1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 ROBERT VAN BUSKIRK, ) 4 Plaintiff, ) Case No. 5 vs. ) C99-20889 JF EAI 6 CABLE NEWS NETWORK, LP, LLLP, ) 7 et al., ) 8 Defendants. ) 9 --------------------------------) 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 SAN JOSE DIVISION 13 In re Cable News Network and ) 14 Time Magazine "Operation ) Lead Case No. 15 Tailwind" Litigation ) C-98-20946 JFPVT 16 * * * ) MDL Case No. 17 All Actions ) 1257 18 (Caption continues on following page) 19 Bethesda, Maryland 20 Monday, January 17, 2000 21 Videotape deposition of: 22 THOMAS MOORER 1 (Caption continued from previous page.) 2 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 3 Civil Division 4 JOHN K. SINGLAUB, ) Civil Action No. 5 Plaintiff, ) CA07004-98 6 vs. ) Calendar 14 7 CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC., ) Judge Zeldon 8 et al., ) 9 Defendants. ) 10 * * * ) 11 APRIL OLIVER, ) 12 Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, ) 13 vs. ) 14 CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC., ) 15 Defendant/Crossclaim Defendant. ) 16 --------------------------------) 17 Bethesda, Maryland 18 Monday, January 17, 2000 19 Videotape deposition of: 20 THOMAS MOORER 21 22 0003 1 Videotape deposition of: 2 THOMAS MOORER 3 called for oral examination by counsel for the 4 Plaintiffs, pursuant to notice, held at the 5 offices of Budow and Noble, P.C., 7201 Wisconsin 6 Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, beginning at 9:14 7 a.m., before Lee A. Bursten, Registered 8 Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for 9 the State of Maryland, when were present: 10 11 ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF 12 VAN BUSKIRK: 13 ELIHU H. BERMAN, ESQUIRE 14 509 South Greenwood Avenue 15 Clearwater, Florida 33758 16 (727) 465-1977 17 18 19 20 21 22 (Appearances continued on next page.) 0004 1 (Appearances continued.) 2 3 ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS 4 SHEPHERD, BISHOP, BENTLEY, BAYLOR, AND 5 GRAVES: 6 JOSEPH M. NYKODYM, ESQUIRE 7 Cotchett, Pitre & Simon 8 840 Malcolm Road 9 Suite 200 10 Burlingame, California 94010 11 (650) 697-6000 12 13 ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS 14 SADLER AND ROSE: 15 PHILLIP J. DUNCAN, ESQUIRE 16 Duncan & Rainwater 17 6315 Ranch Drive 18 Little Rock, Arkansas 72223 19 (501) 868-2500 20 21 22 (Appearances continued on next page.) 0005 1 (Appearances continued.) 2 3 - and - 4 5 DAVID CROMWELL JOHNSON, ESQUIRE 6 700 Landmark Center 7 2100 First Avenue North 8 Birmingham, Alabama 35203 9 (205) 327-5700 10 11 ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS 12 PLANCICH, MINTON, AND KINSLER: 13 MITCHELL J. COOK, ESQUIRE 14 Mitchell J. Cook, P.A. 15 3706 N. Roosevelt Boulevard 16 Suite I Perry's Plaza 17 Key West, Florida 33040 18 (305) 293-7030 19 20 21 22 (Appearances continued on next page.) 0006 1 (Appearances continued.) 2 3 ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT/CROSSCLAIM 4 PLAINTIFF OLIVER: 5 ROGER C. SIMMONS, ESQUIRE 6 Gordon & Simmons 7 131 West Patrick Street 8 Frederick, Maryland 21701 9 (301) 662-9122 10 11 - and - 12 13 DAVID E. SELLINGER, ESQUIRE 14 Venable, Baetjer, Howard 15 & Civiletti, LLP 16 1615 L Street, N.W. 17 Suite 400 18 Washington, D.C. 20036-5612 19 (202) 429-7101 20 21 22 (Appearances continued on next page.) 0007 1 (Appearances continued.) 2 3 - and - 4 5 PHILIP E. KAPLAN, ESQUIRE 6 Kaplan, Brewer & Maxey, P.A. 7 415 Main Street 8 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 9 (501) 372-0400 10 11 ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF 12 JOHN K. SINGLAUB: 13 KEITH MITNIK, ESQUIRE 14 Morgan Collin & Gilbert 15 20 South Orange Avenue 16 Orlando, Florida 32804 17 (407) 420-1414 18 19 20 21 22 (Appearances continued on next page.) 0008 1 (Appearances continued.) 2 3 ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS 4 CNN, TIME, TIME WARNER, AND PETER ARNETT: 5 KEVIN T. BAINE, ESQUIRE 6 NICOLE K. SELIGMAN, ESQUIRE 7 ELIZABETH LIN, ESQUIRE 8 Williams & Connolly 9 725 Twelfth Street, N.W. 10 Washington, D.C. 20005 11 (202) 434-5010 12 13 ALSO PRESENT: 14 PAULA ADKINS, Videographer 15 JOHN K. SINGLAUB 16 VIRGINIA BRACE 17 RUDI GRESHAM 18 19 20 21 22 0009 1 C O N T E N T S 2 EXAMINATION OF THOMAS MOORER PAGE 3 By Mr. Berman 14 4 By Mr. Baine 53 5 By Mr. Berman 112 6 By Mr. Johnson 114 7 By Mr. Duncan 139 8 By Mr. Cook 205 9 By Mr. Mitnik 209 10 By Mr. Simmons 217 11 E X H I B I T S 12 (Retained by Counsel) 13 MOORER PAGE 14 A Transcript of interview 36 15 B Article by John Fritz 66 16 C Article by Paul Richter 71 17 D Statement of Admiral 95 18 E Statement of Admiral with 95 19 handwriting 20 F Article by Laura Myers 102 21 G Transcript of 6/7/98 115 22 broadcast 0010 1 H Transcript of 7/14/98 115 2 broadcast 3 I Article by April Oliver 115 4 and Peter Arnett 5 J Department of Defense 115 6 report, not marked 7 K Transcript of interview 115 8 L CNN Retracts Tailwind 178 9 Coverage 10 M Contents of file, marked 178 11 1 through 13 12 N Rebuttal to the 256 13 Abrams/Kohler Report 14 O Intelligence Information 258 15 Cable 16 P 14 September 1970 memo 263 17 Q 12/22/97 letter 275 18 R May 2, 1998 interview 307 19 with April Oliver 20 S NewsStand - "Valley of 353 21 Death" 22 0011 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Good morning. This 3 is the deposition of Admiral Thomas Moorer, 4 retired, noticed by the plaintiffs in case number 5 C99-20889 JF EAI, entitled Robert van Buskirk 6 versus Cable News Network, Time Incorporated, and 7 Time Warner Incorporated; also In Re: Cable News 8 Network and Time Magazine Operation Tailwind 9 Litigation; and John K. Singlaub versus Cable News 10 Network Incorporated, Time Incorporated, Time 11 Warner Incorporated, Peter Arnett and April 12 Oliver. 13 My name is Paula Adkins, and I am the 14 legal video specialist operating the equipment for 15 this deposition. I am employed by L.A.D. 16 Reporting. This deposition is being taken on 17 Monday, January 17th, 2000, at the offices of 18 Budow and Noble, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, 19 Maryland, at the time indicated at the lower 20 portion of the television screen. The time on the 21 screen is 9:14:13. 22 I will now ask counsel to please 0012 1 identify themselves and indicate the parties they 2 represent. 3 MR. BERMAN: My name is Elihu Berman, 4 and I'm from Clearwater, Florida. I represent 5 Robert van Buskirk, the plaintiff. 6 MR. SIMMONS: And my name is Roger 7 Simmons, Frederick, Maryland. I represent the 8 defendant, cross-claimant and counterclaimant, 9 April Oliver. 10 MR. KAPLAN: My name is Philip Kaplan. 11 I'm a lawyer from Little Rock. I represent April 12 Oliver in the Sadler and Rose cases. 13 MR. SELLINGER: Good morning, Admiral. 14 My name is David Sellinger. I'm from Washington, 15 D.C. I represent April Oliver in the Singlaub 16 case. 17 MR. NYKODYM: Good morning, Admiral. My 18 name is Joseph Nykodym. I'm with the law firm of 19 Cotchett, Pitre & Simon from San Francisco. I 20 represent plaintiffs Michael Shepherd, Arthur 21 Bishop, Michael Bentley, Charles Baylor, and James 22 Graves in the action known as In Re: Cable News 0013 1 Network and Time Magazine Operation Tailwind 2 Litigation. 3 MR. COOK: Good morning. My name is 4 Mitchell Cook. I'm from Key West, Florida. I 5 represent three plaintiffs: Keith Plancich, 6 Denver Minton, and Mark Kinsler. And that case is 7 before the court -- 8 THE WITNESS: How about taking a look so 9 I can see what you look like? 10 MR. COOK: Sorry about that. 11 MR. DUNCAN: My name is Phillip Duncan. 12 I represent Colonel Sadler and Michael Rose. 13 MR. JOHNSON: Admiral, my name is David 14 Johnson. I'm from Birmingham, Alabama. I 15 represent Colonel Sadler and Mr. Rose. 16 MR. BAINE: And I'm Kevin Baine from 17 Williams & Connolly, and I represent CNN, Time 18 Warner, and Time, and various individual employees 19 of CNN who have also been named in some of these 20 lawsuits. 21 MR. MITNIK: I'm Keith Mitnik, and I 22 represent General Singlaub in his suit against CNN 0014 1 and Arnett and Oliver and the rest. 2 MS. SELIGMAN: I'm Nicole Seligman from 3 Williams & Connolly, and I also represent CNN, 4 Time, Time Warner and various individual 5 defendants. 6 MR. GRESHAM: I'm Rudi Gresham. I am 7 here with Admiral Moorer as his spokesperson. 8 MR. BERMAN: I think that's everybody. 9 And we'll be ready to start. 10 THE WITNESS: Very good. 11 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The court reporter, 12 Lee Bursten of L.A.D. Reporting, will now 13 administer the oath to the witness. 14 THOMAS MOORER 15 having been duly sworn, testified as follows: 16 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF 17 VAN BUSKIRK 18 MR. BERMAN: I can start now? 19 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Yes, sir. 20 MR. BERMAN: Thank you. 21 BY MR. BERMAN: 22 Q Admiral, would you state your name for 0015 1 the record, please? 2 A I am Thomas H. Moorer, M-O-O-R-E-R. 3 Q And we're here this morning to talk 4 about events related to Operation Tailwind and the 5 CNN broadcast of June of 1998. And I'm going to 6 ask you a few questions before we get to the meat 7 of the matter. Would you tell us what is your 8 age? How old are you, Admiral? 9 A I'm 88. I will be next month. 10 Q You'll be 88 next month? 11 A Yes. 12 Q Have you taken any medications that 13 might affect your ability to understand the 14 questions that are being asked you? 15 A No. 16 Q And what if any documents have you 17 reviewed in preparation for this deposition? 18 A Well, I've only reviewed the Department 19 of Defense review of allegations concerning 20 Operation Tailwind, which is right here. 21 Q Some time ago, Admiral Moorer, I sent 22 you a copy of an interview that CNN's 0016 1 representative April Oliver had with you, or 2 several interviews. Do you recall, have you 3 reviewed that in connection with this deposition? 4 A I think so. 5 Q Until a little bit later, all the 6 questions I'm going to ask you relate to the 7 situation as it was in September of 1970. You 8 were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that 9 time? 10 A For one month. 11 Q All right. What month was that, can you 12 tell us? 13 A It was -- I came in at the end of July 14 and during the month of August. And then the 15 operation you refer to occurred in September. 16 Q Correct. For the benefit of the Court 17 and the jury that will be listening to this and 18 watching this deposition in court, Admiral, would 19 you tell us, what is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 who are the members of that body? 21 A Well, the members are the Chief of the 22 Army, Chief of the Navy, and the Chief of the Air 0017 1 Force; and according to the law, the Commandant of 2 the Marine Corps attends when subjects relevant to 3 the interests of the Marine Corps are on the 4 agenda. 5 Then there is a Chairman appointed by 6 the President who prepares the agenda and is 7 obligated to keep the President as well as the 8 Secretary of Defense informed as to the position 9 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on major issues. 10 Q I take it that when you told us before 11 you were Chairman for only a month, that doesn't 12 mean that you were a member of the Joint Chiefs 13 for only a month? 14 A No, no. I was Chief of the Navy before 15 that. 16 Q What are the duties and responsibilities 17 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 18 A Well, the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet 19 sometimes twice a week. But we also have met at 20 midnight because of the time differential around 21 the world. 22 And our duties are to review with all 0018 1 the intelligence available the specific issue that 2 has caused the crisis, together with the 3 day-to-day meetings that we attend relative to 4 NATO and arms control and just about every 5 military foreign affairs issue that you can 6 imagine, and then give our position to the 7 Secretary of Defense, who then passes it on to the 8 President. 9 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 10 Staff attends all National Security Council 11 meetings. The President always asks the Chairman 12 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff what is the position 13 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this particular 14 issue, after everyone -- after others have spoken, 15 the Vice President, the head of the CIA, all 16 around the group. 17 And then the Chairman of the Joint 18 Chiefs of Staff is invited to give the position of 19 the Joint Chiefs of Staff together with, if 20 there's a diversion in terms of the position of a 21 particular member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to 22 advise the President, this is our position however 0019 1 it's my duty to advise you that the Secretary -- I 2 mean, that the Chief of Staff of the Army thinks 3 this, because. 4 And then the President puts out what's 5 called a Presidential memorandum, and it starts 6 out "The President has decided that." And once he 7 says that, everybody is supposed to get off their 8 seat and go do something about it. 9 Q Admiral, what was the Studies and 10 Observation Group, which is sometimes referred to 11 by its acronym SOG? 12 A Well, that was a special group that was 13 operating in Laos. It's an operational group 14 that's -- actually its primary mission is to 15 obtain intelligence as to location, the number of 16 personnel, the kinds of personnel. In other 17 words, all the information that can be obtained by 18 infiltrating an area. And if you want to put it 19 that way, generally they are a form of spying, of 20 getting information. That's their main mission. 21 And naturally they encounter opposition. 22 Q Was SOG under your jurisdiction? 0020 1 A It was under the jurisdiction 2 of actually General Abrams, who was in control in 3 the -- this was during the Vietnam War. And they 4 reported directly to General Abrams. 5 Q And reports, those reports came to the 6 attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 7 A Well, after Abrams had received 8 briefings and so on and consolidated the 9 information, it goes to -- not only to the Joint 10 Chiefs of Staff but also to the CIA, depending on 11 what the particular information happens to be. 12 Q Admiral, you spoke about the fact that 13 there were activities around the world that were 14 under consideration by the Joint Chiefs. Where 15 did the Joint Chiefs meet? Was that in 16 Washington? 17 A Yes. We have an office, as you walk in 18 the building, Pentagon, you turn left and go about 19 a half a block, and I'll introduce you to the 20 place where they meet. 21 Q Tell us briefly, Admiral, if you can sum 22 it up, what was your career that led to your 0021 1 becoming one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 2 A Well, I had -- I was at Pearl Harbor 3 when the Japanese attacked. Subsequent to that 4 time I was finally promoted to Rear Admiral, at 5 which time I was commander of the aircraft 6 carriers in the Mediterranean. I was transferred 7 then back to the Pentagon to deal with long-range 8 plans for construction of new ships of various 9 types and new weapons. 10 Subsequent to that time I was then 11 ordered out to Japan, where I was Commander of the 12 Seventh Fleet, which is a major Naval force in the 13 western Pacific. From that I was ordered to 14 Commander in Chief of the Pacific fleet, which 15 included the entire area of the Pacific Ocean. 16 Then I was Commander of the Atlantic 17 fleet, which consists of all the area in the 18 Atlantic Ocean. And at that time I was the 19 Unified Commander, so I was not only Commander of 20 the Navy but I was the Commander of the Air Force 21 and the Marines and the Army, too, in the 22 Pacific -- I mean, in the Atlantic. I'm the only 0022 1 Naval officer that's ever commanded both the 2 Atlantic and Pacific fleets. 3 I was then Chief of the Navy for three 4 years, at which time President Nixon transferred 5 me over to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 6 I stayed there for four years until 1974. And 7 after 45 years in uniform I retired. 8 Q What have your activities been since 9 retirement, Admiral, with regard to any 10 participation you may have had with public events? 11 A Well, quite a bit. I've participated in 12 public events. I'm very interested. After all, 13 my whole life has been involved in the political 14 military relationships around the world. I've 15 been in three wars. So I today have done other 16 activities. I was just selected on the 17th of 17 last month as the outstanding graduate of the U.S. 18 Naval Academy. And so I work on things of 19 interest to the Navy. I go to talk to Congressmen 20 about it. I testify before the Congress. 21 Then in addition to that I've been on 22 several boards, like the Texaco Company. So I'm a 0023 1 busy man. 2 Q I think recently you were in the news 3 with regard to the Panama Canal. 4 A I stay in the news regarding to the 5 Panama Canal. That's about the most stupid thing 6 I've ever been involved in. 7 Q General, going back now to 1970, would 8 you explain to the jury why there were United 9 States military forces in Southeast Asia in 1970? 10 A In Southeast Asia? 11 Q Well, with particular reference to 12 Vietnam and Laos. 13 A Well, of course, coming down to the 14 basic answer to your question, what we were trying 15 to do was to restore the independence of South 16 Vietnam, which was being opposed by North Vietnam. 17 And we became involved in the war called the 18 Southeast Asia War, whatever you want to call it, 19 Vietnamese War. And at that time President 20 Johnson was the President, and also he had as his 21 number one man the Secretary of Defense, 22 Mr. Macnamara. 0024 1 And the North Vietnamese were using Laos 2 as a transition called the Ho Chi Minh Trail to 3 take supplies from North Vietnam down to South 4 Vietnam. And consequently, the activities that we 5 are considering today, their mission was to 6 interrupt this transport of supplies into South 7 Vietnam to be used by the opponents to the South 8 Vietnamese government. 9 Q Was the United States at war with 10 Vietnam? 11 A Well, of course that was an issue which 12 I had many discussions with -- about with 13 Macnamara. I had many other discussions with 14 Macnamara besides that. But nevertheless, we 15 should have been at war. But that was a political 16 decision, not mine, because the Constitution as 17 well as several laws are activated the minute we 18 declare war. 19 We could be fighting with 500,000 men, 20 which we were doing in South Vietnam, but if we 21 don't declare war, it's not a war. As a matter of 22 fact, when I was commander of the Pacific fleet, I 0025 1 was living in Honolulu. I made a speech down at 2 the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, and made -- used the 3 phrase, "this dirty little war." 4 And before I could get back to my 5 headquarters I got a telephone call from Macnamara 6 and his public affairs officer saying, don't ever 7 use that term, because it's not a war. And I 8 said, well, get in the airplane and come out here 9 and we'll show you a war. So that was never -- 10 you're right, the answer to your question, the 11 long answer is no, we did not declare war. 12 Q We were not at war with North Vietnam 13 and we were not at war with Laos, is that correct? 14 A Yes. We weren't at war with Laos. And 15 of course Laos is a mixed-up country. I don't 16 know if you've ever been there, but you would 17 never go again. And they had -- the North 18 Vietnamese were using Laos as -- not only as a 19 transition area down to Ho Chi Minh Trail, but 20 also it involved the relationship with Cambodia. 21 Q If we were not at war with Laos, by what 22 right did United States military forces enter into 0026 1 Laos? 2 A Well, because the Laotians did not have 3 the capability of stopping the Ho Chi Minh Trail 4 transition. And as a matter of fact, to our 5 knowledge, in Cambodia at one time -- I got in an 6 airplane and I went to the capital of Laos, Luang 7 Prabang, and had dinner with the President of 8 Laos, as well as the American ambassador that was 9 in -- assigned to Laos, and I told them that we 10 wanted to conduct operations in Laos to interdict 11 this flow of material that was coming out in large 12 quantities. We bombed it, we did everything to 13 it. 14 We wanted to have the South Vietnamese 15 use their own forces to interdict. And they were 16 feeling in Washington that we couldn't -- did not 17 have permission to do that. And the President 18 told me that he would give permission, assuming 19 that we exercised every precaution we could in 20 order to make certain that the damage was at a 21 minimum. 22 And so we did have authority to go into 0027 1 Laos. 2 Q You had authority given by the Laotian 3 authorities? 4 A Yes. 5 Q In September of 1970, did you know about 6 Operation Tailwind? 7 A Well, I only knew that the SOG forces 8 were busy in the gathering of intelligence and in 9 interdiction. Now, I did not -- I never saw an 10 operation order or an operation report after 11 action. I did not see that as a matter of day to 12 day, although nevertheless I got over a hundred 13 messages a day as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 14 Staff. 15 I had six officers, and each one of them 16 had a different area. And they were -- their task 17 was to take these messages and divide them up 18 according to these NATO and arms control and all 19 of the things we dealt with, and then give me the 20 important messages. 21 So I knew that the SOG forces were 22 active in Laos. But I primarily knew why, namely 0028 1 to assist in the interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh 2 Trail. 3 Q What was the policy of the United States 4 military forces as you knew it with regard to the 5 use of nerve gas? And when I use the term "nerve 6 gas," I'm using it in the manner in which it was 7 used in the CNN broadcast on Operation Tailwind, 8 that is, sarin gas or GBU 15, or sometimes 9 referred to as just GB. 10 A Well, the sarin gas which Mrs. Oliver 11 talked about ad infinitum, there was none in the 12 Vietnamese area, although some people have -- 13 there have more or less been allegations to that 14 effect. The gas was stowed in Okinawa some time 15 away, and it was put over there not for the 16 Vietnamese particularly. 17 But during the time that the Vietnam War 18 was going on, there were always two concerns in 19 the background of those that were deciding policy. 20 And they were, one, what are the Chinese going to 21 do, and are they coming in to assist the North 22 Vietnamese, or whether the Russians were going to 0029 1 do it. 2 Now, the Russians were giving the North 3 Vietnamese large quantities of supplies. And as a 4 matter of fact they gave them the airplanes they 5 had, and they were allowed, until we got 6 permission to mine Haifong Harbor, to bring in 7 large quantities of supplies into Haifong. 8 And so the question was always how many 9 Russians are going to participate. As you know, 10 at the outset of the Vietnam War, President 11 Johnson made the point, he starts out by saying, 12 we seek no wider war. Then he said, we're not 13 going to overthrow Ho Chi Minh. Then he said, 14 we're not going to cross the DMZ. And so on. 15 You know, it was a war that -- you 16 either get into a war if the United States is 17 threatened, or you stay out of the war. It's not 18 right to kill American boys if we're not defending 19 our country. That's my position. 20 Q Were there Russian personnel involved on 21 the side of the North Vietnamese? 22 A Yes, in the sense that the Russians were 0030 1 supplying the surface to air missiles, the SA 2 2 missile, with which they were shooting down our 3 aircraft, and the Russians combined with Jane 4 Fonda were sitting there cheering the North 5 Vietnamese on. And they didn't know how to 6 operate. 7 They had to teach the North Vietnamese 8 how to adjust the missiles and how to operate the 9 missiles. And there were Russians there, if 10 that's your question. The Russians were not in 11 air to air combat -- I mean in air to air combat. 12 Neither were they in infantry combat, trying to 13 stick a bayonet in somebody's belly. But they 14 were there in a technical sense, advising the 15 North Vietnamese. 16 Q To get back to my former question, 17 Admiral Moorer, was there a policy of the United 18 States military forces with regard to the use of 19 nerve gas? 20 A Yes. 21 Q What was that policy? 22 A Well, the policy, as you know, we had in 0031 1 a treaty floating, that had been signed by 2 President Nixon, I think, but it was not actually 3 approved by the Senate yet, but nevertheless, we 4 had no plan to use nerve gas. It wasn't 5 necessary. We used what we call -- what the 6 police call tear gas, and they used quite a bit of 7 it, in terms of trying to capture a criminal, if 8 he's jeopardizing the lives of other people. 9 When we rescued large numbers of 10 soldiers that were isolated in the jungle, and we 11 rescued them, and frequently we did use tear gas 12 to clear the area until we pull the wounded or 13 whatever out of the position he was in. So yes, 14 we used tear gas. But we never used poison gas. 15 Q The tear gas, was that a lethal gas? 16 A What, tear gas? 17 Q Tear gas, yes. 18 A No. The police use it every day. 19 Q General -- I mean Admiral, what was the 20 policy of the U.S. military forces as you knew it 21 with regard to American defectors? 22 A Well, defectors, the policy so far as I 0032 1 knew, and as a matter of fact there were very few 2 defectors, I think there were two, finally, as 3 reported in this document right here, but the 4 policy was to -- 5 MR. SIMMONS: Let the record reflect 6 that the Admiral pointed to a 1998 report by the 7 Pentagon in connection with this case. 8 MR. BERMAN: Would you please -- we 9 would appreciate no interruptions during the 10 deposition. I was going to ask him what it was he 11 pointed to. 12 MR. SIMMONS: Very well. 13 BY MR. BERMAN: 14 Q Would you continue your answer, Admiral? 15 A Repeat your question. 16 Q What was the policy of the military 17 forces of the United States with regard to 18 American defectors? 19 A Well, if the defector was identified and 20 known, they were supposed to bring them back to 21 their command. And then they would -- which 22 happened to one marine, they get court-martialed 0033 1 and so on. 2 Q Was it the policy of the United States 3 military forces to kill American defectors? 4 A No. 5 Q You just indicated a document you 6 referred to a minute ago, Admiral Moorer. What 7 was that document you put your hand on just now? 8 A It says "Department of Defense, Review 9 of Allegations Concerning Operation Tailwind." 10 Q Were members of the United States 11 military forces offered any reward or incentive to 12 bring in American defectors? 13 A Not to my knowledge. It's not like a -- 14 catching a criminal, Jesse James or something, and 15 bringing him into the police and getting $50. No. 16 Q No bounties? 17 A No. 18 Q I want to turn now to the events of 19 1998, with regard to the CNN Newsstand broadcast 20 on June 7, 1998, on the subject of Operation 21 Tailwind. Were you interviewed by representatives 22 of CNN? 0034 1 A I don't think I was interviewed by 2 representatives of CNN. I was represented by 3 Ms. Oliver there. 4 Q Well, I believe Ms. Oliver is an 5 employee of CNN or was an employee of CNN. 6 A Well, I didn't look at it that way. 7 Okay. 8 Q For how many hours did those interviews 9 go on? 10 A I think it was seven or eight, something 11 like that. She came around to my building. And 12 then one evening when I thought this was all over, 13 I go down below in the lobby, and I lived in an 14 apartment house, and there was Mrs. Oliver, and a 15 man named Jack Smith. 16 I didn't know they were coming. I 17 didn't invite them to come. Why they came without 18 telling me I thought was a breach of etiquette, to 19 say the least. But nevertheless they were there, 20 and I talked to them. And so if you're saying 21 that she is -- I thought that she was suing CNN. 22 But if she was an agent of CNN, I talked to her, 0035 1 you're right. 2 Q Where did the interviews take place? 3 A Right there in the building I lived in. 4 Q Where did you live? 5 A 9707 Old Georgetown Road, in a place 6 called Maplewood. And I moved there after I 7 retired, because no mowing and no cooking. 8 Q Is that where you live today, Admiral? 9 A Yes. 10 Q So the interviews took place at your 11 home? 12 A Yes. It wasn't any interview. It was 13 day after day after -- it was several hours. She 14 would come and go. I was just trying to help her 15 out. She was pregnant. And she called me on the 16 phone and she asked me, could you talk to me. And 17 I said, yes, I'll be glad to help you. And that 18 was a mistake on my part. 19 Q What was the state of your health at 20 that time? 21 A My health is in excellent condition, it 22 always has been. I'm lucky. I'm 88. I'm just 0036 1 getting wound up. 2 Q Admiral, I'm going to show you a copy of 3 the document that I've sent to you previously, 4 which was a transcript of the interview, 5 interviews that were carried on by April Oliver. 6 These transcripts were furnished to me by 7 attorneys for the defendant CNN. I'll ask if you 8 can identify it. Have you seen that before? 9 A I think so. Have you got any water 10 around here? 11 MR. JOHNSON: I'll see if I can't get 12 you some. 13 MR. BERMAN: I would like this 14 transcript to be marked as an exhibit in this 15 deposition. This will be marked Exhibit A. 16 (Exhibit Number A was marked for 17 identification and was retained by counsel.) 18 BY MR. BERMAN: 19 Q Admiral, I'm going to read you an 20 excerpt from the transcript of your interview by 21 Mrs. Oliver. 22 MR. KAPLAN: Can you give us a page? 0037 1 MR. BERMAN: Yes. I'm referring to the 2 portion labeled beta 4, page 6. 3 MR. BAINE: Beta 14. 4 MR. BERMAN: I'm sorry, beta 14, page 6. 5 BY MR. BERMAN: 6 Q Ms. Oliver asked you, "Now, of course, 7 the reason we are interested in Tailwind," do you 8 see that? 9 A Not yet. Oh, yes. Now I see it. 10 Right. 11 Q "Of course, the reason we are interested 12 in Tailwind is that we have been told by a lot of 13 people now that it was the first time that the 14 U.S., whether it was CIA or the Air Force or the 15 SOG guys I'm not entirely clear, but it was the 16 first time that the U.S. ever used what is known 17 as a lethal nerve gas in combat. Are you -- how 18 much awareness do you have of this?" 19 You answered, "None." 20 A That's correct. That's the truth. 21 Q And your answer, you continued by 22 saying, "And what you should do when you make a 0038 1 statement like that is get -- you said you've been 2 told by people. So get all those people in front 3 of this camera." And Ms. Oliver said, "We have." 4 And you said, "And let them tell you that that was 5 the case." And Ms. Oliver said, "We have gotten 6 that." And you then replied, "But I don't have 7 the information to confirm what they said." 8 Admiral, did you then believe that 9 Mrs. Oliver did have information from other 10 sources that some U.S. military force had used 11 lethal nerve gas in the Tailwind operation? 12 A No. And what I thought about Ms. Oliver 13 is that she had and others there that -- 14 Mr. Smith, for instance, that they had a very firm 15 conviction that that was a fact. And consequently 16 I told her she was working the problem backwards. 17 She was starting with a conviction and then 18 attempting to get the information so she could 19 then take steps like this and prove it. 20 So the facts are, there was no gas or 21 poison gas like sarin used in that operation. And 22 this book right here from the Secretary of Defense 0039 1 says so. 2 Q Admiral, I'm not asking you whether -- 3 MR. SIMMONS: Excuse me. Could we 4 identify which document he referred to? 5 MR. BERMAN: Again, he referred to the 6 same document. 7 THE WITNESS: I told you that one 8 before. It's "Department of Defense Review of 9 Allegations Concerning Operation Tailwind." 10 BY MR. BERMAN: 11 Q Admiral, I didn't ask you whether the 12 armed forces used nerve gas. I'm asking you 13 whether as a result of what Ms. Oliver told you 14 when she said she had heard it from a lot of other 15 people, whether you then believed that the 16 military forces had used nerve gas. 17 A There it says "No," and I just said 18 none. 19 Q All right. I'm going to show you now an 20 excerpt from the videotape of the broadcast. 21 Would you turn and -- 22 (Whereupon a videotape was shown.) 0040 1 BY MR. BERMAN: 2 Q Admiral, you just heard the voiceover 3 statement that you confirmed that sarin was used 4 in Tailwind. 5 A No, I did not confirm it. I said 6 "None." And I must -- play that all over, now you 7 show me where I confirmed it. I mean, the facts 8 are, I did not confirm it. I never confirmed it. 9 The Secretary of Defense says I didn't confirm it. 10 And that's the whole point. What they did in this 11 particular film was they had a picture of me, and 12 then somebody came along, I guess it was Arnett, 13 and said -- quoted what I said. Instead of 14 letting me say it, he said it. And so it was 15 hearsay. 16 And so I think that that was -- whoever 17 put this film together was trying to sandbag me. 18 And the facts are there was no sarin gas in 19 Southeast Asia. 20 Q Admiral, I'm going to read you now some 21 other excerpts from the interview that we've 22 referred to, Exhibit A. If you look at beta 14, 0041 1 page 7, the next page, at the top of the page 2 Ms. Oliver said, "These men went into battle very 3 well prepared. It was not a casual kind of 4 preparation at all. They were issued the most 5 cutting edge gas masks available that would 6 protect against nerve gas. They were issued 7 something called atropine, which is of course a 8 nerve gas antidote." 9 And then I would like to turn to beta 10 15, page 2. If you'll turn over three more pages, 11 at the bottom of the page you'll see the beta 15, 12 page 2. 13 A Page what? 14 Q 2. Page 2. 15 A Yes, okay. 16 Q And Ms. Oliver said, the second time 17 Ms. Oliver is referred to on that page, one of 18 the -- the second sentence of that paragraph, "I 19 mean, these men were briefed beforehand that a 20 powerful gas would be at their disposal. They 21 were given the atropine. They were given the 22 masks. And the gas was put on standby at NKP at 0042 1 their disposal." 2 NKP is Okinawa? 3 A That's right. And NKP, the gas was 4 removed, because -- when we made that agreement 5 with the Japanese to move back into Okinawa. 6 Q And then if you look down to the next 7 time Ms. Oliver's name appears, she said, "And if, 8 as I believe I can prove, CBU 15 was used in 9 Tailwind, what would be the next step? I mean, 10 would CBU be used again?" And then on page 3, the 11 next page, Admiral, she said, "Well, we've been 12 told by four different SOG men that the weapon was 13 based at NKP." That's the first time her name 14 appears on the page. 15 Do you see that? 16 A Yes, I see it. 17 Q And that they were loaded on A1Es. 18 Those are helicopters, Admiral? 19 A No. That's a dive bomber. 20 Q Dive bombers. And flown in support of 21 Tailwind. 22 A Now, I'm not saying that the A1 wasn't 0043 1 flown in support of Tailwind. I'm saying that the 2 A1 had no sarin gas aboard. That's what I'm 3 saying. 4 Q All right. Now, if you'll turn to beta 5 16, that's several pages further on, Admiral, page 6 2 of beta 16. 7 A Yes. 8 Q The top of the page, Ms. Oliver said, 9 "There was a great big briefing in Saigon after 10 Tailwind about three weeks afterward, and they 11 brought a young, you know, captain down and a 12 young lieutenant down to brief General Abrams on 13 just what happened in Tailwind. Are you aware of 14 this briefing?" And you answered "No." 15 A That's right. 16 Q And she went on to say, "Well, there 17 were 58 stars in the room, and it occurred at a 18 place called The Wat. And it was a very, you 19 know, big deal briefing. And one of the young men 20 who was interviewed talked about CBU, and was, 21 quote, unquote, accurate and effective every time 22 it was brought in, end quote." 0044 1 Admiral, all of those statements by 2 Ms. Oliver were made to you before she asked you 3 the next question that I want to inquire about 4 now, on beta 16, on page 4. 5 A Yes. 6 Q And I believe I have that on the video. 7 (Whereupon, a videotape was shown.) 8 BY MR. BERMAN: 9 Q Now, Admiral Moorer, you just heard 10 yourself, when she asked you, "Isn't it fair to 11 say in light of all this, everything we've talked 12 about, that Tailwind proved that CBU 15 GB is an 13 effective weapon," and you answered "Yes, I 14 think -- but that was already known, otherwise it 15 never would have been manufactured." 16 Admiral, Ms. Oliver's question asking 17 you if Tailwind didn't prove it was an effective 18 weapon, that question necessarily assumed, did it 19 not, that CBU 15 GB had actually been used in 20 Tailwind, and your answer, "Yes, I think -- but I 21 think that was already known," that answer could 22 be taken to mean that Tailwind did prove that CBU 0045 1 GB 15 is an effective weapon. 2 When she asked you that question, 3 Admiral, did you believe that she did have 4 reliable information from other sources to the 5 effect that U.S. military forces had used nerve 6 gas in Operation Tailwind? 7 A No. And I was really answering the 8 question if I believed it was an effective weapon. 9 And I said that if it wasn't an effective weapon, 10 it would have never been manufactured and never 11 been stockpiled. That's what I was telling her. 12 I wasn't denying that it had been stockpiled. 13 Q Was it your intention, Admiral, to 14 confirm that nerve gas was used in Operation 15 Tailwind? 16 A No. I just read you, "None," right at 17 the beginning of our discussion. And it said none 18 in here. 19 Q Admiral, in another section of the 20 broadcast, and I don't have it on this tape, I 21 have it on another tape, there was a voiceover 22 statement that Admiral Moorer confirmed -- or 0046 1 rather, excuse me, that Admiral Moorer 2 acknowledged in an off-camera interview that 3 Tailwind's target was indeed defectors. 4 Did you make such an acknowledgment? 5 A I think you were quoting Arnett. 6 Q Yes. 7 A And he -- what they did was they took my 8 picture and asked me one question, then they 9 put -- dub in Arnett's voice. And what they were 10 doing then is presenting his say. I mean, they 11 didn't say -- they didn't have me there saying it. 12 They said I said it. 13 And consequently the facts are that I 14 was -- as I told you a while ago, that of course 15 there was -- we don't run around deploying all 16 over the world ineffective weapons. The fact that 17 a weapon is deployed overseas means it's 18 effective, or we wouldn't have it in the first 19 place. That was kind of a dumb question, in my 20 view. 21 Q And once more, Admiral, did you 22 acknowledge, as Arnett said you acknowledged, that 0047 1 Tailwind's target was defectors? 2 A No. And I told Mrs. Oliver twice that 3 if I had known Arnett was going to have anything 4 to do with this operation of her interview, I 5 would have never shown up, and I wouldn't have 6 said one word to her. 7 Q Admiral, referring to the briefing that 8 Ms. Oliver described to you as having taken place 9 in Saigon three weeks after the operation, do you 10 know the identity of the young captain that she 11 referred to? 12 A I guess she's talking about this man 13 that -- Oliver is always bringing up his book. 14 And I never seen the book. I never heard of him. 15 And he reports, that I told you a while ago, to 16 General Abrams, and you were talking about a 17 briefing he gave General Abrams in Saigon. And I 18 think that you're talking about Lieutenant 19 Buskirk. 20 And I wasn't going to answer what he 21 said, since I didn't know what he said. 22 Q The author of the book you've just 0048 1 referred to, was that John Plaster? 2 A No. The book I was talking to was 3 written by Buskirk. 4 Q All right. You don't know the identity 5 of the young captain you referred to? 6 A Well, I assume Buskirk was -- I don't 7 know if he was a captain or a lieutenant or -- 8 Q I believe he was the lieutenant, young 9 lieutenant you referred to. 10 A I don't know of any young captains that 11 briefed Abrams. I know of a lieutenant that 12 briefed Abrams. 13 Q I would like to read you one excerpt 14 from the interview. On beta 18, at page 1, that's 15 near the end. Way in the back. 16 MR. NYKODYM: What Bates number is that? 17 CO -- 18 MR. BERMAN: Page CO 1129. 19 MR. NYKODYM: Thank you, sir. 20 BY MR. BERMAN: 21 Q Near the upper half of the page, you see 22 the second -- the first time Ms. Oliver's name 0049 1 appears there, she asked you, "Was this the only 2 time that you personally know of that GB or nerve 3 gas was used?" And you answered, "Well, mainly I 4 know about it because of what you told me." 5 A That's right. That's the truth. And 6 she was bringing it up all the time. 7 Q Except for what she told you, did you 8 have any knowledge that nerve gas had been used in 9 Operation Tailwind? 10 A No. Of course not. Because it wasn't 11 used. 12 Q Did you rely on what she told you in 13 answering her questions in the manner in which you 14 did? 15 A No. 16 Q After the CNN broadcast, and there was a 17 storm of protest from the Department of Defense 18 and the Special Forces Association and others, CNN 19 obtained what they called an independent 20 investigation by David Kohler and Floyd Abrams. 21 And on June 2nd of 1988, in his report, Abrams 22 said this. He said -- this is not in front of 0050 1 you, Admiral. 2 A This is, right here. Go ahead. 3 Q He said, "Admiral Moorer will be 87 next 4 month. He lives in an assisted care retirement 5 home. He was interviewed on four occasions for a 6 total of over seven hours. Though a review of the 7 outtakes of the broadcast demonstrates that his 8 memory remains satisfactory, his responses are 9 often cast in hypothetical terms. 10 "CNN itself ceased calling on Admiral 11 Moorer to comment on ongoing issues in the early 12 1990s, and CNN's Pentagon correspondent raised 13 this credibility issue before the broadcast. 14 Other reporters we interviewed who covered the 15 Defense Department have also declined to rely upon 16 him as a source for the past several years." 17 A I know. And of course that's totally 18 incorrect. As a matter of fact I play golf all 19 the time. I'm going to South Carolina, quail 20 shooting, in February. I'm on the move all the 21 time. And anybody that thinks I'm sick, I'm ready 22 to wrestle them any time. 0051 1 Q Do you know why CNN discredited you in 2 that way? 3 MR. BAINE: Objection. 4 A No, I never know what CNN or what 5 anybody in the media is going to do. The media 6 has got a double standard, from my point of view. 7 And they say one thing one time and one thing the 8 next. If that serves their purpose to say that 9 about me, well, we have freedom of speech, and 10 they can say what they damn please. 11 MR. BAINE: I'm not sure that the court 12 reporter noted my objection to the form of that 13 question. I would like to make it. 14 MR. SIMMONS: I'm not going to raise 15 form objections. If someone else objects, I'll 16 rely upon their objections as well. 17 BY MR. BERMAN: 18 Q Did you make a claim against CNN for 19 discrediting you? 20 A What? 21 Q Did you make a claim against CNN for 22 discrediting you? 0052 1 A No. I didn't make a claim. CNN, I got 2 a few dollars as expense money, that's all. I 3 never sued CNN or claimed any large amount of 4 money or anything like that. I just think they 5 put me to a lot of trouble for nothing. For 6 telling the truth. 7 MR. BERMAN: Admiral, I thank you for 8 assisting us and for responding to these 9 questions. And I have no further questions at 10 this time. Mr. Baine, representing CNN, will have 11 some questions for you. 12 THE WITNESS: You're representing 13 Ms. Oliver? 14 MR. BERMAN: No, I'm representing van 15 Buskirk. 16 THE WITNESS: Van Buskirk. Okay. 17 That's the young man I'm talking about. 18 MR. BERMAN: Right. 19 MR. BAINE: Let's take a quick break. I 20 think it would be better if I sat in that chair so 21 the Admiral would be more comfortable. 22 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the 0053 1 record. The time is 10:01:43. 2 (Recess.) 3 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're back on the 4 record. The time is 10:08:19. 5 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS CNN, 6 TIME, TIME WARNER, AND PETER ARNETT 7 BY MR. BAINE: 8 Q Admiral Moorer, again, I'm Kevin Baine, 9 and I represent CNN, Time, and Time Warner, and 10 some of the employees of CNN who have been sued in 11 some of these actions. As we were explaining at 12 the break, I do not represent April Oliver. She 13 is separately represented here today. 14 MR. SIMMONS: And she is not a CNN 15 employee today. 16 THE WITNESS: What's that? 17 MR. SIMMONS: April Oliver is not an 18 employee of CNN as we sit here today. 19 THE WITNESS: I wasn't aware of that. 20 BY MR. BAINE: 21 Q Now, Admiral, I have just a couple of 22 questions to follow up on the questions Mr. Berman 0054 1 asked you. You weren't present during Operation 2 Tailwind, were you? 3 A Certainly not. 4 Q And you weren't in charge of that 5 operation, you didn't direct it? 6 A No. I didn't even know about the 7 details of it, and I wasn't supposed to. 8 Q Now, sometime after the CNN broadcast 9 came out, there were additional news articles, and 10 in one of those articles that appeared in the 11 Associated Press, you were reported to have said 12 the following. I want to know whether this is 13 accurate, referring to sarin gas. "I don't know 14 that they used it, I don't know that they didn't 15 use it." 16 Would that be correct? 17 A I don't have any proof, that's right. 18 Q So you don't have personal knowledge 19 yourself that it was used or that it wasn't used? 20 A I already said in connection with the 21 answer to that question that I never saw an 22 operation order or an operation report. And until 0055 1 I get a report of operations, I don't know what 2 happened. 3 At the end of World War II, I was in a 4 group that was sent to Japan with subpoena power. 5 We had the authority to subpoena any Japanese, 6 including the prime minister. And we found in a 7 cave all of the Japanese battle reports. And up 8 until that time when we had a chance to read those 9 battle reports, we didn't know everything that 10 happened. 11 Q And so when we're talking about whether 12 or not sarin gas was used on Tailwind, I take it 13 your position ultimately is, because you never saw 14 a document that said that it was used, you don't 15 have personal knowledge that it was used, and you 16 don't know that it wasn't used? 17 A Exactly. And I would have been very 18 upset and raised hell if it had've been used and I 19 wasn't told about it. 20 Q Now, it is a fact, is it not, that there 21 was a weapon that the United States made that 22 contained sarin gas? 0056 1 A Of course. 2 Q And you said that was stored in Okinawa? 3 A That's right. 4 Q And that weapon, I take it, was 5 available if the proper authorization had been 6 issued for someone to use it, would that be true? 7 A Sure. That would be always -- it's just 8 like a nuclear bomb. We've got nuclear weapons 9 stored around hither and there. But they never 10 used the weapon until -- and I'm glad you brought 11 that up. Now, we never used that weapon until we 12 need it. When Mr. Truman authorized the use of 13 nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it saved 14 hundreds of thousands of lives of both American 15 boys and Japanese people. 16 And so that was in my view a case where 17 a weapon of heavy damage capability was used to 18 save American lives. And that was what I meant by 19 my statement. 20 Q And in fact if sarin gas had been 21 necessary to save American lives, you wouldn't 22 have had any problem with using it for that 0057 1 purpose? 2 A No. But I would have known about it. 3 The point is that permission would have to be 4 gained at the very -- from the Commander in Chief 5 before anybody could use the gas. And it would 6 have been a big surprise to me if the request was 7 submitted and approved from Washington and I 8 didn't know about it. 9 Q During your interviews with April 10 Oliver, I think on several occasions you made 11 essentially this point, that you would have had no 12 difficulty using a weapon such as sarin if it was 13 necessary to save American lives. 14 A Of course. 15 Q Treaty or no treaty. 16 A I've been in three wars, buddy, and when 17 I was at Pearl Harbor, and I took -- I pulled 300 18 boys dead out of the water there, and I've seen 19 plenty of people like that. I am trying and have 20 tried all my career to minimize and save the lives 21 of American boys. And that's what I meant by that 22 statement. And if a case came that I could save 0058 1 American boys' lives, I would use anything to put 2 a stop to their death. 3 That's the point I'm trying to make. 4 Q Just hold with me for one second. I 5 want to see if I can find a portion of these 6 interviews I would like to show to you. 7 MR. BAINE: Why don't we go off the 8 record for a second while I search for this. 9 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record. 10 The time is 10:14:08. 11 (Discussion off record.) 12 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're back on the 13 record. The time is 10:14:55. 14 BY MR. BAINE: 15 Q Admiral Moorer, you still have in front 16 of you Exhibit A which is the transcribed 17 interview. And I wanted to direct your attention 18 to a portion of that. If you show it to me I can 19 find it for you, perhaps. Let me see if I can 20 give you the right page. 21 At the very bottom of the page that I'm 22 showing you, which is beta 14, at page 7, 0059 1 Mr. Berman read to you a couple of questions and 2 answers, but he skipped one question and one 3 answer. I just wanted to read that question and 4 answer to you. 5 This is right after you say, "But I 6 don't have the information to confirm what they 7 said." Ms. Oliver's next question was, referring 8 to the use of sarin, "However, it would not 9 surprise you?" And your answer was, on the next 10 page, "Well, I would expect them to use whatever 11 was necessary to achieve their mission in an 12 emergency." 13 Do you see that? 14 A Yes. That's a matter of survival. 15 Q And do you recall that there was another 16 occasion when you -- 17 A Before you leave that, though, I want to 18 point out to you once again that -- how much would 19 have had to go on before they could have used that 20 gas. There would've had to have been a message 21 from the man on the spot, through Abrams, on up 22 through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the 0060 1 President of the United States. He would have to 2 approve it. It would have to go back down. 3 They would have to send a plane up to 4 Okinawa, pick up the weapons, bring them down to a 5 local field, and so on. So it's almost impossible 6 to keep that a secret if it was put in position to 7 be used. 8 Q I would like to read to you from some 9 notes that Ms. Oliver made of another interview 10 that she had with you and ask you whether this is 11 an accurate note of what you told her. 12 A Where is it? 13 Q This is not in front of you. I'm going 14 to read something to you, okay? These are notes 15 that Ms. Oliver made of a previous interview with 16 you, the very first time she spoke to you, when it 17 wasn't on camera. And you were asked this 18 question, and she has notes that this is your 19 answer. I want you to listen carefully, okay? 20 MR. DUNCAN: Could we have a copy of 21 those notes? 22 MR. BAINE: I don't know if you have a 0061 1 copy of those notes. I will be happy to show them 2 to you. 3 MR. DUNCAN: We need a copy of those 4 notes. 5 BY MR. BAINE: 6 Q "QUESTION: So you are aware sarin was 7 used? 8 "ANSWER: I am not confirming for you 9 that it was used. You have told me that. But let 10 me put it this way. It does not surprise me. In 11 an operation of this kind you must make certain 12 that your men are as well equipped for defensive 13 purposes as possible. I don't care if that treaty 14 is ratified or not." 15 Does that sound like an answer you 16 probably gave Ms. Oliver? 17 A Yes. I mean, look. I come back to -- 18 I've been shot down in airplanes. I've been 19 picked up by a ship that was sinking, by -- after 20 that. And I'm imbued with a motivation to 21 survive. And so you're asking me survivability 22 question. And for that reason I say, you do 0062 1 anything to survive. And anybody that does that 2 is bent on suicide. 3 Q At another time during your on-camera 4 interview with April Oliver, and this is reflected 5 on what's in front of you, it's at beta 15, page 6 7, and if you hand that to me I can find it for 7 you. Maybe I can help you. 8 MR. DUNCAN: That's CL 1111. 9 THE WITNESS: Oh, you've got a secret 10 number here. Okay. Go ahead. 11 BY MR. BAINE: 12 Q In the middle of that page, after 13 Ms. Oliver tells you of some information that she 14 had received, why don't I read the entire question 15 and answer to you. This would be the second time 16 that Ms. Oliver's name appears on this page. 17 She says, "Okay. We were told of at 18 least one more time that SOG used it." And I 19 think that it's clear we're talking about sarin 20 gas here. "In January of 1971 there was a 21 company, a small recon team that got trapped and 22 was surrounded. And again, CBU 15, which the men 0063 1 called sleeping gas, was brought in. A bomb 2 damage assessment took place, and then an after 3 action report. 4 "It was written up as being there's no 5 question but that this, this CBU 15 sleeping gas, 6 proved crucial in terms of getting Americans out 7 alive. This would be about three months after 8 Tailwind. So I have two instances at least where 9 the Special Forces teams had access to this weapon 10 and have saved American lives." 11 And your response was, "Well, if they 12 have told you that, it's probably true. I was 13 sitting in the Pentagon with 560,000 men over 14 there, and I'm the first to admit I didn't know 15 what each and every one of them were doing at the 16 time." 17 Do you see that question and answer on 18 that transcript? 19 A Yes. I see that. But I want to point 20 out once more that if that sarin gas had've been 21 used in this fashion, all of the American forces 22 that were participating would be dead. If 0064 1 you start -- sarin covers so much territory. And 2 as I read this description of what happened, they 3 obviously had contact with that gas. That gas 4 attacks the skin. A gas mask is useless against 5 sarin. 6 And so none of them -- all of them were 7 wounded. But none of them died. And therefore 8 they were not exposed to sarin. 9 Q Did you learn more about sarin gas after 10 this broadcast than you knew about it before the 11 broadcast? In other words, did you learn some 12 more additional information about sarin gas and 13 these weapons through the Department of Defense 14 report that you've referred to? 15 A Well, of course, I've learned more 16 detail about it. But I knew about its existence. 17 I knew about the existence of all -- every weapon, 18 and where it was. I had that in my files. And so 19 of course I knew what it would do. But I do know 20 and have had confirmed that it will enter your 21 skin instead of your lungs. 22 Q Let me refer to a couple of statements 0065 1 that were attributed to you in other publications 2 after the CNN and Time reports. I have copies of 3 these here. I would be happy to show them to you. 4 But I'll read them to you first and just ask you 5 whether these statements attributed to you were 6 correctly attributed to you, okay? 7 A Okay. 8 Q The first is an article in the Florida 9 Times Union on -- looks like the date of this was 10 June 10th, 1998. And I'll make copies of these 11 for you all later on. 12 MR. DUNCAN: If you're going to refer to 13 them, we really need to make them a part of this 14 deposition, I think. 15 MR. BAINE: I don't mind doing that. 16 Let's make this -- we'll just make it Deposition 17 Exhibit B. That would be fine. 18 MR. DUNCAN: And why don't you go back 19 and make that note that you referred to earlier an 20 exhibit as well. 21 MR. BAINE: Okay. I don't mind doing 22 that. Actually I do. That's a longer thing. 0066 1 We'll do that later, okay? 2 (Exhibit Number B was marked for 3 identification and was retained by counsel.) 4 BY MR. BAINE: 5 Q I'll read this to you, and I've 6 highlighted the portion I'm going to read. It 7 says, "Just the same, Moorer said he believed the 8 stories of the soldiers who were involved in the 9 operation. The soldiers said nerve gas was 10 dropped from aircraft. 'They would have no motive 11 for trying to make up a cock and bull story, and I 12 believe what they said,' Moorer said." 13 Do you see that at the bottom of that 14 page? 15 A Yes. But the point is that a soldier's 16 out in the jungle fighting. And he -- some kind 17 of gas is dropped. And so he probably thought he 18 would say nerve gas or any kind of debilitating 19 gas or whatever. The point is that that 20 soldier -- if that had been sarin gas, the point 21 I'm trying to make is, if that had've been sarin 22 gas that he detected, he would have never been 0067 1 around to tell -- to make that statement. 2 So the mere fact that he made the 3 statement proves that it was not sarin gas. 4 Otherwise he would have been dead and wouldn't 5 have said a word. 6 Q Well, there are ways to protect yourself 7 from these gases, are there not? You can use 8 various protective gear, can you not? 9 A Yes, but the protective gear generally 10 speaking is -- any time you get into a situation 11 where you use protective gear to protect your 12 skin, then you're wearing heavy, cumbersome 13 overalls that protect your entire body, and you 14 can't do very much fighting. So to my knowledge 15 they didn't wear -- they had gas masks, yes, and 16 the gas masks would protect against breathing of 17 various kinds of gas. 18 But to -- so far as sarin penetrating 19 the body, it doesn't rely on breathing. It's any 20 part of your skin it penetrates. 21 Q At the time of the interview by April 22 Oliver, and I understand you have testified that 0068 1 you didn't confirm the use of sarin gas, and you 2 didn't have any knowledge one way or the other, 3 but you did conduct a rather long, elaborate 4 interview with Ms. Oliver in which the assumption 5 at the very least appears to have been made that 6 sarin was used. 7 Isn't that a fair statement? That was 8 the assumption of the questions and answers that 9 were going back and forth. 10 A Okay. I just testified a short time 11 ago, when I said -- when I was asked by this 12 gentleman on my left, you know, where I learned 13 about -- she asked me how I learned about sarin 14 gas. I told her, from you. Because that's all 15 she would talk about. She sat in my waiting room 16 there for seven hours and talked about nothing but 17 sarin gas. 18 Q She told you she had spoken to men who 19 participated in the mission who told her on-camera 20 that nerve gas was used, right? She told you 21 that? 22 A That's right. But there are more than 0069 1 one kind of nerve gas. 2 Q And she told you that she spoke to 3 pilots who loaded it onto their planes, right, or 4 their helicopters? She told you that? 5 A But what is "it"? 6 Q Nerve gas. 7 A Wait a minute. What is "it"? 8 Q Sarin. 9 A Well, now you're getting specific. And 10 I said no. 11 Q But she told you these things, right, 12 during the interview? 13 A She told me these things, and that's 14 when I told her, why don't you get them on camera. 15 Q Exactly. 16 A And let them speak up and hear what 17 they've got to say, and not do them like they did 18 me, put me on TV and then insert hearsay by some 19 other person like Arnett. And if there's one 20 person in the world I don't want to speak for me, 21 it's Arnett. 22 Q And she told you she had these men on 0070 1 camera saying that nerve gas was used, right? 2 A Yes, but I never saw it. 3 Q Right. And she told you she had pilots 4 who said there was nerve gas also? 5 A And I never talked to them. 6 Q Right. So you didn't have personal 7 knowledge, but she told you these things? 8 A Yes, of course. 9 Q Now, you didn't say to her, hey, that's 10 crazy, that's wrong, I know that's not true, 11 because you didn't know one way or the other, 12 right? 13 A I never treat anybody like that. Once a 14 man puts on a uniform, if he doesn't tell me the 15 truth, he gets court-martialed. 16 Q So your belief, your frame of mind when 17 April Oliver is speaking to you, was that she was 18 telling you that men in uniform told her this 19 weapon was used, and you were not about to assume 20 that men in uniform had lied? 21 A That's right. Until I knew definitely. 22 I've found some of them lie. But I've found it 0071 1 out -- I've caught them and found it out myself. 2 But up until that point I believe what they say. 3 Q That's right. And so at the time of the 4 interview, when she told you that men in uniform 5 had told her these things, you didn't disbelieve 6 that? 7 A No. 8 Q And when you spoke to news reporters 9 after the Tailwind broadcast, such as the reporter 10 from the Associated Press, again, you said, they 11 would have no motive for trying to make up a cock 12 and bull story and I believe what they said, 13 because you had no reason to disbelieve it at that 14 point, right? 15 A Yes. I even believe you. I believe 16 everybody that tells me anything until I find out 17 differently. 18 MR. BAINE: And let me just mark as 19 Exhibit C an article from the Los Angeles Times on 20 June 9th, 1998. 21 (Exhibit Number C was marked for 22 identification and was retained by counsel.) 0072 1 BY MR. BAINE: 2 Q And this is an article in the Los 3 Angeles Times. And it says as follows, after a 4 description of -- let me just hold back and see if 5 I can get the context. 6 It says -- the article quotes Robert van 7 Buskirk, then an Army lieutenant, describing a 8 mission called Operation Tailwind, in which the 9 commandoes attacked the village with nerve gas, 10 then used it again against a contingent of North 11 Vietnamese troops when they blocked the group's 12 withdrawal. 13 Later on in the article the following 14 appears in reference to you, Admiral Moorer. It 15 said, "Yet he," Admiral Moorer, "said he found van 16 Buskirk's claims believable after hearing what the 17 soldier had said. 'He was there and I wasn't,' 18 Moorer said, adding that he believed use of sarin 19 would be justified to protect American lives." 20 That's the part that's highlighted 21 there. Is that a fair account of what you said to 22 the Los Angeles Times? 0073 1 A Well, the key thing, he was there and I 2 wasn't. 3 Q Right. 4 A And I keep coming back to the same 5 business, using the sarin as Truman used the 6 nuclear bomb, to phrase this, to protect American 7 lives. Why do you think we have a Defense 8 Department in the first place? For 157 years, not 9 one hostile soldier has set foot in the United 10 States. Why? Because we don't let people come 11 over here and endanger American lives. 12 And this is the same point. 13 MR. SIMMONS: Did we get an answer to 14 the question? I didn't hear an answer. 15 MR. BAINE: Well, maybe that's a fair 16 point. 17 BY MR. BAINE: 18 Q The question was whether that's a fair 19 account of what you told the Los Angeles Times. I 20 take it your answer is yes? 21 A Well, that's in line with what I told 22 Mrs. Oliver, why don't you ask the people that 0074 1 were there. I was in Washington. 2 Q And one thing that was really clear, I 3 take it, in your interviews and conversations with 4 Ms. Oliver was that she believed that sarin gas 5 was used in Tailwind? 6 A Well, I had to assume she believed, 7 because she brought it up over and over and over 8 again. 9 Q But she never gave you any indication, 10 did she, that she didn't believe it; I take it it 11 was pretty clear that she did believe it? 12 A Well, that's the reason I told her that 13 she was working the problem backwards. She 14 believed it, so she was trying to prove it. 15 Q And what she indicated, would it be fair 16 to say to you -- strike that. Would it be fair to 17 say that what Ms. Oliver was essentially saying to 18 you was, look, I've heard that sarin gas was used, 19 and it's clear to me that it was used, and I 20 believe that it was used, that that was her frame 21 of mind? 22 A I have to give her credit for believing. 0075 1 She believed it, or she wouldn't have been so 2 persistent. Or she had a goal, and her goal was 3 to get a big headline out of -- at the expense of 4 the man in uniform. And that's what was going on. 5 Q But in fairness to her, though, she did 6 tell you that she had men in uniform who had told 7 her this. 8 A Yes, but they never put them on camera. 9 I would like to see them on the camera. 10 Q Well, you did see van Buskirk and Hagan 11 on camera, didn't you, saying that nerve gas was 12 used? Do you remember in the broadcast that van 13 Buskirk and Hagan, both of whom were Tailwind 14 participants -- 15 A Yes, and they said it wasn't used. 16 Q They did say on camera that it was used. 17 Do you remember that? 18 A No. 19 MR. DUNCAN: Objection to the form of 20 the question. 21 MR. BAINE: The broadcast will speak for 22 itself. 0076 1 MR. BERMAN: Note my objection to the 2 form of the question also. 3 MR. DUNCAN: Also assumes facts not in 4 evidence. 5 MR. BAINE: I can go through this if you 6 want. There's really no dispute about this. For 7 the record, let's make clear what I'm talking 8 about. 9 MR. DUNCAN: Let me just complete my 10 record, that the testimony -- 11 MR. BAINE: I'll just refer to the 12 broadcast. 13 MR. DUNCAN: That the broadcast was in 14 the form of what I call the baddest of the bad. 15 And there's no proof that -- 16 MR. SIMMONS: Excuse me. I object to 17 you coaching. 18 MR. BAINE: Now you are testifying. 19 You've made an objection. Let's just leave it at 20 that. 21 MR. DUNCAN: You're getting ready to 22 testify. I'm going to object to that. 0077 1 MR. BAINE: I'm not going to testify. 2 MR. JOHNSON: Do you want a copy of the 3 broadcast? Do you want a copy for use? 4 MR. BAINE: I'm not sure that's 5 accurate. 6 BY MR. BAINE: 7 Q Do you recall, Admiral Moorer, seeing on 8 the broadcast Lieutenant van Buskirk saying 9 sleeping gas was slang for nerve gas, in other 10 words when you got hit with sleeping gas you were 11 going to sleep forever? Do you remember that part 12 of the broadcast? 13 A I don't remember, but I guess it's 14 feasible. 15 Q And do you remember that Hagan, who was 16 a Tailwind participant, made the following 17 statement on camera on the broadcast? Let's see 18 if I can find it. He said on camera, "Nerve 19 gas" -- 20 MR. DUNCAN: Identify which -- 21 MR. BAINE: June 14th. This may also 22 have been June 7th. I don't remember. June 14th. 0078 1 He says, "Nerve gas, the government don't want it 2 called that. They want to call it incapacitating 3 agent or some other form. But it was nerve gas." 4 MR. DUNCAN: Just a second. 5 BY MR. BAINE: 6 Q Do you remember Hagan saying that on 7 camera? 8 A No, but I'm sure he said it. 9 MR. DUNCAN: Let's make a copy of what 10 you're reading from an exhibit so we can identify 11 what pages, and then please identify the page that 12 you're reading from, so we can later reference it. 13 MR. SIMMONS: I would ask that you not 14 interrupt the witness when he's answering a 15 question. 16 MR. DUNCAN: There's a proper procedure 17 to follow in depositions. If he's going to read 18 from a document, let's make it an exhibit and 19 let's identify the page numbers. 20 MR. JOHNSON: I've got copies for 21 everybody if you want them. 22 MR. BAINE: Do you have your copy of the 0079 1 transcript that you want to use? This is mine. 2 MR. JOHNSON: There's the June 7th. 3 There's June 14th. This is for the Admiral. 4 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 5 MR. JOHNSON: Anybody else need June 6 7th? What are we looking at now? 7 MR. BAINE: Hold on a second. As far as 8 I'm concerned, we can make those exhibits later. 9 I don't need them for what I'm doing now. If you 10 want to make them an exhibit later on, you can do 11 it. I'm going to move on to another question. 12 BY MR. BAINE: 13 Q Admiral, you can put those aside. I 14 understand that April Oliver was persistent -- 15 A Very. 16 Q -- in her interviewing of you. 17 A Seven hours worth. 18 Q Was she courteous and professional in 19 her questioning? 20 A Of course. She's a lady. I treat her 21 like a lady. 22 Q And after she interviewed you on one 0080 1 occasion off camera, then another occasion on 2 camera, she -- let me see if I've got this right. 3 I think Ms. Oliver interviewed you four times 4 before the broadcast. Does that sound right? 5 A About. 6 Q And at one point before the broadcast 7 she came to your residence, again by herself, and 8 brought with her a script of the broadcast. Do 9 you remember that? 10 A Yes. 11 Q And I think she also had a draft of the 12 article that was to appear in Time Magazine, do 13 you recall that? 14 A I think so. She had a paper and gave it 15 to me, and I gave it right back to her. She 16 claimed I read it. Somebody claimed I read it for 17 30 minutes. I didn't glance at it, because I knew 18 it was hopeless. I knew if I changed it and then 19 I looked at the TV, it would be right back there, 20 what was on that paper to start off with. 21 So my objections, my corrections, my 22 statements were useless. So I just gave it back 0081 1 to her. I was tired of talking about it. 2 Q You're getting way ahead of me. She 3 showed up and she had a copy of the script with 4 her, right? 5 A Yes. 6 Q And she handed it to you? 7 A Yes. 8 Q Did she invite you to look at the script 9 to make sure it was accurate? 10 A Well, she didn't invite me. She just 11 handed me the paper. I assumed I was supposed to 12 read it or else she wouldn't have given it to me. 13 Q So the idea was, as far as you were 14 concerned, that she was giving you the script so 15 that you could look at it -- 16 A I didn't even know whether it was a 17 script or not. She gave me that paper. And I 18 didn't read it. I gave it right back to her. And 19 then it was alleged that I did read it. So the 20 point is that I've had a lot of experience like 21 this. And it's almost impossible to change the 22 content of a paper that somebody gives you to read 0082 1 when they have a vested interest in the paper. 2 Q I'm not making any allegations here, 3 Admiral Moorer, about what you did and didn't do. 4 I hope you understand that. I just want to make 5 sure I understand what happened that day. 6 A Well, that's right. 7 Q So she gave you the document. And I 8 take it that you at least looked at it -- 9 A She didn't tell me it was going to be on 10 TV. 11 Q Well, you knew that you had a script in 12 your hand because you looked at it and you 13 discussed whether it was fair to say that there 14 were scores of defectors, right? 15 A That's when I think I told her if I had 16 known Arnett was going to be on it I would have 17 never seen her. 18 Q Okay. But you looked at this document 19 and you saw among other things that it said that 20 there were scores of defectors; as a matter of 21 fact it said you said there were scores of 22 defectors, didn't it? 0083 1 A I don't think I ever said "scores." 2 What happened, she ran down her multiplication 3 tables. She said were there five, ten, 15, 20. 4 Q The script that she gave you said that 5 you acknowledged that there were scores of 6 defectors. And you discussed with her whether 7 that was a fair thing to say. And you said, 8 "Well, I didn't use the word 'scores,'" right? 9 A Yes, because I didn't know. And I just 10 found out when Mr. Gresham gave me this document 11 right here, there were two. But that's not my 12 responsibility. The service chief -- 13 Q Sir, that wasn't my question. Let me 14 just -- 15 A It's his responsibility to keep up with 16 how many defectors he has in Army uniform. And 17 the Naval CNO's job is to keep up with how many 18 defectors in Naval uniform. That was below my 19 area of responsibility. 20 Q Admiral Moorer, we're going to get 21 through this much quicker if I can just get some 22 answers to some really simple questions, okay? 0084 1 When she showed you the script, you saw that the 2 script said that you had confirmed there were 3 scores of defectors. And you initially took 4 exception to that, right, you said, I don't know 5 about this "scores," right? 6 A Yes, that's right. 7 Q So you looked at the document at least 8 enough to see the word "scores" and to say to her, 9 I'm not sure that's right. 10 A And then I immediately -- 11 Q Right? 12 A Wait a minute. I immediately assumed 13 that the document had many other things in it like 14 that. And I wasn't going to sit there and rewrite 15 the document or quarrel with the document or 16 something. I thought it was time for me to get 17 out of this operation. And I just handed it back 18 to her. 19 Q But you had a discussion with her about 20 whether that word "score" should be changed, 21 right? 22 A "Score," that's right. Because scores 0085 1 of defectors would have practically been -- would 2 weaken the outfit that was involved. 3 Q Right. And when you raised the question 4 about the word "scores," I take it she said to you 5 something like this; well, in the interview you 6 said it was between 23 and 300, so I thought 7 "scores" was a fair word to use. Is that pretty 8 much what she said to you? 9 A What happened is she reeled off several 10 numbers. And I told her to take her pick. And 11 she came back with "scores." And that was in the 12 document. And that was a word that caught my eye, 13 because there was no way -- if I want to know how 14 many defectors there was, I would've called up 15 General Westmoreland and asked him how many of 16 these guys in your outfit are running away. And 17 he would have told me. 18 But it wasn't my job to keep a running 19 account of every Marine, Army, Navy, Air Force 20 soldier that was defecting, whatever you want to 21 call it. 22 Q In any event, you had a discussion with 0086 1 Ms. Oliver about whether that word "scores" was 2 accurate or not, right? 3 A Yes. 4 Q Now, did you notice any other parts of 5 the script that referred to you? For example, not 6 too much before where the script said "Moorer 7 indicated scores of U.S. military had defected 8 during the war," it said something to this effect, 9 that Moorer confirmed that nerve gas was used in 10 Tailwind. 11 And now, when you sat there with April 12 Oliver that day, did you notice that statement in 13 the script? 14 A No. And I had previously answered the 15 question, "None." 16 Q I understand. 17 A And it was read out when I was talking 18 to this gentleman here. 19 Q You did understand that the idea, that 20 the reason why April Oliver gave you the script 21 was that you would have a chance to look at it if 22 you wanted to, right? 0087 1 A Yes. 2 Q And she wasn't hiding from you what she 3 was going to say; she was willing to let you read 4 what she was going to say? 5 A Well, she -- let me put it this way. 6 She was going to let me read what she thought was 7 going to be broadcast. But I didn't have any 8 confidence whatever that if I injected 9 corrections, that it wouldn't go wiggle right back 10 to where it was to start off with. 11 So -- I've been through this before with 12 the media, and I don't trust them. And so I just 13 handed it back to her. Why should I sit here and 14 rewrite a document when it -- there's no assurance 15 that that's what will wind up? 16 Q That was pretty unusual, wasn't it, for 17 a reporter to come to you and say, I'm going to do 18 a broadcast on TV and I'm going to give you my 19 script before it goes on so you can read it? Had 20 that ever happened to you before? 21 A Yes. 22 Q Someone gave you a script for a 0088 1 broadcast before it was going to go on the air? 2 A I've had that happen many times. 3 Q Can you remember anybody who ever did 4 that with you before? 5 A Well, I had many, many -- well, one I 6 remember was when we did the Christmas bombing 7 against -- to try to get -- the purpose of that 8 was to release the American POWs who were being 9 tortured. And I went to Mr. Nixon, and that is -- 10 we talked about it, how to make them turn the POWs 11 loose. 12 And the minute we started that operation 13 called Christmas bombing, in 1972 I think, I 14 began -- the North Vietnamese began to broadcast 15 the fact that we were killing our own POWs with 16 the bombing. And I get a call from a reporter. 17 And I told him, I said -- the first thing, I said, 18 are you an American? He said yes, he's an 19 American. 20 I said, why do you want to have a 21 miserable Christmas, turn it into an even worse 22 Christmas for the mothers and the fathers and the 0089 1 children of these POWs? We know where all the 2 POWs are. We're not touching a one of them. And 3 don't put that in the paper. 4 He put it in the paper anyway. All 5 night long I got telephone long distance calls. 6 "Why are you killing my father?" "Why are you 7 killing my brother?" "Why are you killing my 8 uncle?" And so that's why I'm very leery when I 9 start talking about something like this, if a 10 reporter is obsessed with the thought that they've 11 got to prove it. 12 Q My question was a little bit different, 13 Admiral Moorer. And I want to make sure that I 14 state it clearly. It might not have been clearly 15 stated the last time. 16 Normally when you deal with the press, 17 they'll come and they'll interview you, and then 18 they'll go off and do their story, right? 19 A Yes, I suppose. 20 Q Now, normally they don't write their 21 story and then send it to you and say, here's my 22 story that I'm going to publish, I want you to 0090 1 read it before I publish it. That's not normally 2 the way they function, is it? 3 MR. DUNCAN: Object, asked and answered. 4 Define "normal." 5 MR. NYKODYM: Assumes facts not in 6 evidence. 7 BY MR. BAINE: 8 Q Must have been a good question, because 9 they didn't like it. 10 MR. BAINE: Could you read it back, 11 please? 12 MR. DUNCAN: He's already answered your 13 question. You don't like his answer, so you keep 14 asking it to try to get a different answer. 15 That's the problem. 16 MR. BAINE: That is not a fair 17 statement, sir. 18 MR. DUNCAN: The record will speak for 19 itself. 20 MR. BAINE: Could you please read the 21 question back. 22 (Requested portion of record read.) 0091 1 BY MR. BAINE: 2 Q Do you understand the question now? 3 A I think it depends on the definition of 4 "normal." 5 Q Okay. That's a fair point. Let me put 6 the question a little differently. In your 7 experience dealing with reporters, do they usually 8 send you the story -- 9 A Sometimes yes, sometimes no. 10 Q -- before they publish it? 11 A Sometimes yes and sometimes no. It 12 depends on whether it's classified, what kind of 13 situation is surrounding, and so on. So if you 14 can get them -- it depends on how sensitive the 15 information is, whether you make them do that one 16 way or another. 17 Q In other words, you might impose a 18 condition on a reporter and say, we're talking 19 about sensitive material, I want to make sure I 20 see what you're going to publish to make sure 21 you're not going to publish classified 22 information, so you might require that they send 0092 1 you something before they publish it, right? 2 A Yes. And not only that, I make them 3 read it before a recorder. 4 Q Right. Now, in this case you didn't 5 require April Oliver to send you her broadcast or 6 her article before she went with it, did you? 7 A No. 8 Q You didn't make her do that? 9 A No. 10 Q She did it on her own? 11 A Huh? 12 Q She did that on her own, right? 13 A I assume she did. I don't think anybody 14 gave her the paper. 15 Q Now, my question is this. In your 16 experience when you're dealing with reporters, and 17 I'm not talking about cases where you have said to 18 them explicitly, this is sensitive information, 19 you've got to show me your article before you 20 publish it, I'm not talking about those cases 21 where you've specifically required it, but in 22 other cases where you've just given an interview, 0093 1 is it normally your experience that the reporter 2 will send you a script of the broadcast before 3 it's aired? Or is that not normally your 4 experience? 5 MR. BERMAN: I object. It's already 6 been asked and answered. 7 A Look. If I'm recording it, then I'm not 8 concerned about whether they gave me a script or 9 not. If I'm not recording it, it depends -- it's 10 a judgment call on my part, depending on the 11 sensitivity and the timeliness of the subject 12 under discussion. 13 BY MR. BAINE: 14 Q But again, that wasn't exactly my 15 question. I'm not asking when you would require 16 it. I'm saying assuming you didn't require it, 17 for whatever reason you did not say you've got to 18 show me the script beforehand, so it's not a case 19 where you've decided it's necessary. 20 A She gave it to me. 21 Q In cases where you have not decided that 22 it's essential for you to see the script 0094 1 beforehand, in your experience does the reporter 2 then just go ahead and do the story without 3 showing it to you in advance? 4 A Oh, yes. I just described to you when 5 that was done. 6 Q Now, after the broadcast was aired, and 7 there was a fair amount of controversy over it, do 8 you recall that you had contacts with the Defense 9 Department about issuing a statement? Do you 10 remember that? 11 A Yes. 12 Q And did the Defense Department send to 13 you a statement that they suggested that you 14 should issue? 15 A Yes, they had a statement, but I rewrote 16 the statement. And that's when Ms. Oliver showed 17 up with a Mr. Smith, who I had never laid eyes on. 18 So he undertook to help me rewrite the statement, 19 an operation I didn't appreciate, and he changed a 20 word. 21 And I got it in his own handwriting. So 22 I thought that was a very discourteous thing for 0095 1 them to do, to show up without announcing their 2 presence, and then trying to get in the act to 3 help me write my statement. So they were in an 4 opposite position there. She gave me her 5 statement, and then she wanted to also write my 6 statement. 7 MR. BAINE: Let me see if I can mark as 8 an exhibit, the next two exhibits, two statements. 9 And then we'll talk about them for a second. 10 (Exhibit Number D and E was marked for 11 identification and was retained by counsel.) 12 BY MR. BAINE: 13 Q I'll show them to you one at a time, 14 Admiral. First I'll show you Exhibit D and ask 15 you whether -- it's hard to read some of the words 16 because some of the words are crossed out, but is 17 that the statement that the Defense Department 18 sent to you? Now I'm talking about the 19 typewritten words on that page, not the 20 handwritten words, because some of the typewritten 21 words are crossed out. There are some handwritten 22 words added. 0096 1 But the basic typewritten statement, is 2 that the statement that the Defense Department 3 sent to you? I think at the top it even says 4 "Public Affairs." 5 A Yes. 6 Q That's what I wanted to know. And then 7 this has been edited a little bit. And some of 8 the handwriting on here is yours and some is not 9 yours, I take it. And I just wanted to direct 10 your attention to two words. 11 A I don't think any of it was mine. 12 Q Well, take a look at the word "sarin" on 13 the second to last line. I want to ask you 14 whether that word, "sarin," is your handwriting. 15 A None of this is my handwriting. 16 Q You don't think the word "sarin" is in 17 your handwriting? 18 A I don't think so, no. It's print. How 19 the hell -- I don't know how my printing looks. 20 Q Above that there's the word "rumors." 21 It's kind of hard to make out, but there's a word 22 "rumors" just about the word "sarin." 0097 1 A That's right. 2 Q I want to ask you whether that isn't 3 your handwriting or your printing. 4 A That is not my word. But that was one 5 of the things -- you've got another one there. Is 6 this the only one you've got? 7 Q That's the only one I have that looks 8 like that, with the word "rumors" on it. The word 9 "rumors" was Mr. Bacon's word, wasn't it? 10 A Yes. 11 Q Mr. Bacon, the spokesperson at the 12 Pentagon -- 13 A That's right. 14 Q -- suggested that your statement should 15 say that you had heard rumors, right? 16 A And then -- 17 Q Is that right? 18 A Mr. Smith struck out the word "of." 19 Q I think that's on the next statement. 20 I'm going to show you that. We'll get to that in 21 a second. 22 A Let me see that. 0098 1 Q Since we're on it, let me give you this. 2 This is Exhibit E. 3 A See, that's his -- he says "indicating" 4 instead of "of." Hang on. 5 Q But on D here -- 6 A We almost had a wrestling match. He was 7 hovering over me like a dark cloud there. 8 MR. DUNCAN: Could we identify "he"? 9 Are you talking about Mr. Smith? 10 MR. BAINE: I think this is not your 11 time to ask questions, okay? Really. 12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm talking about 13 Mr. Smith. 14 MR. BAINE: I think it's not your time 15 to ask questions. 16 MR. DUNCAN: It's being a document as 17 far as our deposition. "He" is a pronoun. I 18 would like for him to identify it. He just did. 19 It's Mr. Smith. 20 MR. BAINE: I know he did. As 21 Mr. Berman said before, I can clarify things like 22 this, and this is the right way to do it. 0099 1 BY MR. BAINE: 2 Q Just so we're clear, then, on this 3 document, D, it would appear that there are two 4 different handwritings, that there's handwriting, 5 the word "authorized" is in someone's handwriting, 6 and then "however I later learned," et cetera. 7 But the word "rumors" and "sarin" would appear to 8 me to be in separate handwriting. 9 And I guess my question is simply this: 10 Is it your testimony that that's not your 11 handwriting, or that you don't know whether it's 12 in your handwriting, it might be your handwriting? 13 What is your best testimony on that? The word 14 "rumors" and "sarin." 15 A No, they're not my handwriting. 16 Q Okay. 17 A I don't -- I thought mine was bad. But 18 this is worse. 19 Q And it's your testimony that on Exhibit 20 E the word "indicating" is Mr. Smith's 21 handwriting? 22 A That's right. 0100 1 Q Now, did you authorize Ms. Oliver and 2 Mr. Smith to release this Exhibit E? 3 A I gave them that copy. 4 Q And it was okay for you -- it was okay 5 with you for them to release that and use it? 6 A Well, at that point I want to emphasize 7 it was after 9:00 at night, and I was getting sick 8 and tired of sitting there in the lobby of my 9 hotel while these people are asking me. So I told 10 them to take the thing and go. 11 Q But you knew that they were going to 12 release it, right? 13 A I assumed they were. 14 Q You started out with the statement that 15 was sent to you by the Department of Defense. 16 A That's right. 17 Q And you ended up with Exhibit E, and you 18 knew that Exhibit E was what was going to be 19 released? 20 A I assumed they were going to release it. 21 Otherwise they were wasting their time. 22 Q Just a couple -- 0101 1 A Let me just say that to me that was a 2 very unorthodox move, for people to come into your 3 private home and then get to harassing you on a 4 statement like that. That was -- I mean, to me I 5 thought it was an insult, and certainly uncalled 6 for, because Mrs. Oliver had never called me that 7 I didn't give her an appointment. 8 But she didn't bother to do that this 9 time. And so all I wanted to do is to get them 10 out of my house. 11 Q You mentioned to several reporters after 12 the CNN broadcast that you had heard rumors and 13 unconfirmed stories of the use of sarin, did you 14 not, rumors and unconfirmed stories? 15 A Well, you know, every operation that 16 reaches the highlight, even a football game, 17 people have lunch and sit around and discuss the 18 situation and the actions involved. And I think 19 at one time the various types of gas that might be 20 used were discussed, and probably sarin was one of 21 them. 22 What they were calling -- what we were 0102 1 discussing a short time ago, what they were 2 calling poison gas, however, that was dropped, was 3 not debilitating to the point that -- it was not 4 fatal. And the only thing I was referring to was 5 a discussion and a speculation of what could have 6 happened if they had've used more gas than they 7 had in the operation. That's all. And I was 8 calling that a rumor. 9 Now, Mr. Smith, he didn't want to use 10 the word "rumor." And so he wound up sticking in 11 "indicating" instead of "of." 12 Q Let me show you one more article, 13 Admiral. This is an article from the Associated 14 Press on June 9th. 15 MR. JOHNSON: Would this be F? 16 MR. BAINE: What is D? Do we have D? 17 MR. BERMAN: We have D and E. 18 MR. JOHNSON: D and E are those two real 19 short statements. 20 MR. BAINE: Let's mark this as Exhibit 21 F. This is Associated Press, June 9th. 22 (Exhibit Number F was marked for 0103 1 identification and was retained by counsel.) 2 BY MR. BAINE: 3 Q Admiral, I'm going to read this to you 4 and then I'll hand it to you, okay? I've 5 highlighted it. 6 You say -- you're reported to have said 7 to the Associated Press, "'Whether they,'" Special 8 Forces, "'had sarin, you can't prove it by me 9 either way.' Moorer said he couldn't entirely 10 discount the possibility sarin gas was used by 11 Special Forces. 'There were rumors that this gas 12 had been used,' he said. 'But I tell everybody if 13 they want to know, I don't know that they used it, 14 I don't know that they didn't use it.'" 15 That's the highlighted portion. 16 A Well -- 17 Q Is that what you told the Associated 18 Press? 19 A I've covered -- I probably said that 20 over the telephone in an interview. I had 21 interview after interview after interview. What I 22 was trying to -- in all of these replies, simply 0104 1 respond to that one question. And I had already 2 said none. N-O-N-E means zero. And the Secretary 3 of Defense and all the Defense Department says 4 zero. General Abrams says zero. He was in 5 command down there. 6 I mean, I don't know why the question 7 kept coming up, coming up, coming up. People 8 don't understand the English language. And this 9 thing here, by -- there are rumors that this gas 10 has been used. And I said I don't know that they 11 used it and I don't know that they didn't use it. 12 I said, why not ask the people that were down 13 there, they know whether they used it or not. 14 The commander of the operation knew. He 15 said no. And so I don't know what is afoot here, 16 whether the -- CNN or April Oliver or somebody 17 just has a fixed conviction that they're going to 18 prove this thing one way or another. 19 And they had that conviction before they 20 ever talked to me the first time, because the 21 first question she asked me, she jumped right into 22 sarin gas. And you can't answer a question about 0105 1 something as provocative and as all-encompassing 2 as that without getting the background on what the 3 question is all about. 4 And so that resulted in the seven-hour 5 discussion about this one little item, sarin gas. 6 And it involves the Secretary of Defense, and the 7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, all in this document. And 8 they knew no more than I did about it. 9 Q I want to talk about defectors for just 10 a minute. 11 A The what? 12 Q Defectors for just a minute. And then 13 we'll try to wrap it up, okay? One of the issues 14 that came up during your conversation with April 15 Oliver was what the purpose of Operation Tailwind 16 was. And if you take a look at Exhibit A, beta 17 16, page 8, it's CO 1119, down at the bottom of 18 that page. The last comment attributed to you, do 19 you see that, down at the bottom? 20 MR. BERMAN: 1109? 21 MR. BAINE: Yes. 22 MR. DUNCAN: 1119. 0106 1 MR. BAINE: Whatever I said it was, is 2 what it is. 3 BY MR. BAINE: 4 Q Ms. Oliver has just made a comment to 5 you about defectors. She says, "Would, say, if 6 there were a dozen defectors operating in Laos on 7 behalf of the enemy, would that be somebody that 8 the U.S. would want to get rid of and take out?" 9 And your answer, "Yes, I would think so, 10 I mean, I'm sure there were some defectors. There 11 are always defectors. And again, the -- you keep 12 bringing up the mission of this operation. But I 13 think one of the missions probably was to locate 14 these people, evaluate the scope of their activity 15 and who is supporting them, things of that kind," 16 et cetera, and then you go on. 17 I wanted to focus on that one sentence 18 where you said, "I think one of the missions 19 probably was to locate these people." Do you 20 recall saying that to April Oliver? 21 A I don't know that that was their 22 mission. In other words, in the process of 0107 1 executing their mission, however, the defectors, 2 they became visible and were captured. 3 Certainly if they were shooting at you, 4 you're going to shoot back. If they're not 5 shooting at you, they are a very lucrative source 6 of intelligence. And so we always liked to get 7 our hands or defectors during the war to learn 8 from them what they've seen, who they talked to, 9 where they were, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. 10 So there's nothing unusual about that. 11 Q Let's make sure we're clear on our 12 terms. Is there a difference between a defector 13 and a deserter? 14 A Well, a defector is one who in effect 15 joins the other side and assists him. A deserter 16 is one who just wants to run like hell and get out 17 of this war in the first place. So they're two 18 different people. 19 Q So we're talking about defectors, 20 someone who has gone and joined the enemy, okay? 21 A Yes. 22 Q If you come across a defector I take it 0108 1 that you would want to capture the defector, if 2 you could? 3 A Yes. And you would capture him unless 4 he's shooting at you. 5 Q And I take it if you came across a 6 defector and he was running away or you couldn't 7 capture him for some other reason, I take it you 8 would want to eliminate him, to kill him? 9 A If he was shooting -- it depends on 10 whether he was shooting at you or not. I mean, if 11 he was a threat, you would obviously want to 12 remove the threat. But you're covering a very -- 13 you said "come across a defector." Well, the 14 point is that you've got to identify him as a 15 defector, and until you do that, you're not going 16 to shoot at him unless he's shooting back. 17 But as I've come back to the point, the 18 main objective is to capture him and talk to him 19 and find out what he knows in the area. 20 Q And if you can't capture him, then the 21 second objective I take it would be to eliminate 22 him so he cannot continue to assist the enemy? 0109 1 A Depending on what you knew about him. 2 Q If you knew for sure he was a defector. 3 A Huh? A defector, not a deserter. 4 Q You're sure he's a defector, but it's 5 not possible to capture him. Under those 6 circumstances, wouldn't you want to eliminate him 7 so that he could not continue to help the enemy? 8 A Yes, but I would just point out to you 9 that to establish the fact that he was helping the 10 enemy is not an easy thing to do. So I would be 11 very careful that I just didn't -- he wasn't a 12 deserter. A deserter is a coward. A defector is 13 one who has joined the other side. There's a 14 difference. 15 Q After this broadcast was aired and the 16 Time article was published, there was a lot of 17 controversy about those two pieces, was there not? 18 A Probably. 19 Q And a number of people said that the 20 reports of nerve gas and killing defectors weren't 21 accurate, correct? 22 A Yes. 0110 1 Q And after that occurred, are you aware 2 of the fact that CNN and Time published 3 retractions and apologies? 4 A Yes. And anybody that looks into this 5 thing would recommend that. Mr. Abrams, if you 6 read that, said that what had happened is what I 7 had started out with and began with, when I told 8 Ms. Oliver that she was working the problem 9 backwards. She already had a conviction that 10 there was sarin gas around and so on. So then she 11 set about to build a case. 12 The facts are that something like an -- 13 an instance like that, I never have understood the 14 American people, but they're just wild about some 15 kind of situation, they're going to catch the man 16 in uniform in where he's done something, despite 17 the fact he's out there fighting for his country 18 and getting killed. There are people that want to 19 damage the military every chance they have. 20 And so I think that you just have to 21 live with that. That's human nature, I'm afraid. 22 Q You mention the fact that CNN asked 0111 1 Floyd Abrams to conduct this investigation, and 2 you're aware of the fact that he came up with this 3 Abrams report, right? You've read the Abrams 4 report? 5 A Yes, I've got it right -- there's one, 6 two, three, four, five, six, seven words at the 7 conclusion of his -- it says, "CNN should retract 8 the statement and apologize." 9 Q And that was Mr. Abrams's 10 recommendation? 11 A Mr. Abrams's recommendation. And they 12 did that. And I got a nice call from Mr. Johnson, 13 who is the president of CNN, as well as 14 Mr. Turner, who is rather occupied these days with 15 more than he can handle. And they both said they 16 were sorry it happened. 17 Q And you've said publicly, I believe, 18 that it took some courage for them to issue that 19 retraction and apology? 20 A I thought so, and I appreciated it very 21 much. 22 Q And you think they did the right thing? 0112 1 A Sure. 2 Q Do you have any problem with the way CNN 3 and Time have handled this? 4 A No. I don't have any problem with the 5 way they handled it. 6 MR. BAINE: Thank you very much, 7 Admiral. 8 MR. BERMAN: Just one question, Admiral 9 Moorer. 10 MR. SIMMONS: Excuse me. Could you move 11 around so that the video camera picks it up in a 12 correct fashion? 13 MR. BAINE: For one question, why don't 14 we just -- 15 MR. BERMAN: Neither one of us is on 16 camera anyway. 17 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF 18 VAN BUSKIRK 19 BY MR. BERMAN: 20 Q Counsel just asked you whether CNN had 21 not retracted the story. And you have agreed that 22 they did apologize. The retraction, really, did 0113 1 it not take the form of a statement that they did 2 not have enough evidence to confirm that sarin gas 3 had been used or that the mission had been to kill 4 defectors, rather than being an admission that it 5 didn't happen? 6 MR. BAINE: Objection to the form of the 7 question. It speaks for itself. I don't know 8 that the witness's testimony about what it says is 9 worth anything. It is on record. 10 MR. BERMAN: Your objection is on 11 record, Mr. Baine. 12 BY MR. BERMAN: 13 Q Is that your understanding of what 14 happened, Admiral Moorer? 15 A Well, I think that the fact that they 16 retracted the story and apologized indicates that 17 it didn't happen. If it happened I would assume 18 that CNN would be quarreling like hell. 19 MR. BERMAN: Tha