Special Operations.Com
U.S.
Special Operations in Operation Desert Storm
1990
- 1991
Iraq
invaded Kuwait a few hours before dawn on 2 August
1990, easily overrunning the Kuwaiti defense forces
and massing along the Saudi Arabian border. While
the Saudi forces established a thin defensive cordon
along the border, the United States deployed air and
ground forces to the Arabian Peninsula to deter further
Iraqi aggression. The United States Central Command
(CENTCOM) had military responsibility for this area
and prepared to reinforce the Saudi Arabian forces.
Its special operations component, Special Operations
Command Central (SOCCENT), likewise prepared to deploy
and conduct combat search and rescue operations and
other assigned missions.
SOCCENT
personnel deployed to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 10
August 1990 and moved to King Fahd International Airport
(KFIA) on 17 August. Its naval element, the Naval
Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG), arrived in Saudi
Arabia on 10 August 1990 and received its second increment
of personnel on 9 September 1990. Meanwhile, SOCCENT’s
Air Force element, AFSOCCENT established its headquarters
at KFIA on 17 August 1990.
In late August, the 5th Special
Forces Group (Airborne) [5th SFG(A)] deployed
two battalions to King Khalid Military City (KKMC)
and retained the third at KFIA.
Army aviation assets of the 160th
Special Operations Aviation Regiment also deployed
to KKMC.
COALITION
WARFARE
Coalition
warfare (warfighting with forces from more than one
nation) was arguably the most important of all the
SOCCENT missions.
With
Saudi concurrence, SOCCENT’s first coalition warfare
mission was given to NSWTG elements, which deployed
to the Kuwait/Saudi Arabian border on 19 August 1990
to provide close air support and to serve as “trip
wires” in case of an Iraqi invasion. The 5th
SFG(A) began replacing the SEALs on 5 September 1990,
and provided early warning, coalition warfare training,
and communications for close air support.
The
number and type of coalition warfare missions grew
steadily throughout DESERT SHIELD and into the early
part of DESERT STORM. The Saudis requested more Special
Forces teams to train them on the M-60A3 tank, artillery,
vehicle maintenance, and other technical areas. Other
allied forces, as they deployed to the Arabian Peninsula,
wanted Special Forces to provide close air support
and liaison with friendly forces. These increasing
requirements for coalition warfare soon absorbed much
of the 5th SFG(A).
SOF
also trained Saudi naval forces in special warfare.
Some Saudis had completed the BUD/S (Basic Underwater
Demolition/SEAL) training course in Coronado, California,
and their commander had worked with SEALs during Operation
EARNEST WILL. Instruction, which included combat swimming
and leadership training, produced three Saudi SEAL teams.
Other NSWTG personnel trained the Saudi high-speed boat
operators as well as conventional Saudi naval forces.
Another
NSWTG mission was to reconstitute the Kuwaiti navy.
Only two gunboats (Al Sanbouk and Istiglal), some
patrol craft, and a motorized coast guard barge (Sawahil)
had escaped the Iraqis. In September the NSWTG began
training Kuwaiti naval personnel; they used the Sawahil
to train 35 Kuwaiti sailors in naval engineering,
seamanship, and small weapons. To instruct the Kuwaitis
in surface warfare, the NSWTG borrowed rated experts
from the conventional U.S. Navy. Beginning in November,
the Sawahil and its crew conducted joint training
with NSWTG small boats and took part in a combat search
and rescue exercise with the USS Nicholas. During
DESERT STORM, the Sawahil provided an operational
platform for coalition forces, including NSWTG Special
Boat Unit detachments, Kuwaiti patrol boats, and SEALs.
Coalition
warfare training continued until the eve of the ground
war. The Arab forces in the east and north faced formidable
military obstacles along their projected areas of
advance, including multiple Iraqi minefields, “fire
trenches,” and above-ground pipelines.
A Special Forces team worked with a Saudi engineer
battalion to plan for clearing invasion lanes through
two Iraqi minefields and over an above-ground pipeline
inside Kuwait. On 22 February, the Saudi engineers
and U.S. Special
Forces easily cleared six lanes because the Iraqis,
battered for over a month by allied air power, failed
to cover the minefields with artillery fire. In the
north, other SF teams worked with the Saudis and the
Egyptians to create breaches in the minefields for
the passage of their forces. On 25 February, the Egyptians
drove into Kuwait against sporadic resistance. The
Egyptian corps that the 5th SFG(A) teams
supported served as the hinge for CENTCOM’s huge turning
movement. By the night of 26 February, the Egyptians
and their SF advisors had reached their objectives
near Kuwait City.
The
28 February cease fire marked the end of most SOCCENT
coalition warfare activities.
It had been a huge effort, requiring an entire
Special Forces Group, SEALs, Special Boat Units, and
support elements. SF teams accompanied 109 allied
units, from battalion to corps, providing close air
support and liaison between forces. SOF eventually
trained some 30,000 coalition troops in 44 subject
areas.
KUWAITI
RECONSTITUTION AND UNCONVENTIONAL
WARFARE
American
Special Forces units helped to reconstitute a number
of Kuwaiti military forces, both conventional and
unconventional.
As a result of meetings between the SOCCENT
commander, Colonel Jesse Johnson, and the Kuwaiti
Armed Forces Chief of Staff, soldiers from the 5th
SFG(A) began training Kuwaiti soldiers in mid-September
at KKMC. The initial mission was to form a Kuwaiti
SF battalion and a commando brigade, but the training
went so well that the mission grew to include four
additional Kuwaiti infantry brigades. Eventually,
SOF units trained a total of 6,357 Kuwaitis, who formed
an SF battalion, a commando brigade, and the Al-Khulud,
Al-IIaq, Fatah, and Badr infantry brigades. The instruction
included weapons training, tactics, staff procedures,
close air support, anti-armor operations, and nuclear,
chemical and biological defense.
Colonel
Johnson also formed a Special
Planning
Group to conduct specialized unconventional
warfare training for selected members
of the Kuwaiti military. About a month
before the start of the Air War, 17 Kuwaiti
military personnel underwent a rigorous
five-week training course, but when DESERT
STORM’s air attack began on 16 January 1991, the Iraqis
closed the border, limiting infiltration
options. Out of necessity, training then
concentrated on infiltration methods.
From
14 to 20 February 1991, SEALs trained 13 Kuwaitis
for a maritime infiltration onto a beach area south
of Kuwait City. They conducted a dress rehearsal on
21 February 1991 and attempted infiltrating five of
the Kuwaitis on the next day. SEAL swimmer scouts
first reconnoitered the shoreline and then escorted
the Kuwaitis to the pier. Unable to link up with the
friendly forces, the Kuwaitis signaled for extraction
and were picked up about 500 meters from the beach.
The mission was aborted, and the SEALs and Kuwaitis
returned safely. Post-war examination of the beach
revealed undetected beach obstacles and heavier Iraqi
troop dispositions than anticipated.
COMBAT
SEARCH AND RESCUE (CSAR)
During
DESERT SHIELD, SOCCENT established procedures for
CSAR, a mission that planners expected would be of
critical importance, given the projected losses of
coalition aircraft. Before it would launch a CSAR
mission, SOCCENT required a visual parachute sighting
and a voice transmission from the downed pilot, as
well as enemy threat analyses. SOCCENT conducted full
scale CSAR exercises before the Air War started.
support the CSAR mission, SOCCENT established
forward operating bases near the Saudi border, close
to the projected areas of operation.
The
first successful CSAR operation of DESERT STORM occurred
on 21 January 1991. An Iraqi missile had shot down
a Navy F-14, 60 miles northwest of Baghdad, and the
pilot had evaded capture. At 0730, an MH-53J Pave
Low helicopter launched from Ar Ar in a fog so thick
that even when flying at 100 feet, the crew could
not see the ground. They flew 130 miles into Iraq
but could not contact the pilot-their coordinates
for his location were nearly 50 miles off. The helicopter
returned to Ar Ar to refuel and launched again at
1200. With
better coordinates, the crew arrived at the pilot’s
location just as an Iraqi truck was descending upon
him. The helicopter copilot directed the two A-10
fighter planes flying overhead to “smoke the truck.”
The A-10's destroyed the truck with cannon fire, and
the helicopter picked up the pilot.
The
photo below was taken during the actual rescue of
Navy Lt. Devon Jones after his F-14 Tomcat was downed
behind enemy lines.
The
next successful CSAR effort occurred on
23 January when a USAF F-16 pilot bailed
out over the gulf. A Navy SH-60B helicopter
carrying two SEALs launched from the USS
Nicholas and found the pilot six miles off the
Kuwaiti
coast. The
SEALs jumped in the water, attaching a rescue harness
to the pilot; the helicopter crew retrieved all three
and returned to the Nicholas just 35 minutes after
launching. The rescuers reported the mission went
“flawlessly” and described the pilot as “cold, but
in good condition.”
On
17 February 1991, an F-16 went down in southern Iraq
36 miles from the Kuwaiti border. Slightly injured,
the pilot parachuted into a heavy concentration of
Iraqi troops but still established contact with rescue
forces. Two MH-60s from the 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment launched from Raffia,
plucked the pilot from the desert, and returned him
directly to KKMC for medical treatment.
For
a number of reasons, most downed aircrew members were
not rescued. The aircrews needed better survival radios,
and there were not always visual sightings of open parachutes.
Many pilots landed in areas of heavy Iraqi concentrations,
and the Iraqis often beat the SOF rescuers to the downed
airmen.
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