfare, and
close combat. Additionally, Iraqi Special Forces are
also used to conduct limited special operations, such
as raids, reconnaissance, and ambushes behind enemy
lines. The Iraqi Special Forces are dedicated to executing
special missions within the context of, and in support
of, regular conventional missions.
Iraqi SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures
include a mixture of doctrines from various countries,
but they have a distinctly British theme. This should
not be considered unusual, considering the long-standing
influence that the British Military Mission exerted
on the Iraqi military before and immediately after
World War II. Prior to the 1990-91 Gulf War, personnel
assigned to perform a special operational mission
were probably selected from all Special Forces organizations
to form strike teams, special mission units, or deep
reconnaissance units. Individuals assigned to these
units were probably the best trained of all SOF personnel
who had completed Special Forces training. The formation
of specialized units required additional training
tailored for missions that could include long-range
reconnaissance or unconventional warfare, such as
sabotage, assassination, and kidnapping.
The capability of the Iraqi Special
Forces to conduct long-range special operations missions
similar to those of U.S. or British Special Forces
units is considered extremely limited. A decisive
factor in any Iraqi Special Forces operation is the
delivery, logistical, and organizational support systems
that are critical to successful accomplishment of
any Special Forces mission. In concert with these
support systems, a battalion-size unit under the Special
Forces Command specializes in air supply techniques.
However, the effectiveness of this unit is in question,
due to the U.S.- imposed no-fly zones and sanctions.
These three support systems are a serious weak link
in any projected Iraqi Special Forces mission. The
poor showing of the Iraqi Special Forces in the 1990-91
Gulf War probably was more the result of insufficient
leadership, misguided utilization, and inadequate
support organization than of the incompetence of the
soldiers themselves.
Conclusion
The Iraqi Special Forces, although downsized,
will probably continue to receive regime support,
especially in areas that could be interpreted as regime
security involving the Republican Guard. However,
the capability to project Special Forces operations
to nearby countries or to interdict Western forces
is extremely limited. The inability to provide high-mobility
helicopter transport, overall logistical, and organizational
support to critical special operations will continue
to plague Iraqi Special Forces operations, whether
carried out by the Republican Guard or the regular
Army, in the near future.