In May 1995, then-Defense
Secretary William Perry assigned US Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) the primary DoD responsibility for
the mission of counterproliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) as part of the broader US
government interagency effort in that area. What
are the specific counterproliferation (hereafter
CP) tasks that US Special Operations Forces (SOF)
are now training to carry out? The answer to that
question is classified, but AFJI reviewed public
statements by SOF officials to get a better idea
of what the CP mission entails.
The US Special Operations
Forces 1996 Posture Statement notes: "Dangers
are increasing so that rogue elements, including
transnational or terrorist groups, will acquire
WMD, including nuclear, biological, or chemical
[NBC] weapons. SOF have developed the skills and
equipment necessary for thwarting and deterring
terrorism. However, as the tools available to terrorists
become more lethal, SOF must be ready to meet these
new threats of WMD." Touching on the second
aspect of the two-part mission, the statement continuous,
"Just as challenging and sensitive will be
SOF's role in support of US efforts to counter the
proliferation of WMD among nations."
The document adds: "SOF
can be effective early in the weapon acquisition
cycle to monitor, deter, or delay the cycle, as
well as later to deter, prevent, or protect against
weapon use. But the CP mission will require the
highest degree of planning, technical sophistication,
and intelligence support."
Thus, drawing on SOF specialties-these
include counterterrorism, "behind-the-lines"
special reconnaissance to gather intelligence, and
direct action (short-duration strikes) to seize
or destroy enemy facilities-the CP mission basically
involves thwarting the acquisition or use of WMD
by either terrorist groups or rogue nations. It
is also strictly an overseas mission, since the
Justice Department has responsibility in the continental
US for preventing terrorist incidents involving
such weapons. (SOF could be used within the US if
the president waived the Posse Comitatus Act.)
FIND, TRACK, AND NEUTRALIZE
SOCOM's number-one technology
development objective, as stated in a 1 December
1995 letter signed by SOCOM's commander-in-chief
(CinC), is "WMD detection, classification,
neutralization, containerization, and protection
technologies." SOCOM's SOF Vision 2020 notes,
"We must be able to find, track, and neutralize
an adversary's WMD capability." H. Allen Holmes,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict, cited this technology
development objective in a speech on 13 December
1995, adding, "Attendant with this is the need
for the latest in protective gear for operating
in NBC environments."
SOF's role involves countering
proliferation overseas through intrusive means.
As SOCOM's CinC, Army General Henry Shelton, wrote
in a draft article last January, "SOF will
play a significant role in countering the threat
from WMD in the future. As the debate continues
over just how to prevent the spread of WMD using
conventional means, SOF already offer an acceptable
counterforce capability [emphasis added]."
He added, "SOF's inherent
capabilities and international activities place
them in an ideal position to foster the international
cooperation needed to stem or prevent NBC smuggling
and terrorism, while still pursuing the means to
detect, deter, neutralize, or effectively destroy
WMD and related infrastructure, if necessary."
Shelton told AFJI in an
interview, "We are taking the lead for DoD
in terms of providing a force that has capabilities
that relate to WMD, and that covers everything from
the ability to detect, classify, and characterize
the type of weapon it is; to gain access to it;
and to render it safe, disarm it, or, in some cases,
destroy it without producing secondary effects.
If we just want to render it safe and move it out
of the area, there are special things required in
some cases to transport it. And so those are the
areas we focus on."
SOF's potential CP roles---likely
clandestine and in some cases covert (disavowed)---include
recovering sensitive NBC materials and seizing personnel
from terrorist organizations abroad intent on targeting
US citizens; interdicting shipments of sensitive
material on land or at sea; and slipping undetected
into such rogue countries as Iraq, Iran, Libya,
or North Korea to bring back intelligence on or
evidence of a secret WMD development program, to
sabotage such a program, or to disarm, disable,
or seize individual WMD.
Lt. Gen. Peter Schoomaker,
commanding general of US Army Special Operations
Command at Ft. Bragg, NC, addressed SOF's CP role
at an academic conference in Boston last November.
He noted, "One of the things we can do is return
from a target with evidence, with proof of what
it is that's there, or to what level of sophistication
certain programs are." He emphasized, "The
target set that we're talking about is not just
weapons, but includes people, technology, facilities,
materials, transportation systems, command and control---all
these kinds of things that, in fact, are potentially
vulnerable."
Asked how his command had
improved SOF CP capabilities, Schoomaker replied:
"I think we've made significant strides. The
first thing we looked at was our ability to operate
in this [NBC] environment, understanding that we
may have to intentionally place ourselves in this
type of environment. We took the standard capability
that exists today and trained to a very high level
using, in some cases, some very good equipment that's
available today in the chemical area."
He noted, "We've layed
out the many [equipment] shortfalls we have...and
we're getting some results from [the R&D community].
In many cases, where the problems lie is in [detecting
WMD]. In the chemical area, we've taken advantage
of some of the most sophisticated training that
DoD's got. Quite frankly, the biggest hurdle has
been the mindset hurdle, and I think we've overcome
that. Now I think we're articulating effectively
what our requirements are, and we are training very
realistically."
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