Special Operations.Com
U.S.
Special Operations in Operation Desert Storm
1990
- 1991
(CONTINUED)
PSYOP
AND CA MISSIONS
Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) units contributed
significantly to the success of the Gulf War.
The
PSYOP campaign was directed toward
individual
units and soldiers, and stressed a
single
theme: the coalition’s quarrel was with
Saddam
Hussein and not with the Iraqi people
or
its army. In the early phases, the PSYOP
program
emphasized “peace and brotherhood;” it
later evolved to stronger themes,
and finally turned to surrender appeals
and
threats. Once begun, the PSYOP campaign (in
conjunction with sustained air attacks) steadily eroded
Iraqi morale. Resistance crumbled quickly when the
coalition ground forces attacked. A total of 86,743
Iraqis were taken prisoner, and most of them possessed
surrender leaflets when they capitulated. Some 29
million leaflets were dropped from a variety of aircraft,
with a few more distributed by artillery shells and
balloons. Three AM and two FM ground stations transmitted
“Voice of the Gulf” broadcasts for 72 days, which
interspersed 3,200 news items and 189 PSYOP messages”
among sports and music programs.
The
Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) was created
in February 1991 to provide emergency services for
Kuwait City once it was liberated. Relief operations
began on 28 February 1991 when the first convoy rolled
into the city. The CCATF stayed in Kuwait City for
two months before turning the relief effort over to
the Army Corps of Engineers. During that time it distributed
12.8 million liters of water, 12,500 tons of food,
1,250 tons of medicine, 750 vehicles, and 245 electrical
generators.
CONCLUSIONS
Flexibility
best describes Special Operations
Forces’
contribution to the DESERT STORM
victory.
Initially tasked with providing CSAR,
SOCCENT
steadily expanded its missions as
conventional
commanders gained confidence in
SOF’s
unique abilities and resources. The
coalition
support mission became an important new SOF capability,
used later in operations in Somalia and Bosnia; the
new geopolitical environment had made SOF more relevant. The SCUD hunting mission demonstrated SOF’s ability to deploy
rapidly and start operations with little delay, and
to execute missions of the gravest national importance.
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