Special
Operations.Com
OPERATIONS EARNEST WILL, PRIME
CHANCE, NIMBLE ARCHER, and PRAYING MANTIS
1987-1989
During
Operation EARNEST WILL, the United States ensured
that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships
could safely transit the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq
War. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted Kuwait to
ask the United States in December 1986 to register
11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they
could be escorted by the US Navy. President Reagan
agreed to the Kuwaiti request on 10 March 1987, hoping
it would deter Iranian attacks. Operation EARNEST
WILL was planned by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
under General George B. Crist.
The protection
offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop
Iran, which used mines and small boats to harass the
convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. To stop these
attacks, the U.S. needed surveillance and patrol forces
in the northern Persian Gulf and bases for these patrol
forces. SOF; including Army helicopters and Navy SEALs
and Special Boat Units, had the best trained personnel
and most capable equipment for monitoring hostile
activity, particularly at night when the Iranians
conducted their missions. The Army's special operations
helicopter crews trained to fly and fight at night.
These helicopters were difficult to spot on radar
and were relatively quiet, allowing them to get close
to a target. Shallow-draft naval special warfare patrol
boats could ply waters that had not been swept for
mines.
In late
July 1987, RADM Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the
Middle East Force, requested naval special warfare
assets. Six Mark III Patrol Boats, other Special Boat
assets, and two SEAL platoons deployed in August.
At the same time, two MH-6 and four AH-6 Army special
operations helicopters and 39 men received orders
to the region in a deployment called Operation PRIME
CHANCE I.
The Middle
East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges,
Hercules and Wimbrown WI, into mobile
sea bases. Besides obviating the need to ask for land
bases, the mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern
Persian Gulf to thwart clandestine Iranian mining
and small boat attacks. Each mobile sea base housed
10 small boats, three helicopters, sufficient fuel,
ammunition, equipment, and workshops to support their
operations, and more than 150 men. In October the
mobile sea bases became operational.
In the
interim, SOF operated from various surface vessels.
On 8 August, the helicopters, designated SEABATs,
escorted the third EARNEST WILL convoy and looked
for signs of Iranian mine laying. The patrol boats
began escort missions on 9 September.
It was
not long before SOF showed what they could do. On
the evening of September 21, one MH-6 and two AH-6
helicopters took off from the frigate Jairett (FFG-33)
to track an Iranian ship, the Iran Ajr. The
helicopters observed the Iran Ajr extinguish
its lights and begin laying mines. Receiving permission
to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets,
stopping the ship. As the Iran Ajr5s
crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters
resumed firing until the crew abandoned ship.
RADM
Bernsen then ordered the SEAL platoon from the Guadalcanal
to board the Iran Ajr. Two patrol boats
provided security. Shortly after first light, the
SEALs boarded the ship and found nine mines and various
arming mechanisms. The patrol boats rescued 10 Iranians
in a lifeboat and 13 in life vests floating nearby.
Documents found aboard the ship showed where the Iranians
had laid mines, implicating Iran in mining international
waters. The Iran Ajr was sunk in deep water
on 26 September.
The mobile
sea bases entered service in early October in the
northern Persian Gulf. From these bases, U.S. patrol
craft and helicopters could then monitor Iranian patrol
craft in the northern gulf and deter their attacks.
Within a few days, patrol boat and AH/MH-6 helicopter
personnel had determined the Iranian pattern of activity-the
Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas separation
platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed
toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for
the tankers.
With
this knowledge, SOF sent three of their helicopters
and two patrol craft toward the buoy on the night
of 8 October. The AHIMH-6 helicopters arrived first
and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored
near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight,
the helicopters sank all three boats. The US patrol
boats moved in and picked up five Iranian survivors
who were subsequently repatriated to Iran.
SOF next
saw action on 19 October, three days after an Iranian
Silkworm missile hit the reflagged tanker Sea Isle
City near the oil terminal outside Kuwait City.
Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured
in the missile attack. In Operation NIMBLE ARCHER,
four destroyers shelled the two oil platforms in the
Rostam oil field on 19 October. After the shelling,
a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosive
charges on one of the platforms to destroy it. The
SEALs next boarded and searched a third platform two
miles away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence
purposes.
After
NIMBLE ARCHER, Hercules and Wimbrown VII
continued to operate near Karan Island, within
15 miles of each other, and sent patrol boats and
helicopters on regular patrols. In November 1987,
two MH-60 Blackhawk helicopters arrived to provide
nighttime combat search and rescue. As EARNEST WILL
continued, SOF were rotated on a regular basis; eventually,
some personnel rotated back to the Persian Gulf for
second or even third tours. In 1988, the Army replaced
the AR/MH-6 helicopters and crews with OH-58D Kiowa
helicopters.
On 14
April 1988, approximately 65 miles east of
Bahrain, the US frigate Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)
hit a mine, blowing a 30 by 23 foot hole in its hull.
Ten sailors were injured. The United States struck
back hard, attacking the Iranian frigate Sahalan
and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil
fields on 18 April during Operation FRAYING MANTIS.
After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and
set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward
the platform but was unable to get close enough because
of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked
the platform.
Elsewhere,
U.S. forces wreaked havoc on Iranian vessels, sinking
two and damaging five others. In the northern Persian
Gulf, Iranian forces fired two Silkworm missiles at
the mobile sea barges, but chaff fired by the frigate
Gary decoyed the missiles. Later that day Iranian
F-4 jet fighters and patrol boats approached the mobile
sea bases, but fled when the Gary locked its fire
control radars on them.
Thereafter,
Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically.
On 18 July, Iran accepted the United Nations cease
fire; on 20 August 1988, the Iran-Iraq War ended.
On 16 July, the last AH-6 and MH-6 helicopters departed
from the theater. In December 1988, the Wimbrown
VII entered a Bahraini shipyard for reconversion
to civilian use. The final EARNEST WILL convoy was
run that month. The U.S. Navy had escorted 259
ships in 127 convoys since June 1987. The mobile
sea base Hercules was not withdrawn until June
1989. The remaining SEAL, patrol boats, and helicopters
then returned to the United States.
Special
Operations Forces provided the critical skills necessary
to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian
Gulf and counter Iran's small boats and minelayers.
Their ability to work at night proved vital, since
Iranian units used darkness to hide their actions.
The most important lessons to come out of Operation
EARNEST WILL were the need to have highly trained
Special Operations Forces capable of responding rapidly
to crises anywhere around the globe and the vital
need for interoperability between conventional and
special operations forces. Additionally, based on
EARNEST WILL operational requirements, USSOCOM would
acquire new weapons systems-the patrol coastal ships
and the MARK V Special Operations Craft.
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