The Special Operation Force "...is the strongest elite force of the entire Korean People's Army and is the unique vanguard force of the Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

-- Kim Il-Sung (former North Korean leader)

Introduction

Strength and Organization

The MPAF controls two primary commands that make up the 70,000-member SOF: the Training Unit Guidance Bureau (TUGB) and the Reconnaissance Bureau (RB). The TUGB and RB, combined with SOF units of the forward and mechanized corps, consist of 23 SOF brigades and 18 independent SOF battalions.

Figure: Special Operations Forces Mission Planning

The TUGB is a central training and guidance command for all SOF units and also serves as a training command and a wartime controlling authority for strategic and corps-level SOF missions. Subordinate to the TUGB are eight light infantry brigades (including three airborne), two airborne brigades, and two amphibious brigades. The RB is the primary intelligence organization tasked to plan SOF infiltration and reconnaissance operations in the ROK. Subordinate to the RB are nine reconnaissance battalions (including a navy and air force battalion) and a sniper brigade.

Under the control of the Forward Corps (1st, 2d, 4th, 5th) are four reconnaissance battalions, three sniper brigades, and three light infantry brigades. Subordinate to mechanized corps are five reconnaissance battalions and four light infantry brigades.

Figure: SOF Disposition

Missions

Operational SOF units support corps objectives with light infantry and reconnaissance missions. Operational light infantry units will target critical terrain and C3I assets, delay ROK/US reserve forces, and attack division (and higher) command posts. In addition, these units ascertain enemy intentions, develop targeting information for SCUDs/FROGs and long-range artillery, conduct post-strike assessments, and determine locations of ROK/US reserve forces.

Tactical SOF units support maneuver division and brigade objectives with light infantry operations. Light infantry units attack brigade and division command posts, capture key terrain to assist in maneuvering divisions and brigades, and destroy ROK/US reserve forces. The organic reconnaissance company of the maneuver unit performs tactical reconnaissance. The reconnaissance company and light infantry battalion develop targets for destruction. These targets include air defense sites, force concentrations, artillery positions, and C3I assets.

Ground Force Operations

Figure: 10-man Reconnaissance Team

Because the DMZ is primarily mountainous, the SOF will use this terrain to provide cover, concealment, safe areas, and numerous routes for escape and evasion. Lowlands will be used for their thick weeds, tall grass, and woods to provide cover and concealment.

Figure: SOF Team Traverses Rugged Terrain

Once past the main ROK defenses, operational- and tactical-level units will attempt to arrive undetected at pre-selected target sites that are critical to ROK/US military operations. Typical targets include: ports, airfields, logistical points, avenues of approach, rail lines, C3I assets, and other reinforcement areas.

Most SOF units under the KPA with strategic missions will attempt to infiltrate ROK/US rear areas by air and water. By air, this will be conducted with the Antonov An-2 COLT, and the MD 500E helicopter (modified and painted to resemble those of the ROKAF). Rubber rafts, midget subs, high-speed boats, and merchant ships reflect only a few of the many water infiltration possibilities.

Figure: Airborne Assault on an Airfield

In the time remaining prior to a target assault, reconnaissance patrols will attempt to gather detailed information on the target and clear any obstacles (mines, barbed wire, etc.) that might slow or deter an attack. Unit personnel will then receive a detailed briefing on the mission objective, conduct equipment inspections, and wait for the main invasion across the DMZ (H-hour).

Figure: Covert SOF Activities

H-hour. At H-Hour, pre-positioned SOF units within ROK/US rear areas will attack targets as massive artillery and rocket attacks are initiated from north of the DMZ. This is intended to weaken critical defense areas and create optimum confusion for ROK/US forces. Simultaneously, additional SOF units will slip through the DMZ, be inserted by air, and land on South Korean beaches.

As soon as the artillery fire ceases, first echelon SOF reconnaissance units will move forward to probe ROK/US lines for weak resistance. Where holes are found, penetration is attempted. If successful, light infantry SOF assets will proceed engage critical enemy targets. When possession or destruction of a target is obtained, SOF units quickly pass possession to follow-on infantry and mechanized forces to consolidate gains and deny ROK/US usage.

Disengagement/Retreat. When SOF units are forced to leave a position, they can be expected to act as a delaying, or covering force. SOF units will attempt to occupy terrain where approaches and attack options are limited, thereby greatly increasing firepower against a pursuing superior force.

Conclusion

Should major staging and communication centers be denied to ROK/US forces at the onset of a new Korean conflict, qualitative superiority and a timely US reinforcement capability would be notably reduced. For this reason, the KPA believes that the SOF is an important force multiplier for the achievement of victory against modern ROK/US forces.