specialoperationsguest

Special Operations.Com

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE

Somalia    1992-1995

(continued)

UNOSOM II

On 5 June 1993, General Mohamed Farah Aideed’s Somalia National Alliance forces ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers assigned to UN Operations Somalia (UNOSOM II). The next day, General Joseph P Hoar, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, asked the Joint Staff to send four AC-130 gunships to carry out air strikes against the Somalis. Four AFSOC gunships deployed on 7 June and remained until 14 July, flying a total of 32 interdiction, reconnaissance, and PSYOP missions in support of UNOSOM II.  Eight of those missions were combat sorties flown over the streets of Mogadishu between 11-17 June. As part of the initial strike against Aideed, three gunships flew over Mogadishu on 11 June and used their 105 mm and 4Omm cannons to demolish two weapons storage facilities, an armored tank compound, and Aideed’s “Radio Mogadishu” propaganda station. The next day, two AC-130s obliterated a second radio station and a weapons factory.  On 13, 14, and 17 June, AFSOC crews flew single AC-130 missions that concentrated on destroying weapons storage areas and vehicle compounds belonging to Aideed and his key supporters. During these missions, Air Force special tactics operators provided target guidance. The AC-130 missions and related ground operations together drove Aideed into hiding. The AC-130s redeployed in mid-July, and other SOF later took up the hunt for Aideed.

TASK FORCE RANGER

  Photo taken during the October 3 firefight.

On 22 August 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed the deployment of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by Aldeed supporters upon U.S. and UNOSOM forces and installations. The JSOTF named Task Force (TF) RANGER, was directed to capture Aideed and his key lieutenants and turn them over to UNOSOM II forces. This was a challenging mission, for Aideed had gone underground in June, after several AC-130 air raids and UNOSOM II ground assaults on his strongholds.

The command and control structure of TF RANGER still remains of interest. Per the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the unified commander (in this case, General Hoar, Commander in Chief, U.S.  Central Command) was entitled to organize his forces as he saw fit. General Hoar had the TF RANGER commander, Major General William Garrison, report to him directly.  Thus, TF RANGER did not fall under the UNOSOM II commander, and at all times TF RANGER remained under U.S.  operational command and control. Major General Garrison did, however, coordinate TF RANGER operations with Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, the commander of U.S. Forces Somalia.

By 28 August, the task force had arrived in country, was conducting training exercises, and was setting up the necessary liaison and communications networks. TF RANGER was made up of special operations ground forces, special operations helicopters, Air Force special tactics personnel, and SEALs. During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into Mogadishu, all of which were tactical successes. They ran these missions both by day and at night, and used both helicopters and vehicles to reach their targets. Although Aideed remained free, the cumulative effect of these missions limited his movements.

On 3 October, TF RANGER launched its seventh mission, this time into Aideed’s stronghold to capture two of his key lieutenants. Helicopters carrying assault and blocking forces launched at 1532 from the TF RANGER compound at Mogadishu airport, with a ground convoy moving out three minutes later. By 1542, the ground forces had arrived at the target location, as the blocking force was setting up perimeter positions and the assault force was searching the compound for Aideed’s supporters.

These forces came under increasingly heavy enemy fire, more intense than during previous raids. The assault team had captured 24 Somalis and was about to load them onto the convoy trucks when a MH-60 Blackhawk was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and crashed about three blocks from the target location. Almost immediately, one six-man element of the blocking force, as well as an MH-6 assault helicopter and an MH-60 carrying a 15-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, began rushing to the scene. The MH-6 crew got there first and, amid a firefight, evacuated two wounded soldiers to a military field hospital. Next, the six-man blocking element arrived, followed by the CSAR helicopter. As the last two members of the CSAR team were sliding down the fast ropes, their helicopter was also hit by an RPG, but somehow the pilot kept the helicopter steady while the two reached the ground safely and then nursed the helicopter back to the airport.

The situation only worsened. Ground fire struck two more MH-60s, with one crashing less than a mile to the south of the first downed helicopter. A Somali mob overran this second site and, despite a heroic defense, killed everyone except the pilot, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders of this crash site, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

The other MH-60 was hit broadside by an RPG, but the crew somehow coaxed it to the new port area where they did a controlled crash landing. Meanwhile, after loading the detainees on the ground convoy trucks, the assault and blocking forces moved on foot to the first crash area, passing through heavy fire that wounded a number of soldiers, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter.  They established defensive positions, laid down suppressive fire to hold the Somalis at bay, treated their wounded, and worked to free the pilot’s body from the wreckage.

With the detainees loaded on trucks, the ground convoy force attempted to reach the first crash site from the north. Unable to find it amongst the narrow, winding alleyways, the convoy came under withering small arms and RPG fire. The convoy had to return to base after suffering numerous casualties, losing two 5-ton trucks, and sustaining substantial damage to the other vehicles. On the way back to base, this convoy encountered a second convoy that had left the airport in hopes of reaching the second crash site.

The second group loaded casualties into its vehicles and escorted the first convoy back to base. About this time, the mission quick reaction force (a company of the 10th Mountain Division in support of UNOSOM II) also tried to reach the second crash site. This force too was pinned by Somali fire and required the fire support of two AH-6 helicopters before it could break contact and make its way back to the base.

The TF RANGER soldiers at the first crash site were resupplied from a helicopter that evening. Reinforcements, consisting of Rangers, 10th Mountain Division soldiers, SEALs, and Malaysian armored personnel carriers, finally arrived at 0155 on 4 October.  The combined force worked until dawn to free the pilot’s body, receiving RPG and small arms fire throughout the night.

All the casualties were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers, and the remainder of the force moved out on foot. With the armored personnel carriers providing rolling cover, the run-and-gun movement, known as the “Mogadishu mile,” began at 0542. Somalis continued firing at the convoy, but the Rangers only sustained minor wounds. AH-6 gunships raked the cross streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the Pakistani Stadium at 0630.  Medical personnel gave emergency treatment to the wounded, and all personnel were prepared for movement to the hospital or the airfield.

Thus ended one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the Vietnam War. A total of 16 members of TF RANGER were killed on 3-4 October and 83 wounded (the 10th Mountain Division suffered numerous wounded and one killed). Various estimates placed Somali casualties above 1,000. All told during their time in Somalia, TF RANGER experienced a total of 17 killed in action and 106 wounded. Task force members had to operate in an extremely difficult environment which required constant innovation, flexibility, and sound judgment. The task force had more than held its own against a vastly superior enemy that was battle-hardened from years of civil war and urban fighting.

 

NEXT

Search the entire Special Operations.Com website for the specific information you are looking for. 
Just type in your search terms in the white box provided below, then select "Search". 

Match  and show results 

Having trouble isolating the information you seek? Then check out the SOC Search Tips

List Subscribe   |    Focus Features    | Updates    |   Newsroom   |  Contact Us

 Copyright ©2000 Special Operations.Com