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Israel's
crack special forces, which have earned world-wide
renown, can trace their roots back to before the
birth of the Jewish nation and to the skills of
an Englishman. It was a British officer named Charles
Orde Wingate serving in Palestine in the late 1930s
who first raised a dedicated Jewish force and devised
highly unorthodox, anti-guerrilla techniques to
counter unrest during the 1936-1938 Arab riots.
The types of units Wingate organized found a permanent
place in 1948 with the creation of the Israeli Defense
Forces, becoming the IDF's elite units. About half
the IDF's current general staff, including some
of its most highly decorated officers, have seen
service in special forces units.
Officials in
the IDF have always been tight-lipped when it comes
to sharing details about their special forces and
their risky operations. However, it's clear from
the recent creation of some new organizations that
Israeli special forces are working hard to remain
on the cutting edge while staying true to the unorthodox
legacy of their "founder."
There are five
categories of Israeli special forces. In the largest
category are the reconnaissance units called Sayerot,
which have no equal in other armies in their structure
and missions. The closest equivalents are US Army
Rangers, but the latter have their own formations,
while in the IDF each regular infantry brigade,
some armor, and even combat engineer formations
have an elite Sayeret, formed entirely by highly
select volunteers. They act as point forces in any
operational foray and are specifically trained to
function as explosives-handling light infantrymen.
Although the Sayerot units each belong to a distinct
brigade, they can be used as deep-penetration forces
operating separately, even beyond Israel's borders.
Their reconnaissance commando training is supplemented
by intensive counter-terrorist instruction.
The
volunteers for these highly professional combat
units are selected from conscripts with only three
years of service. They undergo a rigorous screening
process designed to identify the best of the crop
of highly motivated youth. Soldiers serving in the
Sayerot forces are regarded as the best fighters
in the army, and many later become officers or junior
combat leaders. 
In
the second category of Israeli special forces are
undercover anti-terrorist units whose mission is
to identify, locate, and kill or capture terrorists,
mainly in the occupied territories. Members of these
units normally operate wearing Arab disguises to
mix with the population in their dangerous task.
Over the years these undercover units reportedly
have become the most feared opponents of fanatical
terrorists. 
The General
Headquarters (GHQ) Recon unit comprises the pick
of Israel's elite forces and is one of the best-trained
special forces units in the world. Akin to Britain's
SAS, its members undergo highly specialized training
in skills such as free-fall parachuting, cross-country
driving, scuba diving, and the use of special weapons.
This general staff anti-terrorist unit had remained
in the shadows for many years until a serious training
accident in late 1992 attracted media coverage and
revealed its existence for the first time. Many
of the GHQ Recon unit's daring missions remain top
secret, but among those publicly acknowledged is
the vaunted 1976 Entebbe rescue operation in Uganda.
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his
chief political opponent, former-IDF boss Ehud Barak,
were both officers in this unit.
Working closely
with the GHQ Recon in spirited, but friendly, competition
is the highly regarded naval commando unit Flotilla
13. Although under the separate command of Navy
HQ, this all-volunteer unit akin to US Navy SEALs
often performs more than just missions from the
sea. Although it lost 12 commandos last September
during a botched assault on a Hezbollah stronghold
in southern Lebanon, it has had a long string of
successful missions.
Finally, the
newest addition to Israel's special forces are anti-guerrilla
units, specially trained to combat the growing threat
of the Hezbollah in South Lebanon. One such unit,
Sayeret EGOZ (Walnut), became public recently. Its
members are trained to move stealthily and to locate
and strike the guerrillas, using their intimate
knowledge of the territory to place ambushes along
suspected infiltration routes.
These new anti-guerrilla
units were formed following years of sporadic success
against the increasing fighting skill of the Hezbollah,
many of whose fighters were trained by experienced
Iranian instructors. Over the years of constant
combat, the guerrillas gained a considerable advantage
against Israeli regular troops, who were trained
mainly for high-intensity warfare and had spent
only limited periods in Lebanon. Even the Sayerot,
who receive training in small-unit tactics, were
having difficulties against the guerrillas, who
fought for sustained periods in the same familiar
territory. Thus, the creation of specialized anti-guerrilla
forces became inevitable. To bolster the units'
fighting skills and to develop tactics for anti-guerrilla
warfare in South Lebanon, a dedicated school with
combat-experienced instructors was established.
Recent successes have proven these units a good
investment.
A major problem
for Israel's special forces is an organizational
one--ensuring coordination of these diverse units.
The formation of an IDF Field Forces Command HQ
during the 1980s to emphasize combined-arms warfare
failed to resolve the difficult coordination problems
for special and anti-guerrilla warfare.
Perhaps
inspired by the US Special Operations Command or
the British Army Directorate of Special Forces headquarters,
the IDF is considering the formation of a special
commando corps. It could integrate the special operations
elements of the Israeli army, navy, and air force,
including those involved in anti-guerrilla warfare.
Deep-penetration missions, in particular, while
normally carried out at night by small units, would
undoubtedly benefit from the detailed coordination
and integrated command and control that could result.
*

Armed Forces Journal international / April
1998


