North Korean Special Operations Forces and the Second Front

Introduction

North Korean doctrine is a combination of Soviet and Chinese doctrine, adapted to conditions on the Korean peninsula;, it has been tempered by lessons learned in the Korean War and by observation of all major operations up through Kosovo. It relies heavily on speed, shock, and surprise. The North Koreans view Special Operations Forces (SOF) as a key force multiplier on the battlefield and have developed a doctrine designed to exploit their SOF. It calls for the use of SOF to open a "second front," with the purpose of creating confusion, panic, and paralysis, thereby disrupting Combined Forces Command/United Nations (CFC/UN) combat operations. This front is fought at all levels, the strategic, operational, and tactical.

North Korea's SOF are acknowledged to be the largest in the world. Estimates of the SOF's size vary between 70,000 and 100,000 personnel. Force personnel are chosen for political reliability and loyalty, are the most highly trained North Korean troops, and are among the last to suffer from any resource constraints.

Mission

North Korean SOF are designated as reconnaissance, light infantry, or sniper, and may have further special designations, such as amphibious or airborne. These forces are found at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The differences in designations also indicate differences in missions. To understand fully how the concept of a "Second Front" is fought at all levels, it is important to understand these different missions.

Reconnaissance units determine enemy dispositions, develop targeting information, conduct battle damage assessment, and deduce and verify enemy intentions. Reconnaissance units typically operate in 5- to 10-man teams. Sniper units conduct direct action missions, such as raids on key facilities/nodes and even assassinations of key leaders. Sniper units, like reconnaissance units, operate in 5- to 10-man teams. Light infantry units also conduct direct action missions; however, they operate at anywhere from platoon to battalion level. Snipers and light infantry, while having primarily a direct action mission, also conduct reconnaissance operations, providing redundancy on the battlefield.

Organization

North Korea's total SOF comprise at least 23 brigades and 18 independent battalions. At the strategic level, the two commands that control SOF assets are the Reconnaissance Bureau (REBU) and Training Unit Guidance Bureau (TUGB), also referred to as the Light Infantry Training Bureau. Together, these two bureaus consist of 13 brigade-size elements and nine independent battalions.

At the operational level, the four forward corps (1st, 2d, 4th, and 5th) have organic SOF totalling four reconnaissance battalions, three sniper brigades, and three light infantry brigades. Additionally, four additional light infantry brigades and four reconnaissance battalions are organic to the four mechanized corps.

At the tactical level, each infantry division in the forward corps has one light infantry battalion and one reconnaissance battalion as organic assets.

The Second Front

For the North Koreans, the concept of the Second Front applies to all levels of warfighting. Each commander, at each echelon, will employ his organic SOF assets to fight a second front to the depth of his area of operations. At the strategic level, the reconnaissance battalions of the REBU will operate in support of national objectives. They will target assets of national interest, such as airfields; air-defense and theater missile defense assets; and command, control, communications, and intelligence and logistics nodes. Following old Soviet doctrine, nuclear-capable assets are a very high priority. The reconnaissance battalions also will report on Republic of Korea (ROK) and Combined Forces Command (CFC) civilian and military action, and conduct battle damage assessments. The direct action units of the REBU and TUGB will conduct operations against similar targets, without the purely reconnaissance orientation. Additionally, they will target key military and political figures for kidnapping or assassination. They are likely be equipped with ROK uniforms and equipment to aid them in avoiding detection and conducting their missions.

Infiltration by the strategic level SOF will take place both before and during the initiation of hostilities by air, sea, and ground, and perhaps underground. The most common and numerous infiltration platform is the AN2 Colt biplane, an old, low-tech airplane that is still useful because of its relatively low observability and flight characteristics. It typically carries 10 to 12 troops, who descend by parachute and conduct their missions on the ground. Sea infiltration can be conducted by submarine, semisubmersible delivered from a mother ship, or hovercraft. The hovercraft, while lacking stealth, allows a larger force to be inserted rapidly. A ground insertion will entail infiltration either across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) or, via tunnel, under the DMZ. Because of the distance to targets and the time and difficulties inherent in such operations, it is unlikely that many, if any, strategic level SOF will rely on ground insertion. Also, they probably will not plan for exfiltration; they will either continue their mission under the direction of higher headquarters or, lacking communications, work their way down a target priority list and rely on their leaders' judgment until they can link up with advancing friendly forces.

At the operational level, corps and army group commanders will employ organic SOF to support their missions through the depth of their area of operations. Reconnaissance battalions will work to ascertain enemy dispositions, strength and intentions, and provide targeting data for artillery and multiple rocket launchers. In addition to reconnaissance battalions, there are other units specifically tasked with a forward observer type mission to target conventional and counterbattery fires.

The sniper brigades will operate in 5- to 10-man teams and initiate attacks and raids against command posts (CPs), communications nodes (relay sites, etc.), air-defense sites, logistics sites and bottlenecks, and any other isolated or high-payoff target. Light infantry brigades will operate in up to battalion-size elements, attacking larger targets that sniper brigade teams may not be capable of eliminating. These could include dispersal airfields, forward area rearming and refueling points, multiple-launch rocket systems, larger logistics sites (such as BSAs), and key infrastructure elements (bridges, power generation sites, dams, etc.). Additionally, they will target corps and division reserves to forestall or defeat a counterattack.

Insertion of operational SOF will be much the same as for strategic SOF, with a greater reliance on ground infiltration. As the priority of the mission goes down, so does the access to infiltration platforms. It is likely that at this level air insertion will depend more on helicopters than fixed-wing aircraft. These are also the forces that are likely to be first across the DMZ and through tunnels. They may employ ROK uniforms and equipment, and will likely rely on ground exfiltration or link-up with advancing forces.

At the tactical level, reconnaissance battalions will again conduct typical reconnaissance missions. The light infantry battalion will be used to open a "second front" at the tactical level, disrupting brigade and division rear areas, and creating confusion by hitting CPs, ambushing reinforcing units, and defeating counterattacking forces short of their objective. They will typically infiltrate in the hours immediately preceding an attack. For the initial attack across the DMZ, they will likely have the lowest priority for insertion and will most likely have to conduct their infiltration across the DMZ, perhaps under the cover of the opening barrage. Their initial missions will encompass a reconnaissance role, probing the lines and searching for gaps in the CFC defenses. These gaps will then be exploited by conventional infantry forces, while light infantry and sniper forces continue their infiltration/reconnaissance missions deeper into CFC lines. These units will generally have a planned exfiltration—not quite the "fire and forget" that better characterizes the nature of strategic SOF.

Conclusion

What this all means for the United States, the ROK, or other CFC soldiers is that the entire area has the potential to be a battlefield. Whereas an enemy unit operating in a purely reconnaissance mode attempts to avoid contact, the majority of North Korean SOF will be seeking engagement. The ROK will have an active counter-SOF campaign, but during the initial stages of a war the rear areas are likely to be saturated with North Korean SOF. Unprotected and unwary soldiers/units/sites will provide lucrative targets for North Korean SOF in an especially target-rich environment. Wiremen laying communications wire, signalmen operating a relay site, Stinger gunners providing overwatch, and the headquarters commandant conducting route reconnaissance as his parent unit prepares to deploy from the aerial port of debarkation/seaport of debarkation (APOD/SPOD) all become potential targets. One has only to look at press reports of the most recent North Korean infiltration attempts to realize the level of dedication and ideological indoctrination that is the standard in North Korean SOF. They are trained to act with extreme violence and ruthlessness, and will use this capability to ensure that their conventional forces can maintain the operations tempo necessary for success.

While most people familiar with the Korea problem are also familiar with the "Second Front" concept, it is usually thought of only at the strategic level. All soldiers operating in the theater, from the infantryman at the forward edge of the battle area to the clerk/typist at the SPOD must appreciate that they are in an area where North Korean SOF may operate.